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'''Henry Kissinger''' (1923- ), American statesman and exponent of a [[liberal]] policy of "realism" in foreign policy; he dominated foreign policy in the the administrations of presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Gerald Ford]], as [[Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs|National Security Advisor]] and [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]], holding both positions for a time. He won the much-criticized 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for reaching a peace that ended the [[Vietnam War]]. In close collaboration with Nixon, he created a '''[[détente]] policy''' that called for an end to the [[Cold War]] and for friendly relations with both the [[Soviet Union]] and [[China]]. His position on détente was rejected by [[Ronald Reagan]] in the 1976 campaign for the presidential nomination. Although Reagan narrowly lost that primary to Ford, due to the immense advantage of incumbency for Ford, Reagan won a landslide victory four years later on a platform that repudiated Kissinger's polices. Kissinger was then left out of any prominent role in the [[Reagan Administration]].

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'''Henry Kissinger''' (born 1923), American statesman and exponent of a [[liberal]] policy of "realism" in foreign policy; he dominated foreign policy in the the administrations of presidents [[Richard Nixon]] and [[Gerald Ford]], as [[Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs|National Security Advisor]] and [[United States Secretary of State|Secretary of State]], holding both positions for a time. He won the much-criticized 1973 Nobel Peace Prize for reaching a peace that ended the [[Vietnam War]]. In close collaboration with Nixon, he created a '''[[détente]] policy''' that called for an end to the [[Cold War]] and for friendly relations with both the [[Soviet Union]] and [[China]]. His position on détente was rejected by [[Ronald Reagan]] in the 1976 campaign for the presidential nomination. Although Reagan narrowly lost that primary to Ford, due to the immense advantage of incumbency for Ford, Reagan won a landslide victory four years later on a platform that repudiated Kissinger's polices. Kissinger was then left out of any prominent role in the [[Reagan Administration]].

==Life==

Kissinger was born in Fürth, Germany, on May 27, 1923 to a middle class Jewish family. They fled Nazi persecution, and arrived in New York in 1938, where he changed his first name from Heinz to Henry but never overcame his thick foreign accent. He attended public schools and City University before being drafted at age 19. He returned to Europe during World War II fighting with the U.S. Army; he was in the infantry at first, but his heroism, courage, and daring got him promoted to intelligence. He was discharged as a sergeant in 1946. He spent a year as a civilian instructor in ''de-Nazification'' at an Army school in Germany; charged with de-Nazifying a German town, he did so with remarkable ease. He had power and responsibility far beyond his years because of his intelligence, his energy, and his commitment to opposing the Nazis.

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In the army, Kissinger was informally tutored by Fritz Kraemer, a fellow refugee with two PhD's. In 1950 Kissinger earned his B.A. ''summa cum laude'' at Harvard with a 377 page essay on "The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant."<ref> William Y. Elliott was his director but only read half of it; the Government Department thereupon ruled that future senior theses could not exceed 40,000 words.</ref> He finished his Ph.D. in 1956 at Harvard, with a dissertation on "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22," a study praising how the conservative diplomats of the era built a stable and peaceful international system after the Napoleonic wars.

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In the army, Kissinger was informally tutored by Fritz Kraemer, a fellow refugee with two PhD's. In 1950 Kissinger earned his B.A. ''summa cum laude'' at Harvard with a 377 page essay on "The Meaning of History: Reflections on Spengler, Toynbee and Kant."<ref>William Y. Elliott was his director but only read half of it; the Government Department thereupon ruled that future senior theses could not exceed 40,000 words.</ref> He finished his Ph.D. in 1956 at Harvard, with a dissertation on "A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22," a study praising how the conservative diplomats of the era built a stable and peaceful international system after the Napoleonic wars.

He married Ann Fleischer in 1949 and was divorced in 1964. There were two children, Elizabeth and David. In 1974 he married Nancy Maginnes.

==Harvard professor==

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Kissinger became a full professor in Harvard's Department of Government in 1962. As the director of Harvard's University Summer International Seminar, ~~1952-69~~, he brought in nearly 700 young European and Asian scholars, many of whom became high officials in their own country. Kissinger met practically every intellectual in international relations at home and abroad.

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Kissinger became a full professor in Harvard's Department of Government in 1962. As the director of Harvard's University Summer International Seminar, 1952–69, he brought in nearly 700 young European and Asian scholars, many of whom became high officials in their own country. Kissinger met practically every intellectual in international relations at home and abroad.

