Prevalence of homosexuality going down in cultures that become more conservative

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Homosexuality appears to be rare in Orthodox Jews.

According to a paper produced for the Young Historians Conference, "The Roman Empire’s transition from a polytheistic to Christian society corresponded with and likely contributed to its growing intolerance of homosexuality in social mores and written law; this aligns with the general trend that polytheistic societies have freer attitudes toward sexuality than monotheistic ones."[1] See also: Religious Upbringing and Culture Affects Rates of Homosexuality

Some areas of the United States are more liberal/conservative than others which appears to affect the rate of homosexuality in these cultures. Gallup Organization data from 2013: "The percentage of U.S. adults who identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (LGBT) ranges from 1.7% in North Dakota to 5.1% in Hawaii and 10% in the District of Columbia, according to Gallup surveys conducted from June-December 2012. Residents in the District of Columbia were most likely to identify as LGBT (10%). Among states, the highest percentage was in Hawaii (5.1%) and the lowest in North Dakota (1.7%), but all states are within two percentage points of the nationwide average of 3.5%."[2]

The Republicans in the United States are more conservative than the Democrats and there has been a recent shift toward Democrats leaving their political party and becoming Republicans (See: U.S. Party Preferences Evenly Split in 2022 After Shift to GOP, Gallup Organization, 2023). In addition, "More and more Americans are moving from Democratic-leaning blue states to Republican-voting red ones".[3] In the United States, more anti-LGBTQ laws are being passed in Republican-controlled states.[4]

Russia opposes the homosexual agenda and has passed laws prohibiting the promotion of homosexuality and limiting abortion, and Dem politicians publicly hate Russia for its recent anti-homosexuality propagation legislation.[5]

The gay 1920s in the USA vs. the very ungay 1930s in the USA

The rate of homosexuality in a culture can change over time.[6] [7]
Destitute mother during the Great Depression.

The History.com article indicates:

“ On a Friday night in February 1926, a crowd of some 1,500 packed the Renaissance Casino in New York City’s Harlem neighborhood for the 58th masquerade and civil ball of Hamilton Lodge.

Nearly half of those attending the event, reported the New York Age, appeared to be “men of the class generally known as ‘fairies,’ and many Bohemians from the Greenwich Village section who...in their gorgeous evening gowns, wigs and powdered faces were hard to distinguish from many of the women.”

The tradition of masquerade and civil balls, more commonly known as drag balls, had begun back in 1869 within Hamilton Lodge, a black fraternal organization in Harlem. By the mid-1920s, at the height of the Prohibition era, they were attracting as many as 7,000 people of various races and social classes—gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender and straight alike...

With the end of Prohibition, the onset of the Depression and the coming of World War II, LGBTQ culture and community began to fall out of favor. As Chauncey writes, a backlash began in the 1930s, as “part of a wider Depression-era condemnation of the cultural experimentation of the 20's, which many blamed for the economic collapse.”

The sale of liquor was legal again, but newly enforced laws and regulations prohibited restaurants and bars from hiring gay employees or even serving gay patrons. In the mid- to late ‘30s, Heap points out, a wave of sensationalized sex crimes “provoked hysteria about sex criminals, who were often—in the mind of the public and in the mind of authorities—equated with gay men.”

This not only discouraged gay men from participating in public life, but also “made homosexuality seem more dangerous to the average American.”

By the post-World War II era, a larger cultural shift toward earlier marriage and suburban living, the advent of TV and the anti-homosexuality crusades championed by Joseph McCarthy would help push the flowering of gay culture represented by the Pansy Craze firmly into the nation’s rear-view mirror.

Drag balls, and the spirit of freedom and exuberance they represented, never went away entirely—but it would be decades before LGBTQ life would flourish so publicly again.[8]

”

See also: Evangelical churches see growth during economic downturns and times of crises. Atheism faces a longstanding trend of global market share loss

Conservative religiosity and the prevalence of homosexuality. Conservative religious and population growth rates

See also: Desecularization and European desecularization in the 21st century and United States, irreligion vs. religion and demographics and Atheism and fertility rates

As noted above, according to a paper produced for the Young Historians Conference, "The Roman Empire’s transition from a polytheistic to Christian society corresponded with and likely contributed to its growing intolerance of homosexuality in social mores and written law; this aligns with the general trend that polytheistic societies have freer attitudes toward sexuality than monotheistic ones."[9] See also: Religious Upbringing and Culture Affects Rates of Homosexuality

One's religious/nonreligious upbringing does affect the odds that one will become a homosexual (For example, homosexuality is rare among the Amish and Orthodox Jews). See: Religious Upbringing and Culture Affects Rates of Homosexuality

Steve Turley

Dr. Steve Turley wrote:

