Talk:Kaiser Wilhelm II

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! Part of this article was copied from Citizendium but the copied text was originally written by me, RJJensen (under the name Richard Jensen) and does not include alterations made by others on that site. Conservlogo.png
RJJensen 11:49, 25 April 2009 (EDT)


On the genocide issue see "THE HERERO HOLOCAUST?: The Disputed History Of The 1904 Genocide," by Jeremy Silvester, Werner Hillebrecht & Casper Erichsen. RJJensen 09:20, 26 April 2009 (EDT)

  • There are historians who dispute that the response to the Herero Uprising was any worse than what other colonial powers were doing at the time. Examine the actions of Belgian King Leopold II for a particularly notorious example. Therefore, do not cite only one side of what is a rather acrimonious dispute among academics.

The tone this article is taking also bothers me. Historian Niall Ferguson's The Pity of War argues that the British Empire was far more agressively expansionist and militaristic during this era. As early as 1901, there was a secret decision by the British Cabinet through which Britain would enter a war between Germany and France.

According to Winston Churchill, centuries of British foreign policy boiled down to a single concept. Whenever a continental power grew strong enough to rival Britain's domination of Europe, Whitehall would build a coalition of nations and cut the "bully" down to size by going to war.

Whatever the Kaiser's glaring flaws, he almost certainly would have acted differently in 1914 had he known that a war with France would also be a war against the British Empire.

Also, I am rather curious as to why you deleted my link to information about the annual monarchist demonstrations at Huis Doorn. The last Kaiser does have his admirers in modern Germany and it seems rather unproffessional to conceal this fact. The latter regard him as a good Christian and a loyal family man who is defamed both by wartime propaganda and by history.Kingstowngalway 19:50, 27 April 2009 (EDT)

we don't tolerate moral relativism here. the Kaiser was a great enemy to Africans, to Americans and indeed to Germans and no whitewashing or celebrating will be tolerated. RJJensen 21:51, 27 April 2009 (EDT)
Moral Relativism? Excuse me? I do not see how giving a voice to differing opinions qualifies as moral relativism. It is what makes encyclopedia articles great.

Most European colonialists were enemies to Africans. The ethnic cleansing of the Hereros was an vicious atrocity which was unfortunately far from unique. However, it had more in common with the U.S. Government's "pacification" of the Indians than with the Nazi Holocaust. In my opinion, it deserves an article of it's own.

During most of World War I, the Kaiser was nothing more than a mouthpiece for Generals Hindenburg and Ludendorff. In its last days, the Kaiser's Germany actually had more in common with Japan under Tojo than Germany under Hitler. The average Imperial German infantryman tended to be far better behaved than the soldiers of either regime, however.Kingstowngalway 22:55, 27 April 2009 (EDT)

The Kaiser was a pretty poor joke for leader of a major country, we all agree. He alone had the power to overrule the civilian government and instead he turned the decisions over to Hindenberg. The question is why he was so bad--was it personal incompetence or the German system? I've followed the literature and the strong consensus is that the Herero episode was a major training ground for the Holocaust. Yes, it is moral relatavism to suggest he was just like all the other colonial leaders, no better and no worse. He was vastly worse, despite the admirers he may have. RJJensen 23:00, 27 April 2009 (EDT)
I personally think that it was both the German Governmental system and the Kaiser's own stupidity. The fact that he was always followed by fawing yes-men did not help matters. There are a large number of documented incidents in which he unknowingly and hilariously put his foot in his mouth. Some of these might be added to this article to great effect.

As for the Hereros, I do not desire to see what happened to them whitewashed either. If you are aware of Hitler referring to the Kaiser's actions as a precedent, feel free to cite them with references. To my knowledge, he only referred to the Armenian Genocide as an influence and I am not aware of any quotations about the Hereros.