Kissinger was eager to serve on national commissions. He served as Study Director, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, for the Council of Foreign Relations from 1955 to 1956; Director of the Special Studies Project for the Rockefeller Brothers Fund from 1956 to 1958; and Director of the Harvard Defense Studies Program from 1958 to 1971. He resigned from Harvard in January 1971 when his two-year leave of absence expired.

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In 1957 Kissinger published ''Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy,'' which proposed a flexible defense posture, including provision for "limited warfare" and the strategic employment of nuclear weapons as an alternative to the doctrine of "massive retaliation" against direct foreign aggression, which dominated military thinking during the mid-1950s. The book brought Kissinger to national attention, and he became an mid-level advisor on security questions under presidents [[Dwight D. Eisenhower]], [[John F. Kennedy]], and [[Lyndon B. Johnson]]; he was foreign policy advisor in [[Nelson Rockefeller]]'s 1968 quest for the Republican party nomination, but Nixon won the nomination and Kissinger switched to the winner.

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Kissinger was consultant to the Department of State (~~1965-68~~), United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (~~1961-68~~), Rand Corporation (~~1961-68~~), [[National Security Council]] (~~1961-62~~), Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (~~1959-60~~), Operations Coordinating Board (1955), Director of the Psychological Strategy Board (1952), Operations Research Office (1951), and Chairman of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (~~1983-84~~). In 2001 he was not appointed to head the commission studying the [[9-11 Attack]] because he was too controversial.

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Kissinger was consultant to the Department of State (1965–68), United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (1961–68), Rand Corporation (1961–68), [[National Security Council]] (1961–62), Weapons Systems Evaluation Group of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (1959–60), Operations Coordinating Board (1955), Director of the Psychological Strategy Board (1952), Operations Research Office (1951), and Chairman of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1983–84). In 2001 he was not appointed to head the commission studying the [[9-11 Attack]] because he was too controversial.

==National Security Advisor and Secretary of State==

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Kissinger's approach to foreign policy was shaped by his vision of world peace achieved through a global balance of power; and accordingly Kissinger believed that effective U.S. diplomacy needed to be backed by force and guided by the pragmatism of Realpolitik rather than by high ideals and abstract causes. In practice his diplomacy, which mixed a highly visible, personal style with secret, behind-the-scenes maneuverings, was marked by bold, often controversial, initiatives and by frequent travel between world capitals in what came to be known as "shuttle diplomacy".

===Nuclear strategy===

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On taling office Nixon and Kissinger were briefed on the US nuclear war plan, the [[Single Integrated Operational Plan]] (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans. Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department officials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear escalation or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP. Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting. In 1972 the John Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissinger's interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panel's report led to the controversial "Schlesinger Doctrine" and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.<ref> William Burr, "The Nixon Administration, the 'Horror Strategy,' and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2005 7(3): 34-78. Issn: 1520-3972 Fulltext: [[Project Muse]]; Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'—1945 to 1980," ''Journal of Strategic Studies,'' Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 37-71; Scott Sagan, ''Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security'' (1989). </ref>

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On taling office Nixon and Kissinger were briefed on the US nuclear war plan, the [[Single Integrated Operational Plan]] (SIOP). Appalled by the catastrophic scale of the SIOP, Nixon and Kissinger sought military options that were more credible than massive nuclear strikes. Participants in the Air Force Nuclear Options project also supported more flexible nuclear war plans. Although Kissinger repeatedly asked Defense Department officials to construct limited options, they were skeptical that it would be possible to control nuclear escalation or to introduce greater flexibility without weakening the SIOP. Interagency studies presented a mixed verdict about the desirability of limited options; nevertheless, continued White House pressure encouraged Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to sponsor a major review of nuclear targeting. In 1972 the John Foster panel developed concepts of limited, selective, and regional nuclear options that were responsive to Kissinger's interest in credible nuclear threats. The Foster panel's report led to the controversial "Schlesinger Doctrine" and further efforts to revise the SIOP, but serious questions endured about the whole concept of controlled nuclear warfare.<ref>William Burr, "The Nixon Administration, the 'Horror Strategy,' and the Search for Limited Nuclear Options, 1969-1972: Prelude to the Schlesinger Doctrine." ''Journal of Cold War Studies'' 2005 7(3): 34-78. Issn: 1520-3972 Fulltext: [[Project Muse]]; Aaron L. Friedberg, "A History of U.S. Strategic 'Doctrine'—1945 to 1980," ''Journal of Strategic Studies,'' Vol. 3, No. 4 (December 1980), pp. 37-71; Scott Sagan, ''Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security'' (1989).</ref>