“ According to University of London scholar Eric Kaufmann’s detailed study on global demographic trends, we are in the early stages of nothing less than a demographic revolution. In Kaufmann’s words, "religious fundamentalists are on course to take over the world." There is a significant demographic deficit between secularists and conservative religionists. For example, in the U.S., while self-identified non-religionist women averaged only 1.5 children per couple in 2002, conservative evangelical women averaged 2.5 children, representing a 28 percent fertility edge. Kaufmann notes that this demographic deficit has dramatic effects over time. In a population evenly divided, these numbers indicate that conservative evangelicals would increase from 50 to 62.5 percent of the population in a single generation. In two generations, their number would increase to 73.5 percent, and over the course of 200 years, they would represent 99.4 percent. The Amish and Mormons provide contemporary illustrations of the compound effect of endogamous growth. The Amish double in population every twenty years, and projections have the Amish numbering over a million in the U.S. and Canada in just a few decades. Since 1830, Mormon growth has averaged 40 percent per decade, which means that by 2080, there may be as many as 267 million Mormons in the world, making them by 2100 anywhere from one to six percent of the world’s population.

In Europe, immigration is making the continent more religiously conservative, not less; in fact, London and Paris are some of the most religiously dense areas within their respective populations. In Britain, for example, Ultra-Orthodox or Haredi Jews constitute only 17 percent of the Jewish population but account for 75 percent of Jewish births. And in Israel, Haredi schoolchildren have gone from comprising a few percent to nearly a third of all Jewish pupils in a matter of five decades, and are poised to represent the majority of the Jewish population by 2050. Since 1970, charismatic Christians in Europe have expanded steadily at a rate of 4 percent per year, in step with Muslim growth. Currently, Laestadian Lutherans in Finland and Holland’s Orthodox Calvinists have a fertility advantage over their wider secular populations of 4:1 and 2:1 respectively.

In contrast, Kaufmann’s data projects that secularists, who consistently exemplify a low fertility rate of around 1.5 (significantly below the replacement level of 2.1), will begin a steady decline after 2030 to a mere 14 to 15 percent of the American population. Similar projections apply to Europe as well. Kaufmann thus appears to have identified what he calls "the soft underbelly of secularism," namely, demography. This is because secular liberalism entails its own “demographic contradiction,” the affirmation of the sovereign individual devoid of the restraints of classical moral structures necessitates the freedom not to reproduce. The link between sex and procreation having been broken, modernist reproduction translates into mere personal preference. It thus turns out that the radical individualism so celebrated and revered by contemporary secular propagandists is in fact the agent by which their ideology implodes.[10]

”
"I argue that 97% of the world's population growth is taking place in the developing world, where 95% of people are religious."- Eric Kaufmann[11]

On July 24, 2019, due to religious immigration to the United States and the higher fertility rate of religious people, Eric Kaufmann wrote in an article entitled Why Is Secularization Likely to Stall in America by 2050? A Response to Laurie DeRose: "Overall, the picture suggests that the U.S. will continue to secularize in the coming decades. However, a combination of religious immigration, immigrant religious retention, slowing religious decline due to a rising prevalence of believers among the affiliated, and higher native religious birth rates will result in a plateauing of secularizing trends by mid-century." [12]

Eric Kaufmann wrote in his academic paper Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century

“ Today, values play a more important role in fertility behaviour, throwing the contrast between religious pronatalism and secular low-fertility individualism into relief. Over several generations, this process can lead to significant social and political changes. Early Christianity’s exponential rise during its gestation period from 30 to 300 A.D. has been traced to its superior demography (fertility, mortality and female sex ratio), which maintained a rate of growth similar to contemporary Mormonism: 40 percent per decade. For Christians, this led to a jump from 40 converts to 6 million inside three centuries. (Stark 1996) Christianity became the religion of an empire and a continent. In the United States, conservative sects increased their share of white Protestantism from roughly a third to two-thirds during the twentieth century – largely on the back of higher fertility. On the other hand, sects like the Shakers and Cathars, which permitted entry only through conversion, rapidly faded from the scene. Demographic religious revival is a medium and long-term phenomenon, but awareness of shifting population composition can lead to political soul-searching and instability well before the full impact of demographic change takes place. This is clear in ethnically-tense societies like Israel, Northern Ireland, Bosnia, Lebanon, Cote D’Ivoire or Assam.[13] ”

European desecularization in the 21st century

See: European desecularization in the 21st century

Austria's census data permits demographers to perform analysis which indicates the secular population plateauing in Europe by 2050, or as early as 2021.[14]

For more information, please see: European desecularization in the 21st century

American desecularization in the 21st century

See: United States, irreligion vs. religion and demographics

Current religious demography scholarship suggest that the relatively low fertility of secular Americans and the religiosity of the immigrant inflow provide a countervailing force that will cause the secularization process within the total population to plateau before 2043.

