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[[Image:Lemay45.jpg|thumb|300px|''Time'' Aug. 13, 1945]]

[[Image:Lemay45.jpg|thumb|300px|''Time'' Aug. 13, 1945]]

Arnold, in personal charge of the campaign (bypassing the theater commanders) brought in a new leader, brilliant, indefatigable, hard-charging General [[Curtis LeMay]]. In early 1945, LeMay ordered a radical change in tactics: remove the machine guns and gunners, fly in low at night. (Much fuel was used to get to 30,000 feet; it could now be replaced with more bombs.) The Japanese radar, fighter, and anti-aircraft systems were so ineffective that they could not hit the bombers. Fires raged through the cities, and millions of civilians fled to the mountains. Tokyo was hit repeatedly, and suffered a fire storm in March that killed 83,000. On June 5, 51,000 buildings in four miles of Kobe were burned out by 473 B-29s; Japanese opposition was fierce, as 11 B-29s went down and 176 were damaged. Osaka, where one-sixth of the Empire's munitions were made, was hit by 1,733 tons of incendiaries dropped by 247 B-29s. A firestorm burned out 8.1 square miles, including 135,000 houses; 4,000 died. The police reported: Although damage to big factories was slight, approximately one-fourth of some 4,000 lesser factories, which operated hand-in-hand with the big factories, were completely destroyed by fire.... Moreover, owing to the rising fear of air attacks, workers in general were reluctant to work in the factories, and the attendance fluctuated as much as 50 percent.

Japan's stocks of guns, shells, explosives, and other military supplies were thoroughly protected in dispersed or underground storage depots, and were not vulnerable to air attack. The bombing did affect long-term factors of production. The Japanese built airplane components in thousands of small shops scattered about their major cities; they did not use their small towns and villages. The U.S. Army Air Force answered the dispersion by burning out entire large cities (while avoiding the small towns and villages). Physical damage to factories, plus decreases due to dispersal forced by the threat of further physical damage, reduced physical productive capacity by roughly the following percentages of pre-attack plant capacity: oil refineries, 83%; aircraft engine plants, 75%; air-frame plants, 60%; electronics and communication equipment plants, 70%; army ordnance plants, 30%; naval ordnance plants, 28%; merchant and naval shipyards, 15%; aluminum, 35%; steel, 15%; and chemicals, 10%.<ref>United States Strategic Bombing Survey, ''Summary Report: (Pacific War)'' (1946) [http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#eeoaaatj online p, 18]</ref>

Munitions output plummeted, and by July, 1945, Japan no longer had an industrial base. The problem was that it still had an army, which was not based in the cities, and was largely undamaged by the raids. The army was short of food and gasoline, but, as Iwo Jima and Okinawa proved, was capable of ferocious resistance. Further, fierce resistance at Okinawa came from the Kamikaze attacks which were flung at the American fleet. The desperate measures used were to make the advances of the U.S. forces a "costly battle of attrition".<ref>Spector, Ronald. ''Eagle Against the Sun: The American War With Japan'' (1985)</ref>

Japan's stocks of guns, shells, explosives, and other military supplies were thoroughly protected in dispersed or underground storage depots, and were not vulnerable to air attack. The bombing affected long-term factors of production. Physical damage to factories, plus decreases due to dispersal forced by the threat of further physical damage, reduced physical productive capacity by roughly the following percentages of pre-attack plant capacity: oil refineries, 83%; aircraft engine plants, 75%; air-frame plants, 60%; electronics and communication equipment plants, 70%; army ordnance plants, 30%; naval ordnance plants, 28%; merchant and naval shipyards, 15%; aluminum, 35%; steel, 15%; and chemicals, 10%.<ref>United States Strategic Bombing Survey, ''Summary Report: (Pacific War)'' (1946) [http://www.anesi.com/ussbs01.htm#eeoaaatj online p, 18]</ref>

Why did the US drop the atomic bomb? Historians have debated the issue over the years. On the one hand, Japan was defeated and many civilian leaders wanted to reach conditional surrender terms. After sifting through the records and cross-examining Japanese leaders, the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded in 1946 that Japan would have surrendered by the end of 1945 because of the devastation wrought by the sea/air blockade, the incessant B-29 and carrier raids. The Survey lends weight to the conclusion, after the war, that the atomic bomb did not have to be used to gain victory. Some "revisionists" have suggested Hiroshima was supposed to be an unmistakable signal to Stalin to play along diplomatically with the Americans who planned to rule the postwar world. Others have wondered whether some sort of demonstration explosion could have been made, in order to frighten Tokyo without killing so many people. The option was considered, but only two bombs were available. Truman decided instead to drop millions of leaflets upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki warning people to leave immediately, and at the Potsdam Conference in mid-July 1945, he explicitly warned Japan it must surrender immediately or be hit with terrible force.