===Détente with Soviet Union and China===

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Kissinger's first priority in office was the achievement of détente with the Soviet Union and China, and playing them off against each other . Recognizing and accepting the Soviet Union as a superpower, Kissinger sought both to maintain U.S. military strength and to inaugurate peaceful economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges to engage the Soviet Union in the international system. This policy flourished under Kissinger's direction and led in 1972 to the signing of the first [[Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty]] (SALT I). At the same time Kissinger successfully engineered a rapprochement with Communist China, leading to the astonishing news in 1971 that Nixon would visit China, which he and Kissinger did in 1972.<ref> Margaret Macmillan, ''Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World'' (2008)</ref>

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Kissinger's first priority in office was the achievement of détente with the Soviet Union and China, and playing them off against each other . Recognizing and accepting the Soviet Union as a superpower, Kissinger sought both to maintain U.S. military strength and to inaugurate peaceful economic, cultural, and scientific exchanges to engage the Soviet Union in the international system. This policy flourished under Kissinger's direction and led in 1972 to the signing of the first [[Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty]] (SALT I). At the same time Kissinger successfully engineered a rapprochement with Communist China, leading to the astonishing news in 1971 that Nixon would visit China, which he and Kissinger did in 1972.<ref>Margaret Macmillan, ''Nixon and Mao: The Week That Changed the World'' (2008)</ref>

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Aware that China and the Soviet Union were at sword's point, with rival claims to be the true Communists, Kissinger used the "Soviet card" to win over China by playing up the Soviet threat to the Chinese as a way of promoting closer relations with China. He even hinted at a US-China alliance to oppose the Soviets, and, with Nixon's trips to Moscow, hinted that China had better come to terms lest the US form an alliance with Moscow. The tactics worked, resulting in a friendly relationship with both Beijing and Moscow. As part of the détente, both powers reduced or ended their aid to North Vietnam, thus allowing a settlement of the [[Vietnam War]].<ref>Evelyn Goh, "Nixon, Kissinger, and the 'Soviet Card' in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971-1974." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(3): 475-502. </ref>

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Aware that China and the Soviet Union were at sword's point, with rival claims to be the true Communists, Kissinger used the "Soviet card" to win over China by playing up the Soviet threat to the Chinese as a way of promoting closer relations with China. He even hinted at a US-China alliance to oppose the Soviets, and, with Nixon's trips to Moscow, hinted that China had better come to terms lest the US form an alliance with Moscow. The tactics worked, resulting in a friendly relationship with both Beijing and Moscow. As part of the détente, both powers reduced or ended their aid to North Vietnam, thus allowing a settlement of the [[Vietnam War]].<ref>Evelyn Goh, "Nixon, Kissinger, and the 'Soviet Card' in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971-1974." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(3): 475-502.</ref>

"In the Soviet Union, there is really nobody left who has any memory of an entrepreneurial tradition," said Kissinger. "In China, there are many people left who participated in Chinese entrepreneurial life." He believed that a Sino-US alliance to oppose Soviet aggression could encourage internal reform within the Chinese system while promoting a more peaceful international order. After China made such reforms, hundreds of millions were lifted out of poverty.<ref>http://www.huliq.com/37702/rising-economic-growth-in-china-india-contributes-to-food-inflation "...hundreds of millions have been lifted out of poverty in the past few decades"</ref>

===Vietnam===

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Kissinger worked to achieve a disengagement of U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam. He promoted Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization," aimed at turning the burden of actual combat over to the South Vietnamese, with repeated shows of U.S. air strength, notably in the bombings of Cambodia and North Vietnam. Kissinger met secretly with North Vietnamese leaders in Paris from 1969 on, finally concluding a cease-fire in January 1973, for which he and chief North Vietnamese negotiator [[Le Duc Tho]] were awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize. Later rumors to the effect that Kissinger knew the South Vietnamese government was too weak to survive long were wrong; Kissinger and Nixon had built South Vietnam into one of the strongest militaries in ~~Asia--much~~ stronger than the North ~~Vietnamese--and~~ they had stripped away much of Hanoi's support from Moscow and Beijing. The problem was that Saigon put all its future on the continuation of Nixon in office and his promises to intervene militarily if necessary. Nixon collapsed unexpectedly (because of Watergate) and his personal promises were gone. Saigon despaired and desperately fought back when Hanoi did invade in 1975, after Nixon was gone and Congress forbad further American intervention.