As for scholarly consensus, there is a strain of commentary in academia which attempts to paint all of German history as a training ground for the Holocaust. History, however, is a very complicated thing. It is composed of human beings, not abstractions, and is therefore very hard to push into a box.Kingstowngalway 09:09, 28 April 2009 (EDT)

People interested in the Hereros should read the literature referenced here, which demonstrates the close links to Nazi plans. (At one point the Nazis wanted to move the Jews to Africa and they researched the issue.) German revanchism and nostalgia for aristocracy and anti-democratic norms certainly exists but is NOT the sort of conservatism we promote at Conservapedia. RJJensen 09:59, 28 April 2009 (EDT)
Actually, the Huis Doorn pilgrimages are overseen by the monarchist organization Tradition und Leben, which, according to their website, carries the slogan, "We Crown Democracy."Kingstowngalway 11:50, 28 April 2009 (EDT)
American rejected monarchy in 1776. RJJensen 12:29, 28 April 2009 (EDT)

German Emperor vs. Emperor of Germany

I changed Emperor of Germany to German Emperor - again. For us today, this seems to be a minor point, for Wilhelm II, it was very important. One reason for his love for the fleet was that it was the only imperial force at his command. At least in peacetime and formally, each state within the empire had its own army, so he was only commander of the Prussian, but no a German army. --AugustO (talk) 17:42, 27 May 2016 (EDT)

If it's "king of Prussia," why wouldn't it be "emperor of Germany"? I checked Röhl. He consistently uses "German emperor" all the way through a 1600(!)-page book. So I guess you're right. PeterKa (talk) 20:21, 27 May 2016 (EDT)
Amusingly, at first, it wasn't even "King of Prussia", it was (only) "King in Prussia" - at least from 1701 until 1772. These were quite important distinctions, "of" implying to be the overlord of the whole region. "Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire" was the title of the emperors of the first empire, "German emperor" is the title of the second empire. Even Ludwig II of Bavaria couldn't be bribed enough to accept an emperor of Germany (and he was probably the most bribable of all German princes) --AugustO (talk) 20:39, 27 May 2016 (EDT)
I know you put a lot of work in this, but it reads like stale, recycled, British propaganda. RobS#NeverHillary 08:48, 1 June 2016 (EDT)
I don't want to get to involved in this article - the more you read about Wilhelm II, the more unpleasant the picture becomes - he really had no redeeming qualities. Even his comments about the Pogromnacht pale in comparison to his antisemitism, which only grew over time. That said:
John C. G. Röhl (whose biography seems to be the source of much of the material) overstates IMO the power and influence which Wilhelm II could wield.
In August 1914, Wilhelm ordered the German army to invade France, triggering World War I. The Allied Powers of France, Russia, and Britain opposed this aggression. The Kriegsschuldfrage (the question who is to fault for the war). Germany wasn't the only nation interested in this war, militaristic factions existed in all major European nations. Is there any serious historian today who claims that Germany was the only culprit? Who claims that there was a single trigger, and not a chain of interlinked triggering events? OTOH, invading Belgium (a fact with isn't mentioned yet) was a particularly unjustifiable act...
Unfortunately for Wilhelm II, as far as his personality is concerned, the stale, recycled, British propaganda was mostly right. --AugustO (talk) 14:18, 1 June 2016 (EDT)
That's right. The Kaiser just woke up one morning in August 1914 and decided to start a World War. No mention of the "Dear Nicky" letter or nothing. A.J.P. Taylor, a Brit incidentally, is an excellent source for this. I only bring this up cause recently I stumbled upon an original 1927 copy of this in English; never before have I found such detail about the Kaiser before and during WWI in English. RobS#NeverHillary 19:56, 2 June 2016 (EDT)
Taylor is a wonderful writer, but I think quite manipulative. There's a market for the "no fault" theory of the war, and he supplies it. I have a whole section about how reluctant the Kaiser was to go to war. I just added an example of Bethmann manipulating him. Bethmann was endlessly sneaky, so there's more where that came from. But in the end, it's lonely at the top. If Bethmann was a snake, well, wasn't it Wilhelm's duty to dismiss him? According to the Willy-Nicky Correspondence (1920), Nicholas offered to accept mediation the day before he ordered Russian mobilization. Wilhelm didn't even bother to address the offer in his reply. This was considered the smoking gun for a long time. Wilhelm thought it was important to provoke Russia into mobilizing first so that the war could be portrayed as a "Balkan squabble." The British felt very superior to the Balkans, so this argument was supposed to keep the British out of the war. PeterKa (talk) 23:15, 2 June 2016 (EDT)
Ok, but it was a whole series of blunders and screw ups. I do not think anybody can say the Kaiser, or the Tsar, or anybody (other than the Black Hand terrorists & the Okhranna that supplied them) wanted war. I'm suggesting the Kaiser is not a figure like Hitler, who did want war.
Then, and not to be pedantic, there is somewhat of a difference in understanding between what a Commander-in-Chief is in US parlance, and who the Commander-in-Chief of the Prussian Army is. (btw, is the Queen the Commander-in-Chief in Britain?) RobS#NeverHillary 23:48, 2 June 2016 (EDT)
I don't go into anything speculative in the article, but IMO the German General Staff was the driving force behind the war. Perhaps this was due to the influence of Ludendorff, AKA "the first Nazi."[1] For a long time, the German military archive was believed to have been destroyed by firebombing in 1945. But material turned up at the end of the Cold War. A few historians have looked through it, but no one focusing on the question, "Why was the General Staff so eager for war in 1914?" PeterKa (talk) 01:24, 3 June 2016 (EDT)
Looking at your sources, I guess I need to be brought up to speed on a new school of thought among German historians in modern democratic Germany that's way more critical of the monarch. I base my understanding on Gordan Craig, who's very respected, and I'm sure, not outdated. But yes, the Kaiser, and before that, the Prussian Kings, really did not have the power often imputed to them. The Prussian military really did have a mind of its own. Even today, the Russian GRU, which is modeled after the Prussian military, survived regime change from the Soviet era. Also, the German Chancellor is not the Commander-in-Chief to this day, as the German General Staff was brought under NATO's command structure, not the German government. What little power the Kaiser really had over the military & foreign ministry, he lost as the war progressed.
Even Hitler did not really have the power over the German military often imagined; that is what Operation Valkyrie and the trials and events afterward were all about.
Suffice it to say, for the Kaiser's bluster for decades leading up to the war, when the actual events of July 1914 are looked at, he really didn't want war and tried to avert it; but as this article points out, the decision by others (and not really on a time table, tho) was made in 1912 if a certain series of events were to occur.
So, if the opening section could be tweaked to make him look a little less like a brain-dead war monger, I suggest in all fairness it would be a little more accurate. The Kaiser was not an absolute dictator. RobS#NeverHillary 14:37, 3 June 2016 (EDT)

