Eknes-Tucker v. Alabama

In Eknes-Tucker v. Governor, of the State of Alabama, 80 F.4th 1205 (11th Cir. 2023), a panel of the Eleventh Circuit reinstated a ban on transgender treatment of children in Alabama:

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This appeal centers around section 4(a)(1)-(3) of Alabama's Vulnerable Child Compassion and Protection Act (the "Act"). Section 4(a)(1)-(3) of the Act states that "no person shall engage in or cause" the prescription or administration of puberty blocking medication or cross-sex hormone treatment to a minor "for the purpose of attempting to alter the appearance of or affirm the minor's perception of his or her gender or sex, if that appearance or perception is inconsistent with the minor's sex." Thus, section 4(a)(1)-(3) makes it a crime in the State of Alabama to take part in providing puberty blockers or cross-sex hormone treatment to a minor for purposes of treating a discordance between the minor's biological sex and sense of gender identity. Shortly after the Act was signed into law, a group of transgender minors, their parents, and other concerned individuals challenged the Act's constitutionality, claiming that it violates the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As part of that lawsuit, the district court issued a preliminary injunction enjoining Alabama from enforcing section 4(a)(1)-(3) of the Act pending trial, having determined that the plaintiffs are substantially likely to succeed on both of the aforementioned claims. Specifically, as to the due process claim, the district court held that there is a constitutional right to "treat [one's] children with transitioning medications subject to medically accepted standards" and that the restrictions of section 4(a)(1)-(3) likely impermissibly infringe upon that constitutional right. As to the equal protection claim, the district court held that section 4(a)(1)-(3) classifies on the basis of sex by classifying on the basis of gender nonconformity and likely amounts to unlawful discrimination under the intermediate scrutiny standard applicable to sex-based classifications. On review, we hold that the district court abused its discretion in issuing this preliminary injunction because it applied the wrong standard of scrutiny. The plaintiffs have not presented any authority that supports the existence of a constitutional right to "treat [one's] children with transitioning medications subject to medically accepted standards." Nor have they shown that section 4(a)(1)-(3) classifies on the basis of sex or any other protected characteristic. Accordingly, section 4(a)(1)-(3) is subject only to rational basis review. Because the district court erred by reviewing the statute under a heightened standard of scrutiny, its determination that the plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits cannot stand. We therefore vacate the preliminary injunction.

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80 F.4th at 1210-11.