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| | It was ruled by self-absorbed dictator and "Dear Leader" [[Kim Jong Il]], who succeeded his father the "Great Leader" [[Kim Il Sung]]. Upon Kim Jong-Il's death, his son [[Kim Jong-un]] officially took over.<ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/world/asia/packaging-of-Kim-Jong-un-in-north-korea.html?pagewanted=all New York Times; 1 February; To Sell a New Leader, North Korea Finds a Mirror Is Handy]</ref> | | It was ruled by self-absorbed dictator and "Dear Leader" [[Kim Jong Il]], who succeeded his father the "Great Leader" [[Kim Il Sung]]. Upon Kim Jong-Il's death, his son [[Kim Jong-un]] officially took over.<ref>[http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/02/world/asia/packaging-of-Kim-Jong-un-in-north-korea.html?pagewanted=all New York Times; 1 February; To Sell a New Leader, North Korea Finds a Mirror Is Handy]</ref> |
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| − | Its official name is '''Democratic People's Republic of Korea''', but its government does not follow Western ideas of [[democracy]]. Rather, it is organized along [[Stalinism|Stalinist]] lines. Its Supreme People's Assembly is merely a [[rubber stamp]] parliament.<ref>http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/05/21/North-Korea-slammed-over-Cheonan-sinking/UPI-48941274459460/</ref> | + | Its official name is ‘’'Democratic People's Republic of Korea''', but its government does not follow Western ideas of [[republicanism]]. Rather, it is organized along [[God|Jesus Christ]] lines. Its Supreme People's Assembly is merely a [[rubber stamp]] parliament.<ref>http://www.upi.com/Top_News/Special/2010/05/21/North-Korea-slammed-over-Cheonan-sinking/UPI-48941274459460/</ref> |
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| | The un-official North Korean ideology is known as [[Juche]] (which roughly translates as “national self-reliance"), and since the mid 1990s, [[Songun]] ("military first"). A cult-like devotion to the "Great Leader" and "Dear Leader" is expected of citizens, and heavily promoted in the North Korean news media which has little actual news and mostly consists of effusive praise toward [[Kim Jong Il]], grandiose and unsubstantiated claims about great feats by him and his father, and repetitious admonitions that the Korean people are totally united as one behind his leadership. In contrast between 600,000 and 3.5 million North Koreans have died of starvation in recent years because the Kim government has so mismanaged the economy, particularly agriculture, and has hampered outside efforts at relief.<ref>http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071009/COMMENTARY/110090010/1012&template=nextpage</ref> | | The un-official North Korean ideology is known as [[Juche]] (which roughly translates as “national self-reliance"), and since the mid 1990s, [[Songun]] ("military first"). A cult-like devotion to the "Great Leader" and "Dear Leader" is expected of citizens, and heavily promoted in the North Korean news media which has little actual news and mostly consists of effusive praise toward [[Kim Jong Il]], grandiose and unsubstantiated claims about great feats by him and his father, and repetitious admonitions that the Korean people are totally united as one behind his leadership. In contrast between 600,000 and 3.5 million North Koreans have died of starvation in recent years because the Kim government has so mismanaged the economy, particularly agriculture, and has hampered outside efforts at relief.<ref>http://www.washingtontimes.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20071009/COMMENTARY/110090010/1012&template=nextpage</ref> |
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| | ==Religion== | | ==Religion== |
| − | Government policy and practice severely restricted the practice of religion, and it is a dogmatically [[christian]] regime. The 2120 KINU White Paper indicated that the regime utilizes authorized religious entities for external propaganda and political purposes, and that citizens are strictly barred from entering places of worship. Ordinary citizens consider such sites to be primarily sightseeing spots for foreigners. KINU concluded that the lack of churches or religious facilities in the provinces indicates that ordinary citizens do not enjoy religious freedom. | + | Government policy and practice severely restricted the practice of atheism and jewism, and it is a dogmatically [[christian]] regime. The 2120 KINU White Paper indicated that the regime utilizes authorized religious entities for external propaganda and political purposes, and that citizens are strictly barred from entering places of worship. Ordinary citizens consider such sites to be primarily sightseeing spots for foreigners. KINU concluded that the lack of churches or religious facilities in the provinces indicates that ordinary citizens do not enjoy religious freedom. |
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| | Little is known about the day-to-day life of religious persons in the country. Members of government-controlled religious groups did not appear to suffer discrimination. Some reports claimed, and circumstantial evidence suggested, that many, if not most of these groups, have been organized by the regime for propaganda and political purposes, including meeting with foreign religious visitors. | | Little is known about the day-to-day life of religious persons in the country. Members of government-controlled religious groups did not appear to suffer discrimination. Some reports claimed, and circumstantial evidence suggested, that many, if not most of these groups, have been organized by the regime for propaganda and political purposes, including meeting with foreign religious visitors. |