World War I began in August 1914 with a massive German invasion of France by way of Belgium. The Allied Powers of France, Russia, and Britain opposed this aggression. This ignores the whole "crisis of July" - and the fact that Austria-Hungary had declared war on Serbia in late July 1914: this was the aggression which Russia opposed, by general mobilization against Austria and Germany - which lead to the declaration of war from Germany to Russia on August 1, 1914 - three days before the invasion of Belgium. --AugustO (talk) 06:08, 3 June 2016 (EDT)

Yes, I agree wholly. There are extremely important lessons to be learned among diplomats and never to be forgotten here. I hope we don't loose the opportunity. WWI was the result of diplomatic failures in Foreign Ministries among all the participants; when they failed, then the War Ministries were called upon to do their jobs. It wasn't directly caused by excessive militarists, more by idiot diplomats. RobS#NeverHillary 14:37, 3 June 2016 (EDT)
I don't actually agree with this "no fault" view of the origin of the war. But I took out the offending material all the same; This article should focus on Wilhelm's role. As far as A.J.P Taylor goes, he is quite notorious for his view of WWII. He views Hitler the same way he does the Kaiser, i.e. as someone who didn't want war, but just kind of blundered into one. The popularity of such views has a lot to do with the Cold War, when people worried that the U.S. and Russia would blunder into war. Tuchman's Guns of August came out around the time of Cuban missile crisis and made the phrase "World War I" a useful shorthand for "blundering into war." Tuchman's book itself is actually quite nuanced and not responsible for this simplistic interpretation. Fritz Fischer showed that Germany made the decision to go to war at least a year before it started. So the real reason for the war was not Franz Ferdinand and Sarajevo. PeterKa (talk) 07:27, 5 June 2016 (EDT)
  • Fischer showed that Germany made the decision to go to war at least a year before it started.
That is exactly the point I hope we can agree on. "Germany made the decision" vs "the Kaiser made the decision". The Kaiser's role as Commander-in-Chief does not translate into what American's and the English speaking world think of as "Commander-in-Chief". RobS#NeverHillary 16:08, 5 June 2016 (EDT)

I didn't want to create the impression that no one was at fault, in the opposite, I think, most were at fault, with the main culprits being Germany and Austro-Hungary. But the other nations didn't enter the war reluctantly - to protect Belgium's virtue, so to speak - every nation thought that it could defeat the enemy gloriously after a short struggle, and jumped on this opportunity. And all were wrong.... --AugustO (talk) 08:53, 5 June 2016 (EDT)

Prussian-German General Staff

I place this link here. This is well worth the read to serious students of the subject.