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Kissinger worked to achieve a disengagement of U.S. forces fighting in Vietnam. He promoted Nixon's policy of "Vietnamization," aimed at turning the burden of actual combat over to the South Vietnamese, with repeated shows of U.S. air strength, notably in the bombings of Cambodia and North Vietnam. Kissinger met secretly with North Vietnamese leaders in Paris from 1969 on, finally concluding a cease-fire in January 1973, for which he and chief North Vietnamese negotiator [[Le Duc Tho]] were awarded the 1973 Nobel Peace Prize. Later rumors to the effect that Kissinger knew the South Vietnamese government was too weak to survive long were wrong; Kissinger and Nixon had built South Vietnam into one of the strongest militaries in Asia—much stronger than the North Vietnamese—and they had stripped away much of Hanoi's support from Moscow and Beijing. The problem was that Saigon put all its future on the continuation of Nixon in office and his promises to intervene militarily if necessary. Nixon collapsed unexpectedly (because of Watergate) and his personal promises were gone. Saigon despaired and desperately fought back when Hanoi did invade in 1975, after Nixon was gone and Congress forbad further American intervention.

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Demographic evidence indicates that the US bombings of Cambodia, especially the Menu bombings, ultimately killed about 40,000 Cambodian combatants and civilians.<ref>Marek Sliwinski, Le Génocide Khmer Rouge: Une Analyse Démographique (L’Harmattan, 1995), pp41-8.</ref> Some estimates go as high as 100,000 killed by the bombing.<ref>http://www.yale.edu/cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf</ref> The US Seventh Air Force argued that the bombing prevented the fall of Phnom Penh in 1973 by killing 16,000 of 25,500 Khmer Rouge fighters besieging the city. Documents uncovered from the Soviet archives after 1991 reveal that the North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1970 was launched at the explicit request of the Khmer Rouge and negotiated by Pol Pot's then second in command, Nuon Chea.<ref>Dmitry Mosyakov, “The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives,” in Susan E. Cook, ed., Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda (Yale Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series No. 1, 2004), p54ff. Availible online at: http://128.36.236.77/workpaper/pdfs/GS20.pdf "In ~~April-May~~ 1970, many North Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia in response to the call for help addressed to Vietnam not by Pol Pot, but by his deputy Nuon Chea. Nguyen Co Thach recalls: “Nuon Chea has asked for help and we have liberated five provinces of Cambodia in ten days.”"</ref>

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Demographic evidence indicates that the US bombings of Cambodia, especially the Menu bombings, ultimately killed about 40,000 Cambodian combatants and civilians.<ref>Marek Sliwinski, Le Génocide Khmer Rouge: Une Analyse Démographique (L’Harmattan, 1995), pp41-8.</ref> Some estimates go as high as 100,000 killed by the bombing.<ref>http://www.yale.edu/cgp/Walrus_CambodiaBombing_OCT06.pdf</ref> The US Seventh Air Force argued that the bombing prevented the fall of Phnom Penh in 1973 by killing 16,000 of 25,500 Khmer Rouge fighters besieging the city. Documents uncovered from the Soviet archives after 1991 reveal that the North Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1970 was launched at the explicit request of the Khmer Rouge and negotiated by Pol Pot's then second in command, Nuon Chea.<ref>Dmitry Mosyakov, “The Khmer Rouge and the Vietnamese Communists: A History of Their Relations as Told in the Soviet Archives,” in Susan E. Cook, ed., Genocide in Cambodia and Rwanda (Yale Genocide Studies Program Monograph Series No. 1, 2004), p54ff. Availible online at: http://128.36.236.77/workpaper/pdfs/GS20.pdf "In April–May 1970, many North Vietnamese forces entered Cambodia in response to the call for help addressed to Vietnam not by Pol Pot, but by his deputy Nuon Chea. Nguyen Co Thach recalls: “Nuon Chea has asked for help and we have liberated five provinces of Cambodia in ten days.”"</ref>

The communist leaders had expected that the ceasefire terms would favor their side. But Saigon, bolstered by a surge of U.S. aid received just before the ceasefire went into effect, began to roll back the Vietcong. The communists responded with a new strategy hammered out in a series of meetings in Hanoi in March 1973, according to the memoirs of Tran Van Tra.