This represents an important theoretical point in that demography permits society to become more religious even as individuals tend to become less religious over time.[15]

For more information, please see: United States, irreligion vs. religion and demographics

2023: Gallup poll: Fewer in U.S. say same-sex relations morally acceptable

Political conservatives and fertility rates vs. political liberals and fertility rates. American Conservatives and anti-LGBTQ backlash

See also: Fertility rates of conservatives vs. liberals in the United States

Newsweek's 2023 article Major Brands Silent About Pride Month After Backlash states:

“ Brands that have recently been the subject of backlash online have remained silent on social media for the first day of LGBTQ+ Pride Month—though they may yet post on their social media channels as June progresses.

The North Face, Lego and Miller Lite carried supportive messages on June 1, 2022, but did not do so this year. All three brands have been accused of going "woke" over recent marketing campaigns.

Other brands—such as Target, Bud Light and Adidas—have yet to post, despite doing so later in June last year. Of the accounts reviewed by Newsweek, only Kohl's and PetSmart had defied critics so far in posting Pride Month content.

Companies are facing a rising tide of outrage over advertising campaigns that are viewed by some as appealing to progressive causes, and the calls for boycotts that many have faced in recent months speak to a wider culture war about the acceptance of LGBTQ+ individuals in public life.[16]

”

The 2023 article Anti-LGBTQ backlash rattles US pride events indicates:

“ A spike in anti-LGBTQ rhetoric and threats has taken a heavy toll on pride celebrations in the United States this year, organizers say — especially in states where politicians want to curtail rights.

This month’s celebrations in Houston, the largest pride event in conservative Texas, have been scaled back due to rising insurance and security costs, as well as concerns over soaring temperatures and capacity.

“We made the decision to cancel the festival this year,” said Kendra Walker, president of Pride Houston 365, downgrading the plans to a parade.

The change was first announced in January as Texas lawmakers prepared bills restricting gender-affirming health care and drag performances. Now, pride planners across the US and Canada say they are facing higher bills because of anti-LGBTQ disinformation and hate...

Florida has become a hotspot, with Governor Ron DeSantis, a Republican running for president, signing bills this spring banning youngsters from drag shows and restricting how they learn about the LGBTQ community.[17]

”
Donald Trump

The article The Conservative Fertility Advantage by the Institute for Family Institute indicates:

“ Data about fertility rates is only available for around 600 of the largest counties, thus many small, rural counties are excluded. But the relationship shown here is clear: President Trump did better in counties with higher birth rates, and the difference is fairly large, with the most pro-Biden counties having total fertility rates almost 25% lower than the most pro-Trump counties. If anything, this effect is understated, since the most pro-Trump counties were small, rural counties that usually have even higher birth rates and are excluded from this analysis. Indeed, Yi Fuxian at the University of Wisconsin showed that the relationship between voting and fertility is even more pronounced when we look at fertility rates and state voting trends...

As can be seen, the Republican fertility advantage is relatively stable across elections. It even shows up in a panel model, suggesting that as counties become more Republican, their fertility rates tend to rise relative to the national average. The use of state controls (and some robustness tests I ran in large states with many counties) suggests this effect isn’t driven by unique features of states: within Red states or Blue states, and controlling for county racial and ethnic characteristics and population densities, Republican counties have higher birth rates.

This is particularly astonishing given that Democrats perform very well in counties with many Hispanic and black voters, who have higher birth rates than non-Hispanic white Americans (and indeed, the more non-Hispanic whites in a county, the lower its birth rate in my models). The relationship is also unchanged if the sample is restricted to only very-high-density counties, such as those representing the center of major cities. In other words, the Republican “fertility advantage” does not arise from more rural counties with higher birth rates, and it exists despite the fact that much of the Democratic Party’s electoral base is among racial and ethnic groups with higher birth rates in general. The split I identify isn’t about race or urbanization or region of the country: it’s about family. Within racial- or ethnic-groups, within states or urbanized areas, the more conservative areas tend to have more babies.

In the 1970s, there was little or no difference in fertility rates between liberal and conservative women. But by the 2000s, completed fertility for liberal women had declined markedly below that of conservative women. In recent years, the gap in childbearing between young conservative and liberal women has really opened, which may portend a bigger gap in the coming years...

Before the 1990s, fertility differences by ideology were small. Women over age 45 had no difference in completed fertility, and women of all ages (but with controls for year of age) had only a small difference. There was, however, already a difference in ideology: conservative women reported a childbearing ideal about 0.12 kids higher than liberal women, which is a small, but significant, difference.

For the period after 1995, however, gaps grow. Conservative women over age 45 had about 0.25 more children on average than their liberal peers, an effect which in fact shows up throughout the age distribution once the “over 45” restriction is relaxed. The gap in fertility ideals grew larger as well.