The idea of "civilian control" of the armed forces is something entirely alein to German thinking. To this day, the German government does not control its own military. The German Chief of Staff is the "representive", as this essay points out, to the German government. Strategic planning and decisions are made collectively within the General Staff.

If not for the success of this system - which most all of the world's militaries have copied, it would have been stamped out after WWII. Instead, it was integrted into NATO which are now "partners" in planning and decision making. The German General Staff has been working and seeking "partners" since it overthrew Napolean.

The truth remains, neither the Kings of Prussia, the Kaisers, Hitler, or modern democratic German Chancellors ever were Commanders-in-Chief of the German military ('Commander-in-Chief' as understood in the Anglo-American sense) or had complete unfettered control over the German General Staff. RobS#NeverHillary 20:43, 14 June 2016 (EDT)

Even Wikipedia says,
"The Prussian General Staff also enjoyed greater freedom from political control than its contemporaries, and this autonomy was enshrined in law on the establishment of the German Empire in 1871. It came to be regarded as the home of German militarism in the aftermath of the First World War, and the victors attempted to suppress the institution. It nevertheless survived..." RobS#NeverHillary 21:20, 14 June 2016 (EDT)

Operational model

The German General Staff has become the model of all the world's large standing militaries. It earned this reputation over several centuries, but I'll attempt to thumbnail it here. It has even been adapted outside the military sphere - the modern American presidency and White House uses this model.

Napoleon Bonaparte was among the last of inspirational battlefield commanders dating back to Alexander the Great, various Caesars, Attila the Hun, and a host of others known to history commonly as, "the man on horseback". The charismstic leader commanded absolute confidence and alligience from his troops based on his superior​ wisdom, instincts, vision, and leadership qualities. He would position himself on a hilltop on horseback surveying the armies arrayed on the battlefield below, messengers would ride up, and he would dispatch orders and instructions to flank positions which somehow always were executed flawlessly, won the day and resulted in victory.

The problem is, you never know when a leader of such talents may arise, hence, how is it possible to defend against?

The time of Napolean is known as the Enlightenment, when science gained a foothold in military planning. So Karl von Clausewitz addressed this question. Is it an Art of War, or a Science of War? He answered by saying neither, because they exclude genius from the rule. You never know when a charismstic leader able to inspire troops with a genius for battlefield exploits may arise, so the only way to prepare and defend against such an occurrance is to divide up the duties and responsibilities of a battlefield commander among a staff of experts. Two heads are better than one.

Since your strategic commander lacks the genius of the opposing man on horseback, his job is to solely focus on the strategic vision aided by a logistical commander at his side concerned with nothing more than transport, supply, and manpower requirements. The two worked as a team, the leader being the chief strategist, and his co-equal (flunky) then known as a Quartermaster General. When the chief strategist, surveying the battlefield, saw an opportunity for an opening for instance, to outflank an opponent, rather than gamble like the man on horseback was likely to do, he would turn to the Quartemaster and ask, "Is it possible to get so many guys up into that far position behind the enemy and keep them supplied?" The Quartermaster would quickly survey the situation, not second guess the strategic commander or debate him, and deliver his expert, technical opinion with a "yes" or "no". It was through this system the Prussians were eventually able to defeat Napolean.

The earliest staff reformers of this team model are well known to history, Gens. Bucher and Bleichroder, Gens. Sharnhorst and Gneisenau. Later came Hindenburg and Ludendorf, and in World War II Gens. Marshall and Eisenhower (yes, Eisenhower was only a logistical commander, not a strategist).