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In 1974, Congress voted not to enforce the commitments agreed to in the Paris Peace Accords. Air support for Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos was cut off. The military aid promised was scaled back or never materialized, and the North was allowed to resume support for the Khmer Rouge. "After Nixon stepped down over Watergate," said one Communist commander, "we knew we would win."<ref>http://www.grunt.com/scuttlebutt/corps-stories/vietnam/north.asp</ref> Without the logistical support provided by the Ho Chi Minh trail, the North would not have been able to launch an invasion of South Vietnam by 1975, which it predicted would be its "last chance" before the South was self-sufficiently able to defend itself.<ref>http://www.grunt.com/scuttlebutt/corps-stories/vietnam/north.asp</ref> The US canceled the bombing of Communist positions on the trail. In Cambodia, last minute efforts on the part of the US to arrange for a peace settlement involving Sihanouk ended in failure. When the US Congress vetoed [[Ford]]'s call for a resumption of air support in Cambodia, panic and a sense of doom filled the capital, which was mercilessly shelled for more than a year by the Communists. President Ford openly predicted a "bloodbath" and stated that the Congress's decision to abandon Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge, in particular, would lead to "an unbelievable horror story".<ref>http://www.paulbogdanor.com/left/cambodia/bloodbath1.pdf</ref> The US frantically abandoned Saigon, and the Pathet Lao advanced throughout Laos. The Ford administration's prediction that the Khmer Rouge would murder at least one million people<ref>Washington Post, June 4, 23, 1975</ref> was laughed off by liberal reporters. Some journalists, mocking the claims of a bloodbath, were so bold as to sing the following lyrics to the tune of "''She Was Poor But She Was Honest''": "Oh will there be a dreadful bloodbath/ When the Khmer Rouge come to town?/ Aye, there'll be a dreadful bloodbath/ When the Khmer Rouge come to town."<ref>http://jim.com/canon.htm#ch2 From an important study by genocide survivor Sophal Ear. Note that the source is, of all people, William Shawcross.</ref>

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In one of [[~~Vietnam_War~~#Aftermath| the largest mass killings since the Nazi Holocaust]], the victorious Communists murdered 3-4 million people throughout Indochina, including over 2 million killed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia alone.

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In one of [[Vietnam War#Aftermath|the largest mass killings since the Nazi Holocaust]], the victorious Communists murdered 3-4 million people throughout Indochina, including over 2 million killed by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia alone.

===Middle East===

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Kissinger helped to diffuse sectarian conflicts in [[Lebanon]] in order to prevent a possible regional war, and opposed the Soviet-backed attempt by Communist forces to conquer North [[Yemen]] (which was the recipient of much US aid).

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On 20 July 1974, [[Turkey]] invaded northern [[Cyprus]], overthrew its Greek-backed dictatorship (headed by Nikos Sampson), and installed a new regime. This led to the collapse of the Greek military junta, and the restoration of democracy in Greece, three days ~~later--July~~ 23, 1974. Sampson had been brought to power by the Greek Cypriot national guard (acting under the orders of Athens), which ousted the elected president, Makarios; Turkey removed him from power after a mere eight days in office. "Had Turkey not intervened," Sampson told the Greek newspaper Eleftherotipia, "I would not only have proclaimed Enosis [union of Cyprus with Greece] but I would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus as well."<ref>http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/Most%20wanted/most%20wanted%20files/EOKA_Members_List_s.html</ref> Turkey took control of one-third of the country. Civilian casualties were remarkably light. Turkey restored democracy to Cyprus, and new elections brought Glafcos Clerides to power. President Makarios, in his speech to the UN Security Council on 19 July 1974, described the coup that replaced him as "an invasion of Cyprus by Greece."