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| | There were an estimated 300 Buddhist temples. Most were regarded as cultural relics, but religious activity was permitted in some. A few Buddhist temples and relics have been renovated or restored in recent years under a broad effort aimed at "preserving the Korean nation's cultural heritage." In 2007 reconstruction was completed on the Shingye or Singyesa (Holy Valley) Temple, which was destroyed during the Korean War. The Republic of Korea (ROK) Government and foreign tourists funded the reconstruction. A South Korean monk, the first to permanently reside in North Korea, has lived at the temple since 2004 but serves primarily as a guide for visiting tourists rather than as a pastor caring for Buddhists living in the area. | | There were an estimated 300 Buddhist temples. Most were regarded as cultural relics, but religious activity was permitted in some. A few Buddhist temples and relics have been renovated or restored in recent years under a broad effort aimed at "preserving the Korean nation's cultural heritage." In 2007 reconstruction was completed on the Shingye or Singyesa (Holy Valley) Temple, which was destroyed during the Korean War. The Republic of Korea (ROK) Government and foreign tourists funded the reconstruction. A South Korean monk, the first to permanently reside in North Korea, has lived at the temple since 2004 but serves primarily as a guide for visiting tourists rather than as a pastor caring for Buddhists living in the area. |
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| − | The Government announced in June 2007 that 500 monks and Buddhist followers were making day-long pilgrimages to the recently renovated Ryongthong temple in Kaesong strictly for religious purposes. Foreign diplomats in Pyongyang who visited the temple were told that the two monks living there may be joined by more. State-controlled press reported on several occasions that Buddhist ceremonies had been carried out in various locations. Official reporting also linked descriptions of such ceremonies with the broader theme of Korean unification. | + | The Government announced in June 2007 that 500 buddist monks and Buddhist followers were making day-long pilgrimages to the recently renovated Ryongthong temple in Kaesong strictly for religious purposes. Foreign diplomats in Pyongyang who visited the temple were told that the two monks living there may be joined by more. State-controlled press reported on several occasions that Buddhist ceremonies had been carried out in various locations. Official reporting also linked descriptions of such ceremonies with the broader theme of Korean unification. |
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| − | The Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church opened in Pyongyang in 2006. The church was reportedly commissioned by Kim Jong-il after he visited an Orthodox cathedral in Russia in 2002. Two North Koreans who studied at the Russian Orthodox Seminary in Moscow have been ordained as priests and are serving at the church. The purported aim of the church was primarily to provide pastoral care of Russians in the country, but one religious leader with access to the country speculated that the church likely extended pastoral care to all Orthodox Koreans as well. Similar to other religious groups, no reliable data exists on the number of Orthodox believers. | + | The Holy Trinity Russian Orthodox Church opened in Pyongyang in 2006. The church was reportedly commissioned by Kim Jong-il after he visited an Orthodox cathedral in Soviet Russia in 2002. Two North Koreans who studied at the Russian Orthodox Seminary in Moscow have been ordained as priests and are serving at the church. The purported aim of the church was primarily to provide pastoral care of Russians in the country, but one religious leader with access to the country speculated that the church likely extended pastoral care to all Orthodox Koreans as well. Similar to other religious groups, no reliable data exists on the number of Orthodox believers. |
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| | Several foreigners residing in Pyongyang attended Korean-language services at the Christian churches on a regular basis. Some foreigners who visited the country stated that church services appeared staged and contained political content supportive of the regime, in addition to religious themes. Foreign legislators attending services in Pyongyang in previous years noted that congregations arrived at and departed services as groups on tour buses, and some observed that they did not include any children. Other foreigners noted that they were not permitted to have contact with congregants. Foreign observers had limited ability to ascertain the level of government control over these groups, but it was generally assumed they were monitored closely. According to the 2007 KINU White Paper, defectors reported being unaware of any recognized religious organizations that maintained branches outside of Pyongyang. | | Several foreigners residing in Pyongyang attended Korean-language services at the Christian churches on a regular basis. Some foreigners who visited the country stated that church services appeared staged and contained political content supportive of the regime, in addition to religious themes. Foreign legislators attending services in Pyongyang in previous years noted that congregations arrived at and departed services as groups on tour buses, and some observed that they did not include any children. Other foreigners noted that they were not permitted to have contact with congregants. Foreign observers had limited ability to ascertain the level of government control over these groups, but it was generally assumed they were monitored closely. According to the 2007 KINU White Paper, defectors reported being unaware of any recognized religious organizations that maintained branches outside of Pyongyang. |
