| − | The collapse of the Russian army in Russo-Japanese War of 1905 freed Germany to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. In the years that followed, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisors.<ref name=rohl /> German public opinion was generally opposed to war until 1911, when Britain's intervention in the Agadir crisis fueled a wave of Anglophobia. The idea that war was inevitable became conventional wisdom and the Kaiser's reluctance began to look quaint, even to his own advisors. | + | The collapse of the Russian army in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905 allowed Germany to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. In the years that followed, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisors.<ref name=rohl /> German public opinion was generally opposed to war until 1911, when Britain's intervention in the Agadir crisis fueled a wave of Anglophobia. The idea that war was inevitable became conventional wisdom and the Kaiser's reluctance began to look quaint, even to his own advisors. |
| | In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the Kaiser jointly by Bethmann Hollweg, the chancellor; Moltke, the army chief of staff; and Kiderlen, the foreign secretary. In December, the Kaiser was informed that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The Kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl>Röhl, p. xxviii</ref> A meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 was identified by German historian Fritz Fischer as the decisive moment when the imperial government finally resolved upon war.<ref>Fischer, Fritz, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=wIE5mgEACAAJ&dq= Germany's Aims in the First World War]'', W. W. Norton, 1968.</ref> | | In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the Kaiser jointly by Bethmann Hollweg, the chancellor; Moltke, the army chief of staff; and Kiderlen, the foreign secretary. In December, the Kaiser was informed that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The Kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl>Röhl, p. xxviii</ref> A meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 was identified by German historian Fritz Fischer as the decisive moment when the imperial government finally resolved upon war.<ref>Fischer, Fritz, ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=wIE5mgEACAAJ&dq= Germany's Aims in the First World War]'', W. W. Norton, 1968.</ref> |