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On 20 July 1974, [[Turkey]] invaded northern [[Cyprus]], overthrew its Greek-backed dictatorship (headed by Nikos Sampson), and installed a new regime. This led to the collapse of the Greek military junta, and the restoration of democracy in Greece, three days later—July 23, 1974. Sampson had been brought to power by the Greek Cypriot national guard (acting under the orders of Athens), which ousted the elected president, Makarios; Turkey removed him from power after a mere eight days in office. "Had Turkey not intervened," Sampson told the Greek newspaper Eleftherotipia, "I would not only have proclaimed Enosis [union of Cyprus with Greece] but I would have annihilated the Turks in Cyprus as well."<ref>http://www.britains-smallwars.com/cyprus/Most%20wanted/most%20wanted%20files/EOKA_Members_List_s.html</ref> Turkey took control of one-third of the country. Civilian casualties were remarkably light. Turkey restored democracy to Cyprus, and new elections brought Glafcos Clerides to power. President Makarios, in his speech to the UN Security Council on 19 July 1974, described the coup that replaced him as "an invasion of Cyprus by Greece."

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Both the Turks and the Greeks committed indiscriminate ethnic cleansing against the other side. <ref>http://www.hr-action.org/chr/ECHR01.html 1st Report of the European Commission of Human Rights; Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and aftermath (20 July 1974 - 18 May 1976)</ref><ref>http://www.hr-action.org/chr/ECHR02.html 2nd Report of the European Commission of Human Rights; Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and aftermath (19 May 1976 to 10 February 1983)</ref> Facts and information on the death and the burial site of 201 out of 500 cases of Turkish Cypriot "missing" persons were provided by the Cyprus government on 12 May 2003. A typical report stated:

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Both the Turks and the Greeks committed indiscriminate ethnic cleansing against the other side.<ref>http://www.hr-action.org/chr/ECHR01.html 1st Report of the European Commission of Human Rights; Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and aftermath (20 July 1974 - 18 May 1976)</ref><ref>http://www.hr-action.org/chr/ECHR02.html 2nd Report of the European Commission of Human Rights; Turkey's intervention in Cyprus and aftermath (19 May 1976 to 10 February 1983)</ref> Facts and information on the death and the burial site of 201 out of 500 cases of Turkish Cypriot "missing" persons were provided by the Cyprus government on 12 May 2003. A typical report stated:

In a Greek raid on a small Turkish village near Limassol, 36 people out of a population of 200 were killed. The Greeks said that they had been given orders to kill the inhabitants of the Turkish villages before the Turkish forces arrived.<ref>Washington Post, 23 July 1974

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===Major Controversies===

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[[Bryce Harlow]], former Eisenhower White House staff member, claimed to have "a double agent working in the White House....I kept Nixon informed." Harlow and [[Henry Kissinger]] (who was friendly with both campaigns and guaranteed a job in either a Humphrey or Nixon administration) separately predicted Johnson's "bombing halt": "The word is out that we are making an effort to throw the election to Humphrey. Nixon has been told of it," Democratic senator [[George Smathers]] informed Johnson. According to [[Robert Dallek]], Kissinger's advice "rested not on special knowledge of decision making at the White House but on an astute analyst's insight into what was happening." [[William Bundy]] stated that Kissinger obtained "no useful inside information" from his trip to Paris, and "almost any experienced Hanoi watcher might have come to the same conclusion". While Kissinger may have "hinted that his advice was based on contacts with the Paris delegation," this sort of "self-promotion....is at worst a minor and not uncommon practice, quite different from getting and reporting real secrets."<ref>[[Robert Dallek]] (2007), ''Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power'', HarperCollins, pp. 73-74.</ref> Nixon asked [[Anna Chennault]] to be his "channel to Mr. [[Nguyen van Thieu|Thieu]]"; Chennault agreed and periodically reported to [[John Mitchell]] that Thieu had no intention of attending a peace conference. On November 2, Chennault informed the South Vietnamese ambassador: "I have just heard from my boss in Albuquerque who says his boss [Nixon] is going to win. And you tell your boss [Thieu] to hold on a while longer." In 1997, Chennault admitted that "I was constantly in touch with Nixon and Mitchell."<ref>Dallek, pp. 74-75.</ref> In response, Johnson ordered wire-tapping members of the Nixon campaign.<ref>Dallek, p. 75.</ref> Dallek wrote that Nixon's efforts "probably made no difference" because Thieu was unwilling to attend the talks and there was little chance of an agreement being reached before the election; however, his use of information provided by Harlow and Kissinger was morally questionable, and Humphrey's decision not to make Nixon's actions public was "an uncommon act of political decency."<ref>Dallek, pp. 77-78.</ref> [[Conrad Black]] agreed that there is "no evidence" connecting Kissinger, who was "playing a fairly innocuous double game of self-promotion", with attempts to undermine the peace talks. Black further commented that "the Democrats were outraged at Nixon, but what Johnson was doing was equally questionable", and there is "no evidence" that Thieu "needed much prompting to discern which side he favored in the U.S. election."<ref>[[Conrad Black]] (2007), ''Richard Nixon: A Life in Full'', PublicAffairs, p. 553.</ref>