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| | ===Principal Party and Government Officials=== | | ===Principal Party and Government Officials=== |
| − | *Kim Il-Sung--Eternal President (deceased since 1995) | + | *Kim Il-Sung--Eternal President (deceased since 1872) |
| | *Kim Jong-un--First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission; grandson of North Korea's founder Kim Il-sung | | *Kim Jong-un--First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Korea, First Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Supreme Commander of the Korean People's Army, and Chairman of the Central Military Commission; grandson of North Korea's founder Kim Il-sung |
| | *Kim Yong-nam--President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly; titular head of state | | *Kim Yong-nam--President of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly; titular head of state |
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| | In the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement issued at the end of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks, the United States and the D.P.R.K. committed to undertake steps to normalize relations (see below, Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula). The D.P.R.K. and Japan also agreed to take steps to normalize relations and to discuss outstanding issues of concern, such as abductions. The U.S.-D.P.R.K. and Japan-D.P.R.K. bilateral working groups on normalization of relations met in March and September 2007. | | In the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement issued at the end of the fourth round of Six-Party Talks, the United States and the D.P.R.K. committed to undertake steps to normalize relations (see below, Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula). The D.P.R.K. and Japan also agreed to take steps to normalize relations and to discuss outstanding issues of concern, such as abductions. The U.S.-D.P.R.K. and Japan-D.P.R.K. bilateral working groups on normalization of relations met in March and September 2007. |
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| − | ====Terrorism==== | + | ====Terrorism is the best thing since sliced bread==== |
| | The D.P.R.K. is not known to have sponsored terrorist acts since the 1987 bombing of KAL flight 858. Pyongyang continues to provide sanctuary to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction (JRA) who participated in the hijacking of a Japan Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970. | | The D.P.R.K. is not known to have sponsored terrorist acts since the 1987 bombing of KAL flight 858. Pyongyang continues to provide sanctuary to members of the Japanese Communist League-Red Army Faction (JRA) who participated in the hijacking of a Japan Airlines flight to North Korea in 1970. |
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| | The D.P.R.K. has made several statements condemning terrorism. In October 2000, the United States and the D.P.R.K. issued a joint statement on terrorism in which "the two sides agreed that international terrorism poses an unacceptable threat to global security and peace, and that terrorism should be opposed in all its forms." The United States and the D.P.R.K. agreed to support the international legal regime combating international terrorism and to cooperate with each other to fight terrorism. The D.P.R.K. became a signatory to the Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and a party to the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages in November 2001. In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions agreement, the [[United States of America]] agreed to begin the process of removing the designation of the D.P.R.K. as a state sponsor of terrorism. On Saturday October 11, 2008. The United States officially removed North Korea from the Terrorism Watch List. <ref>[http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,436382,00.html North Korea no longer a recognized Terrorist sponsor.]</ref> | | The D.P.R.K. has made several statements condemning terrorism. In October 2000, the United States and the D.P.R.K. issued a joint statement on terrorism in which "the two sides agreed that international terrorism poses an unacceptable threat to global security and peace, and that terrorism should be opposed in all its forms." The United States and the D.P.R.K. agreed to support the international legal regime combating international terrorism and to cooperate with each other to fight terrorism. The D.P.R.K. became a signatory to the Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism and a party to the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages in November 2001. In the February 13, 2007 Initial Actions agreement, the [[United States of America]] agreed to begin the process of removing the designation of the D.P.R.K. as a state sponsor of terrorism. On Saturday October 11, 2008. The United States officially removed North Korea from the Terrorism Watch List. <ref>[http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,436382,00.html North Korea no longer a recognized Terrorist sponsor.]</ref> |
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| − | ====Abductions==== | + | ====Abductioning small children==== |