Eisenhower brought the model to the White House when he became Commander in Chief, and established the White House Chief of Staff position. While President's job is that of the strategic visionary, the Chief of staff's job is practical implementation, which includes informing the strategic visionary that his strategy is unrealistic. White Houses that understand this system of teamwork have been successful. White Houses which have been occupied by a leader who imagines himself a charismatic man on horseback, not in need of expert technical advice and can rule by dictate, have not been so successful. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2 09:36, 29 March 2017 (EDT)


What are the sources on the Schlieffen plan? Wikipedia? The Schlieffen plan dates to 1892 and was based upon fighting a two-front. The Russo-Japanese war presented a onetime, scaled-down, temporary opportunity to economize it into a one-front war, nothing more. But the basic plan of fighting a two-front war existed since the collapse of the Three Emperors League in 1887 and the founding of the Russo-French rapprochement of 1891.

The problem of a two-front war occupied German military planners since the founding of the Second Reich in 1871. Schlieffen is recognized as the one who proposed a workable solution. In 1940, the German's used a modified Schlieffen plan based on bluff, decoy, and diversions. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2 19:58, 27 March 2017 (EDT)

Schlieffen's exact words were to "strike Paris like hammer on an anvil" thru Belgium, and the movement of troops thru Belgium were to "brush the English Channel on the sleeze". Once these actions were completed, to rush troops East via rail, an advantage Russian military organizers did not have, to meet the overwhelming numbers of Russians, under equiped, travelling on foot. (Solzhenitsen. In August 1914, says for this army of village farm boys travelling on foot they had only one gun for every three men. Troop strength: German professional military who should have been deployed to Belgium, 175,000; underequiped Russian farm boys, 400,000. It's further been hypothesized Hindenburg's and other members of Junker class decision not to execute the Schlieffen plan is because they were large estate landowners in the East more concerned with self interest than attacking or defending the urbanized Western sector).

The reason the Schlieffen planned failed is, because it wasn't implemented. Hindenburg & Ludendorf modified it by transferring troops for battles of Tannenburg & Masurian Lakes in the East, slowing the advance in Belgium, and allowing the Brits time to infiltrate troops across the channel. This is what caused the 4 years of trench warfare.

When a modified version based on bluff (see First Battle Ardenne), was used in 1940, it worked in less than 6 weeks Paris fell. The culmination of 70 years of German General Staff planning. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2 20:14, 27 March 2017 (EDT)

"Moltke revived it in 1911"? The plan was always operational, from 1892-1914. Moltke was updating it, based on technical improvements and manpower requirements after Schlieffen's retirement. This is common in all contingent military operational plans. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2