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[[Bryce Harlow]], former Eisenhower White House staff member, claimed to have "a double agent working in the White House....I kept Nixon informed." Harlow and Henry Kissinger (who was friendly with both campaigns and guaranteed a job in either a Humphrey or Nixon administration) separately predicted Johnson's "bombing halt": "The word is out that we are making an effort to throw the election to Humphrey. Nixon has been told of it," Democratic senator [[George Smathers]] informed Johnson. According to [[Robert Dallek]], Kissinger's advice "rested not on special knowledge of decision making at the White House but on an astute analyst's insight into what was happening." [[William Bundy]] stated that Kissinger obtained "no useful inside information" from his trip to Paris, and "almost any experienced Hanoi watcher might have come to the same conclusion". While Kissinger may have "hinted that his advice was based on contacts with the Paris delegation," this sort of "self-promotion....is at worst a minor and not uncommon practice, quite different from getting and reporting real secrets."<ref>[[Robert Dallek]] (2007), ''Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power'', HarperCollins, pp. 73-74.</ref> Nixon asked [[Anna Chennault]] to be his "channel to Mr. [[Nguyen van Thieu|Thieu]]"; Chennault agreed and periodically reported to [[John Mitchell]] that Thieu had no intention of attending a peace conference. On November 2, Chennault informed the South Vietnamese ambassador: "I have just heard from my boss in Albuquerque who says his boss [Nixon] is going to win. And you tell your boss [Thieu] to hold on a while longer." In 1997, Chennault admitted that "I was constantly in touch with Nixon and Mitchell."<ref>Dallek, pp. 74-75.</ref> In response, Johnson ordered wire-tapping members of the Nixon campaign.<ref>Dallek, p. 75.</ref> Dallek wrote that Nixon's efforts "probably made no difference" because Thieu was unwilling to attend the talks and there was little chance of an agreement being reached before the election; however, his use of information provided by Harlow and Kissinger was morally questionable, and Humphrey's decision not to make Nixon's actions public was "an uncommon act of political decency."<ref>Dallek, pp. 77-78.</ref> [[Conrad Black]] agreed that there is "no evidence" connecting Kissinger, who was "playing a fairly innocuous double game of self-promotion", with attempts to undermine the peace talks. Black further commented that "the Democrats were outraged at Nixon, but what Johnson was doing was equally questionable", and there is "no evidence" that Thieu "needed much prompting to discern which side he favored in the U.S. election."<ref>[[Conrad Black]] (2007), ''Richard Nixon: A Life in Full'', PublicAffairs, p. 553.</ref>

Kissinger was also accused of intentionally abandoning South Vietnam to Communist forces, the accusation which probably hurts him most today. He responded to this charge as follows:

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In 1976, Kissinger "declined to approve" that a letter be sent to Chile warning them against carrying out any political assassinations.<ref>http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/cable_ties_kissinger_to_chile_controversy/</ref> In an Aug. 30, 1976 memo, Shlaudeman discussed the possibility that the U.S. ambassador in Uruguay might be endangered by delivering a warning against assassination. The U.S. ambassador to Chile said that Pinochet might take as an insult any inference that he was connected with assassination plots.<ref>http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/cable_ties_kissinger_to_chile_controversy/</ref> When the CIA learned about the Chilean plan to set up a covert office in Miami as part of Chile's overseas operations in 1974, however, Kissinger did authorize the CIA to send the Chilean Directorate of National Intelligence (DINA) a warning not to go ahead with the plan. He rejected the State Department's proposal to publicly rebuke Chile on the matter. As a result, the Chileans backed down.<ref>http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Kissinger+DECLASSIFIED.(document+shows+Secretary+of+State+supported...-a054468923</ref> Kissinger's decision not to send the letter is considered a subject of controversy because Chile was engaging in a spree of international murders at the time (the day the letter was to be sent, a Pinochet critic was assassinated in [[Washington, D.C.]]).<ref>http://www.boston.com/news/nation/washington/articles/2010/04/10/cable_ties_kissinger_to_chile_controversy/</ref>

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Kissinger's alleged warm support of Pinochet is without much basis in fact; Kissinger and Ford began viewing Pinochet's regime as a serious Cold War liability as early as 1975 and the US engaged in repeated diplomatic confrontations with it from 1977 on.<ref>www.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_3236_1698/r92_fermandois_ing.pdf Translated from Spanish</ref> The CIA warned that "internationally, the Latin generals look like our guys;" therefore, the US had a vested interest in moderating the way they behaved.