Munitions output plummeted, and by July, 1945, Japan no longer had an industrial base. The problem was that it still had an Army, which was not based in the cities, and was largely undamaged by the raids. The Army was short of food and gasoline, but, as Iwo Jima and Okinawa proved, was capable of ferocious resistance.

The civilian government in Tokyo wanted peace on conditional terms, but that was impossible because of Roosevelt's policy of "unconditional" surrender, and because the civilians did not control Japan's decisions--the Imperial Army did (in the name of the Emperor). It is often assumed that the atomic bombs caused Japan to finally surrender. However, others point to the declaration of war by the Soviet Union who, invaded Manchuria, and crushed the Japanese Army there. Thus ending Japan's feeble hopes for a negotiated peace. However, in reply, other historians have noted that the Soviet Union did not declare war on Japan until August 8, 1945; two days after the first atomic bomb had been dropped. It was a last-minute grab for the spoils of war. It is known that after Hiroshima and the invasion of Manchuria the army and navy still wanted to fight on, while the civilians wanted to give up. The decisive move was the unprecedented intervention of Emperor Hirohito, who ordered negotiations to be opened after the second atomic bomb had been dropped. Even then a small number of Imperial officers tried to stage a coup by occupying the palace grounds. They planned to not allow the broadcast of Hirohito's order; however, their actions failed. With Roosevelt gone, the Americans redefined "unconditional" to allow continuance of the Emperor. Hirohito then broadcast an order to the nation and its armed forces to surrender, which was obeyed by all but a few who carried out futile last minute suicide attacks which failed. Until that day, the Japanese military leaders were still making their preparations for resisting the expected Allied invasion of the home islands.<ref>Wheeler, Keith. "The Fall of Japan" (1983)</ref>

==Why the Atomic Bomb?==  

===Military Opposition to A-Bomb===

Why did the US drop the atomic bomb? Historians have puzzled over the problem for years. On the one hand, Japan was clearly defeated and wanted to surrender. After sifting through the records and cross-examining Japanese leaders, the experts of the U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey concluded in 1946 that Japan would have surrendered by the end of 1945 because of the devastation wrought by the sea/air blockade and the incessant B-29 and carrier raids. The Survey lends weight to the retrospective conclusion that the atomic bomb did not have to be used to gain victory. Some "revisionists" have suggested Hiroshima was supposed to be an unmistakable signal to Stalin to play along diplomatically with the Americans who planned to rule the postwar world. Many have asked whether some sort of demonstration explosion should have been made, in order to frighten Tokyo without killing so many people. The option was considered, but with only two bombs available Truman decided instead to drop millions of leaflets upon Hiroshima and Nagasaki warning people to leave immediately, and at the Potsdam Conference he explicitly warned Japan it must surrender immediately or be hit with terrible force.  

No military ethic in the end supports the use of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Both cities were major seaports and had a number of both military and industrial installations, but the military value of those targets was not great. The target committee felt both cities made excellent psychological targets as they had been untouched by earlier bombing raids. The committee recommended the bomb should be used on the Japanese Empire mainland to save American lives and produce maximum shock to try to convince the Japanese to surrender. The civilians made the final call for use of the bombs.

The U.S. Navy had very little to do with the atomic bomb decision. However, having temporarily lost 5 of its 11 big carriers at Okinawa, it did not want to face the Kamikazes again during an invasion of Japan. It argued that the blockade was working well, cutting off nearly all oil, food and troop movements to and from Japan. It expected that the blockade would eventually lead to surrender. Not for several years thereafter were the admirals able to integrate atomic weapons into their Mahanian doctrine.