The German military archive was recovered at the end of the Cold War and Terence Zubar has reviewed it. His conclusion is that Schlieffen never used the Schlieffen Plan as an actual war plan. If Germany had gone to war with Schlieffen in command, it would have followed a strategy of defense followed by counterattacks. This was probably the only realistic strategy given the size and capabilities of the Germany army in Schlieffen's time. I don't think it is reasonable to think of the plan as "operational" before army expansion in 1913. In WWII, the Germans had tank divisions. These swung around the Maginot line and played the role of Carthaginian cavalry. The complexities of the Schlieffen Plan can't be dealt with here and requires its own article. PeterKa (talk) 20:43, 27 March 2017 (EDT)
I agree with that. I think much of it is just being misrepresented here.
It's an age old question. Talking about it gives one the impression the Schlieffen plan caused the deadlock, trench warfare, and the needless loss of 4 million lives. If on the other hand, it was not implemented, why is it relavent to any discussion of WWI?
Here we start to get into the politics of demonization by pacifists against militarism which started after 1918. And a simple looking at the facts destroys any argument they had, no matter how widespread and popular. I just don't see the point of keeping alive in the 21st century such widely discredited and disproven notions. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2 21:05, 27 March 2017 (EDT)
Here is a review of Zuber's book so you don't have read the whole thing:[2]
The reason the German offensive failed is because they ran out of supplies at the time of the Marne. While the Germans waited for their supply train to catch up, the French and British dug trenches. Even if the supply situation had been better, the Germans had already done a heroic amount of marching at that point. To have outflanked the French would have required a whole lot more marching. It's hard to see how the plan could have worked, with or without the divisions transferred to the East. Hans Delbrück (1919) and Gerhard Ritter (1956) exposed these flaws long ago.
Most sources say the Schlieffen plan dates from 1905.[3] That's talking about the copy of the plan that survives. That copy is an extremely preliminary rough draft compared to the documentation that would be needed to send an army marching. I don't know where you got 1892 from. PeterKa (talk) 01:21, 28 March 2017 (EDT)
Ok, technically you could say he pulled it all together into a single memorandum in 1905 but he worked on it more than 10 years, and it was a problem the whole General Staff had been concerned with since Schieffen attended the military academy. I'm relying on Gordon Craig, Politics of the Prussian Army which I don't have a copy at hand.
The key elements were manpower and timing. But as I said earlier, if the plan was never implemented, you can't blame Schlieffen for the disaster of the Marne. That's just outdated pacifist rhetoric from the 1920s and beyond. The lessen of Schlieffen fits into a larger paradigm in military science of operational planning. Schlieffen did not work on this alone, his entire staff was concerned with it nite and day for 12 years. When it came to be used, all that effort was wasted. And the plan did work in 1940 when the Germans faked a move thru Belgium but the main thrust came thru the Ardenne.
Bottomline: Schlieffen is part of a model used by all the world's military establishments to in operational planning and implementation, and the organizational structure that produced it. The disaster at the Marne was not Schlieffen's failure, Schlieffen's plan was devised to avoid that. And his name and ideas now are used, unfairly, to attack the senseless military strategies, operations, and failures he spent a lifetime working to avoid. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2 02:47, 28 March 2017 (EDT)
And Ritter's criticism of 1956 has to be looked at thru the politics of his day: it was part of a de-mystification and de-militarization of all post-WWI German society, and rehabilative programming in officers schools, then coupled with the General Staff of NATO. But NATO itself has adopted the Prussian General Staff operational planning organisation, and structure. Schlieffen, along with many others, are still used as brilliant case studies in military academies worldwide, and not just for flaws or failures. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2 03:33, 28 March 2017 (EDT)
Craig was published back in 1955, you know. He's says the Schlieffen plan was developed "between 1897 and 1905." He also claims Schlieffen was inspired by the account of Cannae that Delbrück gives in History of the Art of War, which was published in 1900. (p. 279) PeterKa (talk) 05:50, 29 March 2017 (EDT)
Much to be learned from the Schlieffen plans is, not just what it was, but how it came into existence. Schlieffen is known to, in a time of peace, give staff assignments to underlyings to produce detailed written contingencies for various aspects under a time constraint - like over the Christmas holiday while they were at home with their families - just to emphasize the constant vigilance military planners need. This is the Schlieffen plan. And this is the model of preoccupation, commitment, and staff coordination that has made the German General Staff the model of all the world's large, surving military establishments. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2`
  • ...would have required a whole lot more marching... - exactly the point. Schlieffen's plan called for initial deployment to Belgium and required no marching from Prussia to Belgium. After Paris would fall then troops would be transported East.RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2 10:23, 29 March 2017 (EDT)
Ritter was writing for German military academies concerned with teaching officers "inner leadership" and moral responsibility; Craig was writing for tbe Anglo-American alliance eager to incorporate Prussisn military theories into NATO as it was learning more about the traditions of their new German partners staff planning. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2 10:40, 29 March 2017 (EDT)
The strategy Germany followed in 1914 has only a passing resemblance to anything Schlieffen proposed. Schlieffen never proposed transporting the army west to east. IMO, Moltke's planners were inspired by the cult of the offensive (offensive à outrance) that the French army adopted in 1911. After Delbrück criticized the plan in 1919, the need to claim a patriotic lineage arose. PeterKa (talk) 19:37, 29 March 2017 (EDT)
Again, my point: What's the point of bringing it up, then? Schlieffen wanted to concentrate virtually all forces in the West, and leave the East wide open.
See, this is what happens. The article appears to blame Schlieffen for the disaster in the West, whereas you & I seem to agree he had nothing to do with it. And maybe, if his idea were implemented, the Marne could have been avoided. That should be the only context his name is mentioned.
So the fallback position becomes, "Schlieffen was immoral because he didn't respect sovereign rights and international borders." If that's the case, Schlieffen was 100 years ahead of his time cause this is exactly what EU leaders are doing right now - tearing down sovereign rights and eliminating international borders. RobSCIA v Trump updated score:CIA 3, Trump 2 23:48, 29 March 2017 (EDT)