In other words, the “family gap” between conservatives and liberals is a new phenomenon. It’s only in the last two decades that conservatives began to reap a fertility advantage. But it’s not just a fertility difference: if controls for marital status are removed, the conservative fertility advantage gets even bigger. That is, conservatives are simply more likely to be married than liberals. Thus, there is a conservative-liberal gap on marriage and separately on odds of childbearing conditional upon marital status...

Finally, this conservative fertility advantage probably will not give conservatives some inevitable long-term political edge. Fertility rates are falling for conservatives just as much as liberals. Given the size of the fertility differential between conservatives and liberals, it doesn’t actually take a large amount of ideology switching to offset this higher birth rate. Thus, while conservatives may wish that their fertility advantage could afford a durable political majority, that hope is probably just as fleeting as the now-silly-sounding claims of progressives a decade ago that immigration would create a durable Democratic majority. That’s because, at least right now, conservative parents have not been sufficiently successful in keeping their kids in the fold.[18]

”

American culture war, demographics and expected tipping point after 2020

See also: Culture war and American atheism and liberal and Atheism and fertility rates

The Birkbeck College, University of London professor Eric Kaufmann wrote in his 2010 book Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth? concerning America:

“ High evangelical fertility rates more than compensated for losses to liberal Protestant sects during the twentieth century. In recent decades, white secularism has surged, but Latino and Asian religious immigration has taken up the slack, keeping secularism at bay. Across denominations, the fertility advantage of religious fundamentalists of all colours is significant and growing. After 2020, their demographic weight will begin to tip the balance in the culture wars towards the conservative side, ramping up pressure on hot-button issues such as abortion. By the end of the century, three quarters of America may be pro-life. Their activism will leap over the borders of the 'Redeemer Nation' to evangelize the world. Already, the rise of the World Congress of Families has launched a global religious right, its arms stretching across the bloody lines of the War on Terror to embrace the entire Abrahamic family.[19] ”


An unborn child in the womb. Liberals believe that the unborn child has no right to life.

The rise of homeschooling and private religious schools in the United States that teaches homosexuality is a sin

Many public schools in the United States attempt to indoctrinate children into accepting LGBTQ ideology, but public schooling is going down in prevalence.

  • In 2012, in the United States, there were around 1.8 million homeschool students, and in 2021, that number is expected to be above 5 million.[20]

American colleges, which often indoctrinate into LGBT ideology, are closing more and more due to financial problems, high tuition and lower enrollment

Videos:

Leftist Colleges Are imploding as Conservative Colleges surge

See also

References

  1. ↑ Christianity's Influence on Attitudes toward Homosexuality in the Roman Empire by Jennie Jiang
  2. ↑ LGBT Percentage Highest in D.C., Lowest in North Dakota, Gallup Organization, 2013
  3. ↑ Americans are increasingly moving to red, Republican-leaning states – where life is cheaper, but people also die younger, The Conversation website, 2023
  4. ↑ Anti-LGBTQ backlash rattles US pride events, Breitbart, 2023
  5. ↑ Democrat Congressman Jaime Raskin: "Moscow ... is a world center of antifeminist, antigay, anti-trans hatred, as well as the homeland of replacement theory for export. In supporting Ukraine, we are opposing these fascist views, and supporting the urgent principles of democratic pluralism." [1].
  6. ↑ Christianity's Influence on Attitudes toward Homosexuality in the Roman Empire by Jennie Jiang
  7. ↑ How Gay Culture Blossomed During the Roaring Twenties, History.com, 2019
  8. ↑ How Gay Culture Blossomed During the Roaring Twenties, History.com, 2019
  9. ↑ Christianity's Influence on Attitudes toward Homosexuality in the Roman Empire by Jennie Jiang
  10. ↑ (source: Text below the YouTube video Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth and the text was written by Dr. Steven Turley).
  11. ↑ London: A Rising Island of Religion in a Secular Sea by Eric Kaufmann, Huffington Post, 2012
  12. ↑ Why Is Secularization Likely to Stall in America by 2050? A Response to Laurie DeRose by Eric Kaufmann July 24, 2019
  13. ↑ Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century by Eric Kaufmann, Belfer Center, Harvard University/Birkbeck College, University of London (PDF)
  14. ↑ Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century by Eric Kaufmann
  15. ↑ Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043, Journal for the Sientific Study of Religion, vol. 49, no. 2 (June) 2010, Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon,
  16. ↑ Major Brands Silent About Pride Month After Backlash], Newsweek, 2023
  17. ↑ Anti-LGBTQ backlash rattles US pride events, Breitbart, 2023
  18. ↑ [The Conservative Fertility Advantage by the Institute for Family Institute
  19. ↑ Why is the year 2020 a key year for Christian creationists and pro-lifers?
  20. ↑ As the pandemic continues, more families turning to homeschooling, Fox News, 2021
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