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A military buildup was approved in January 1812. This recreated the regular Army that Congress had voted to dismantle in 1810. Madison and other Republican leaders still objected to this institution. They argued for a summer offensive using militia and short term volunteers.<ref>Hickey, p. 32.</ref> In early April, a package of measures were approved that were considered preliminary to war. Madison sent a war message to Congress on June 1 listing all the complaints against Britain and asking for a declaration of war. "Under pretended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force and without the practicality of applying one, our commerce has been plundered in every sea, the great staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate markets, and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interest," according to Madison's message. Madison's most passionate words emphasized the plight of impressed sailors, the "thousands of American citizens...torn from their country and from everything dear to them." Although sailors' rights had played a minor role in pre-war politics and diplomacy, they would be remembered as a central theme of the war.<ref name=gilje>Gilje, Paul A., ''Free Trade and Sailors' Rights in the War of 1812'', p. 7.</ref>

A military buildup was approved in January 1812. This recreated the regular Army that Congress had voted to dismantle in 1810. Madison and other Republican leaders still objected to this institution. They argued for a summer offensive using militia and short term volunteers.<ref>Hickey, p. 32.</ref> In early April, a package of measures were approved that were considered preliminary to war. Madison sent a war message to Congress on June 1 listing all the complaints against Britain and asking for a declaration of war. "Under pretended blockades, without the presence of an adequate force and without the practicality of applying one, our commerce has been plundered in every sea, the great staples of our country have been cut off from their legitimate markets, and a destructive blow aimed at our agricultural and maritime interest," according to Madison's message. Madison's most passionate words emphasized the plight of impressed sailors, the "thousands of American citizens...torn from their country and from everything dear to them." Although sailors' rights had played a minor role in pre-war politics and diplomacy, they would be remembered as a central theme of the war.<ref name=gilje>Gilje, Paul A., ''Free Trade and Sailors' Rights in the War of 1812'', p. 7.</ref>

   

   

On June 4, the House of Representatives voted 79 to 49 for war. In the U.S. Senate, the outcome was in doubt for a time and the final vote was 19 to 13. With New England vehemently opposed, Congress declared war on June 18. Support for war was strongest in the West and in the South, the regions least likely to suffer from British retaliation. For New England, trade was about economics and jobs. For the rest of the country, it was a question of the nation's honor. By the time war was declared, the grievances it was based on were already outdated. In May 1812, Britain had offered to license U.S. merchant ships on the same basis that British ships were licensed. In June, it had revoked the Orders in Council altogether. At the time war was declared, news of these concessions had not yet arrived in the U.S. But American leaders did know that Britain was in the process of forming a new government which would reformulate policy on this issue.

On June 4, the House of Representatives voted 79 to 49 for war. In the U.S. Senate, the outcome was in doubt for a time and the final vote was 19 to 13. With New England vehemently opposed, Congress declared war on June 18. The Federalist response, written by Josiah Quincy, emphasized the absurdity of going to war over maritime issues when so few naval preparations had been made. Quincy also denounced the war as an election year stunt to help the Madison and the Republicans in the fall. Believing that the proposal was unpopular, Quincy moved that the hearings be opened to the public. Quincy's motion was rejected by the Republican majority.<ref>David Stephen Heidler，Jeanne T. Heidler, ''Encyclopedia of the War of 1812'', "Quincy, Josiah", pp. 438-439.</ref>

 

Support for war was strongest in the West and in the South, the regions least likely to suffer from British retaliation. For New England, trade was about economics and jobs. For the rest of the country, it was a question of the nation's honor. By the time war was declared, the grievances it was based on were already outdated. In May 1812, Britain had offered to license U.S. merchant ships on the same basis that British ships were licensed. In June, it had revoked the Orders in Council altogether. At the time war was declared, news of these concessions had not yet arrived in the U.S. But American leaders did know that Britain was in the process of forming a new government which would reformulate policy on this issue.

===The role of the War Hawks===

===The role of the War Hawks===

==The strategic pattern==

==The strategic pattern==

[[Image:1812map.jpg|thumb|200px|main areas of the fighting]]  

[[Image:1812map.jpg|thumb|main areas of the fighting]]  

The fundamental military strategy of the United States was simple enough. The primary undertaking would be the conquest of Canada. The United States also planned an immediate naval offensive, whereby a swarm of privateers and the small Navy would be set loose on the high seas to destroy British commerce. The old invasion route into Canada by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River led directly to the most populous and most important part of the enemy’s territory. The capture of Montreal would cut the line of communications upon which the British defense of Upper Canada depended, making the fall of that province inevitable. But this invasion route was near the center of disaffection in the United States from which little local support could be expected. The places where enthusiasm for the war ran high and where the Canadian forces were weak offered a safer theater of operations, though one with fewer strategic opportunities. Thus, in violation of the principles of objective and economy of force, the first assaults were delivered across the Detroit River and across the Niagara River between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario rather than along the Hudson–Lake Champlain–Montreal line of advance.  

The fundamental military strategy of the United States was simple enough. The primary undertaking would be the conquest of Canada. The United States also planned an immediate naval offensive, whereby a swarm of privateers and the small Navy would be set loose on the high seas to destroy British commerce. The old invasion route into Canada by way of Lake Champlain and the Richelieu River led directly to the most populous and most important part of the enemy’s territory. The capture of Montreal would cut the line of communications upon which the British defense of Upper Canada depended, making the fall of that province inevitable. But this invasion route was near the center of disaffection in the United States from which little local support could be expected. The places where enthusiasm for the war ran high and where the Canadian forces were weak offered a safer theater of operations, though one with fewer strategic opportunities. Thus, in violation of the principles of objective and economy of force, the first assaults were delivered across the Detroit River and across the Niagara River between Lake Erie and Lake Ontario rather than along the Hudson–Lake Champlain–Montreal line of advance.