In July 1945 the AAF saw its doctrine of strategic bombing working. The original plan was to have used [[B-29]] bombers, from high altitude, with greater precision than the [[B-17]] and [[B-24]] bombers used in Europe. Unexpected high-altitude winds proved this was impossible, and Gen. [[Curtis LeMay]], newly commanding the strategic bombers, on his own authority changed to low-altitude incendiary bombing. He had the bombers shed their machine guns and gunners, and the gasoline no longer needed to lift the planes to 30,000 feet. The result was a doubling of the bomb load, and very scared fliers who were greatly relieved to discover their losses were less using the new tactics.<ref>Craven and Cate, 5: 608-14; Thomas R. Searle "'It made a lot of sense to kill skilled workers': The firebombing of Tokyo in March 1945," ''Journal of Military History 103-134 66, no. 1 (Jan 2002): pp. 103-134</ref> From the first raid on March 9, the new tactic was devastating. The B-29 dropping conventional high explosives and incendiaries was the perfect instrument to destroy the infrastructure of Japan's larger cities. The great bombing campaign had just started; it was planned to peak in 1946. The atomic bomb was not part of AAF doctrine; the AAF generals knew very little about the bomb and demanded a direct order from President Truman before they agreed to explode it.

The U.S. Army agreed that the combination of blockade and strategic bombing would eventually destroy every Japanese city, but felt it could not destroy the Japanese Army, which was widely dispersed and dug in. The Japanese military had in fact planned by the end of 1945 to have 2.5 million troops under arms in the Home Islands. To defend Kyushu alone they would have approx. 600,000 to 900,000 troops available by November, 1945. Coastal fortifications were also being built on the islands. Nearly 1/4 of the Japanese population (including women and children) were conscripted or volunteered for local defense.<ref>Dunnigan & Nofi, ''The Pacific War Encyclopedia'' (1998)</ref>

General Marshall worried that the American people would grow weary of more years of warfare, and might even demand some sort of compromise peace in order to bring the soldiers home. Marshall underestimated the intense determination of nearly all Americans to defeat Imperial Japan. A poll in June 1945, found that 70 percent were in favor of either imprisonment or executing Hirohito. Marshall also objected to dropping the bombs on cities fearing that Japan might become an enemy forever. Most of all, he had a tactical rather than strategic use in mind. Only a handful of bombs were being built, (two to four per month) and MacArthur's invasion forces ought to have all of them. Marshall and his planners concluded that Japan would surrender only after ground troops captured Tokyo. The invasion of Kyushu was scheduled November 1, 1945; all bombs available then (probably seven) should be used there. They would give invading infantry forces enough firepower to destroy defensive ground installations, communications facilities, kill exposed enemy soldiers, and also block the arrival of reinforcements. To waste the precious bombs on irrelevant civilian targets would cause more American casualties in the phased invasion of the home islands. Marshall told Truman that if the invasion of the home islands took place, a minimum of 250,000 U.S. servicemen would be lost.

 

In mid-1945 the Japanese troops on the home islands of Kyushu and Honshu were overall poorly trained, but resistance was expected to be very heavy.  Kamikazes were a great threat with the Japanese having nearly 10,000 planes (about 5,000 for Kamikaze use) and 19,000 pilots with plus gasoline for the purpose.<ref>Dunnigan & Nofi, ''The Pacific War Encyclopedia'' (1998)</ref>

 

Unlike Iwo Jima and Okinawa, Kyushu and Honshu were big enough to permit extensive use of tanks and large-scale maneuvering. In fact, the Japanese Army stock-piled at least six tank regiments for the defense of Kyushu and Honshu, alone.<ref>Zaloga, Steven J. ''Japanese Tanks 1939–45'' (2007)</ref> In sum, Japanese resistance would have been suicidal, with very heavy losses, but American losses would not been as high, as MacArthur predicted. Stimson and Truman, however, overruled Marshall and decided that the first two bombs would be used on cities in order to demonstrate the power of the Allied forces and bring the war to a swift conclusion.

 

 

 

General Marshall worried that the American people might grow weary of more years of warfare, and might even demand some sort of compromise peace in order to bring the soldiers home. (Marshall underestimated the intense determination of nearly all Americans to destroy Japan.) Furthermore he objected to dropping the bombs on cities on moral and political grounds (Japan might become an enemy forever). Most of all, he had a tactical rather than strategic use in mind. Only a handful of bombs were being built, (two to four per month) and MacArthur's invasion forces ought to have all of them. Marshall and his planners concluded that Japan would surrender only after ground troops captured Tokyo. The invasion of Kyushu was scheduled November 1; all bombs available then (probably seven) should be used there. They would give invading infantry forces enough firepower to destroy defensive ground installations, communications facilities, kill exposed enemy soldiers, and also block the arrival of reinforcements. To waste the precious bombs on irrelevant civilians would cause more American casualties, and like all the high American officials Marshall was committed to minimizing American--not Japanese-- losses.