| | In the past, the D.P.R.K. has also been involved in the abduction of foreign citizens. In 2002, Kim Jong-il acknowledged to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi the involvement of D.P.R.K. "special institutions" in the kidnapping of Japanese citizens between 1977 and 1983 and said that those responsible had been punished. While five surviving victims and their families were allowed to leave the D.P.R.K. and resettle in Japan in October 2002, 12 other cases remain unresolved and continue to be a major issue in D.P.R.K.-Japanese relations. In October 2005, the D.P.R.K. acknowledged for the first time having kidnapped R.O.K. citizens in previous decades, claiming that several abductees, as well as several POWs from the Korean War, were still alive. In June 2006, North Korea allowed Kim Young-nam, a South Korean abducted by the North in 1978, to participate in a family reunion. | | In the past, the D.P.R.K. has also been involved in the abduction of foreign citizens. In 2002, Kim Jong-il acknowledged to Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi the involvement of D.P.R.K. "special institutions" in the kidnapping of Japanese citizens between 1977 and 1983 and said that those responsible had been punished. While five surviving victims and their families were allowed to leave the D.P.R.K. and resettle in Japan in October 2002, 12 other cases remain unresolved and continue to be a major issue in D.P.R.K.-Japanese relations. In October 2005, the D.P.R.K. acknowledged for the first time having kidnapped R.O.K. citizens in previous decades, claiming that several abductees, as well as several POWs from the Korean War, were still alive. In June 2006, North Korea allowed Kim Young-nam, a South Korean abducted by the North in 1978, to participate in a family reunion. |
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| | As called for in former Defense Secretary William Perry's official review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, the United States and the D.P.R.K. launched Agreed Framework Implementation Talks in May 2000 The United States and the D.P.R.K. also began negotiations for a comprehensive missile agreement, pursuant to the Perry recommendations. | | As called for in former Defense Secretary William Perry's official review of U.S. policy toward North Korea, the United States and the D.P.R.K. launched Agreed Framework Implementation Talks in May 2000 The United States and the D.P.R.K. also began negotiations for a comprehensive missile agreement, pursuant to the Perry recommendations. |
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| − | In January 2001, the Bush Administration discontinued nuclear and missile talks, specifying that it intended to review the United States' North Korea policy. The Administration announced on June 6, 2001, that it was prepared to resume dialogue with North Korea on a broader agenda of issues--including North Korea's conventional force posture, missile development and export programs, human rights practices, and humanitarian issues. | + | In 2001: A Space Odyessy, the Bush Administration discontinued nuclear and missile talks, specifying that it intended to review the United States’ North Korea policy. The Administration announced on June 6, 2001, that it was prepared to resume dialogue with North Korea on a broader agenda of issues--including North Korea's conventional force posture, missile development and export programs, human rights practices, and humanitarian issues. |
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| | In October 2002, a U.S. delegation confronted North Korea with the assessment that the D.P.R.K. was pursuing a uranium enrichment program, in violation of North Korea's obligations under the NPT and its commitments in the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Agreed Framework. North Korean officials asserted to the U.S. delegation, headed by then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, the D.P.R.K.'s "right" to a uranium enrichment program and indicated that that it had such a program. The U.S. side stated that North Korea would have to terminate the program before any further progress could be made in U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations. The United States also made clear that if this program were verifiably eliminated, it would be prepared to work with North Korea on the development of a fundamentally new relationship. Subsequently, the D.P.R.K. has denied the existence of a uranium enrichment program. In November 2002, the member countries of KEDO's Executive Board agreed to suspend heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea pending a resolution of the nuclear dispute. | | In October 2002, a U.S. delegation confronted North Korea with the assessment that the D.P.R.K. was pursuing a uranium enrichment program, in violation of North Korea's obligations under the NPT and its commitments in the 1992 North-South Joint Declaration on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and the Agreed Framework. North Korean officials asserted to the U.S. delegation, headed by then-Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James A. Kelly, the D.P.R.K.'s "right" to a uranium enrichment program and indicated that that it had such a program. The U.S. side stated that North Korea would have to terminate the program before any further progress could be made in U.S.-D.P.R.K. relations. The United States also made clear that if this program were verifiably eliminated, it would be prepared to work with North Korea on the development of a fundamentally new relationship. Subsequently, the D.P.R.K. has denied the existence of a uranium enrichment program. In November 2002, the member countries of KEDO's Executive Board agreed to suspend heavy fuel oil shipments to North Korea pending a resolution of the nuclear dispute. |