 

In mid-1945 the Japanese troops on the home islands of Kyushu and Honshu were very poorly trained, equipped and officered. Furthermore, total US air supremacy would have rendered them immobile. Unlike Iwo Jima and Okinawa, Kyushu and Honshu were big enough to permit extensive use of tanks and large-scale maneuvering. The Kamikazes were a potential threat: Japan had 10,000 planes left and 19,000 pilots, plus enough gasoline for the purpose. However, but with its new close-in air bases on Okinawa, the AAF was prepared to close down every Japanese airfield. In sum, Japanese resistance might have been suicidal, with very heavy losses, but American losses would probably have been small, just as MacArthur predicted. Stimson and Truman, however, overruled Marshall and decided that the first two bombs would be used on cities in order to demonstrate the awesome power of the Allied forces.  

===Manhattan Project===

===Manhattan Project===

President [[Harry S. Truman]], who had been completely frozen out of decision making and secret information before he suddenly became President in April, did not know what he wanted to do. He lurched this way then that, depending on who talked to him last.<ref> J. Samuel Walker, ''Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan'' (1997) [http://www.questia.com/read/35245486?title=Prompt%20and%20Utter%20Destruction%3a%20Truman%20and%20the%20Use%20of%20Atomic%20Bombs%20against%20Japan online edition]</ref> The man who talked to him last about the bomb was Henry Stimson. Stimson rarely participated in strategic planning, but he had one card up his sleeve--the atomic bomb. To build it, Roosevelt, set up the Manhattan Project.  

President [[Harry S. Truman]], who had been completely frozen out of decision making and secret information before he suddenly became President in April, did not know what he wanted to do. He lurched this way then that, depending on who talked to him last.<ref> J. Samuel Walker, ''Prompt and Utter Destruction: Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs against Japan'' (1997) [http://www.questia.com/read/35245486?title=Prompt%20and%20Utter%20Destruction%3a%20Truman%20and%20the%20Use%20of%20Atomic%20Bombs%20against%20Japan online edition]</ref> The man who talked to him last about the bomb was Henry Stimson. Stimson rarely participated in strategic planning, but he had one card up his sleeve--the atomic bomb. To build it, Roosevelt, set up the Manhattan Project.

 

The Manhattan Project was managed by Major General [[Leslie Groves]] (Corps of Engineers) with a staff of reservists and many thousands of civilian scientists and engineers. Nominally Groves reported directly to Marshall, but in fact Stimson was in charge. Stimson secured the necessary money and approval from Roosevelt and from Congress, and made sure Manhattan had the highest priorities. He controlled all planning for the use of the bomb, overruling the high command of the Army, Navy and AAF in the process. He wanted "Little Boy" (the Hiroshima bomb) dropped within hours of its earliest possible availability. And it was. Stimson wanted Japan to surrender, and thought the Hiroshima bomb on August 6 would provide the final push Tokyo needed. When nothing seemed to happen he had Truman drop "Fat Man" on Nagasaki on August 9. The Japanese offered to surrender on August 10.<ref> See Richard Rhodes, ''The Making of the Atomic Bomb'' (1995)

The Manhattan Project was managed by Major General [[Leslie Groves]] (Corps of Engineers) with a staff of reservists and many thousands of civilian scientists and engineers. Nominally Groves reported directly to Marshall, but in fact Stimson was in charge. Stimson secured the necessary money and approval from Roosevelt and from Congress, and made sure Manhattan had the highest priorities. He controlled all planning for the use of the bomb. He wanted "Little Boy" (the Hiroshima bomb) dropped within hours of its earliest possible availability. And it was. Stimson wanted Japan to surrender, and thought the Hiroshima bomb on August 6 would provide the final push Tokyo needed. When nothing happened, he recommended to Truman that "Fat Man" be dropped August 9 on Nagasaki. The Japanese offered to surrender on August 10.<ref>Rhodes, Richard. ''The Making of the Atomic Bomb'' (1995)</ref>

</ref>      

===Stimson's vision===

===Stimson's vision===