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Kissinger's alleged warm support of Pinochet is without much basis in fact; Kissinger and Ford began viewing Pinochet's regime as a serious Cold War liability as early as 1975 and the US engaged in repeated diplomatic confrontations with it from 1977 on.<ref>http://www.cepchile.cl/dms/archivo_3236_1698/r92_fermandois_ing.pdf Translated from Spanish</ref> The CIA warned that "internationally, the Latin generals look like our guys;" therefore, the US had a vested interest in moderating the way they behaved.

The moderate left-wing extremist [[Christopher Hitchens]] has accused Kissinger of bad faith, describing him as a "toady" of Nixon who "knows what to do" without "being asked." He has also condemned Kissinger's business ties with Indonesia, arguing that they influenced the US "tilt" in favor of Suharto during the war in East Timor.<ref>http://www.etan.org/et2002a/february/01-09/09ksngr.htm</ref> In a general sense, Kissinger responded to these and similar charges by stating:

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</blockquote>

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''Contra'' Hitchens, Kissinger attempted to resign from the Nixon White House on at least three separate occasions<ref>http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,907332,00.html?promoid=googlep</ref>~~--not~~ exactly the sort of thing one would expect from a "toady."

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''Contra'' Hitchens, Kissinger attempted to resign from the Nixon White House on at least three separate occasions<ref>http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,907332,00.html?promoid=googlep</ref>—not exactly the sort of thing one would expect from a "toady."

Conrad Black has written that "Kissinger has sincere compassion for the victims of the grinding wheels of history," although "he tends to take his distance from the beleaguered...during their ordeals." On Vietnam, he maintains that Kissinger "toiled demiurgically for the war's end without a disaster, and his anger [at the Democrats and the media] is real and earned." The "claims of the demented left," that he committed "crimes against Cambodia or Chile" are "bunk."

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</blockquote>

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The death of Schneider had the opposite effect of what was intended by the Nixon ~~administration--even~~ as the CIA worked to buy off the Congress so as to prevent Allende's appointment, it ensured that the nation would rally behind the otherwise polarizing leader.

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The death of Schneider had the opposite effect of what was intended by the Nixon administration—even as the CIA worked to buy off the Congress so as to prevent Allende's appointment, it ensured that the nation would rally behind the otherwise polarizing leader.

==Evaluation==

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* Goh, Evelyn. "Nixon, Kissinger, and the 'Soviet Card' in the U.S. Opening to China, 1971-1974." ''Diplomatic History'' 2005 29(3): 475-502. Issn: 0145-2096 Fulltext: [[Ebsco]]

* Hanhimäki, Jussi M. "'Dr. Kissinger' or 'Mr. Henry'? Kissingerology, Thirty Years and Counting." ''Diplomatic History'' 2003 27(5): 637-676 full text at [[EBSCO]]

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* Hanhimäki, Jussi M. "Ironies and Turning Points: Détente in Perspective," in Odd Arne Westad, ed. ''Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory'' (2000), pp ~~326-42~~; [http://www.amazon.com/Reviewing-Cold-War-Approaches-Interpretations/dp/0714681202/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1215175936&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

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* Hanhimäki, Jussi M. "Ironies and Turning Points: Détente in Perspective," in Odd Arne Westad, ed. ''Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations, Theory'' (2000), pp 326–42; [http://www.amazon.com/Reviewing-Cold-War-Approaches-Interpretations/dp/0714681202/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1215175936&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

*Horne, Alistair. "Kissinger: 1973, The Crucial Year" (2009); one of the best books on the man.

* Isaacson, Walter. ''Kissinger'' (1992); a major biography [http://www.amazon.com/Kissinger-Biography-Walter-Isaacson/dp/0743286979/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211577598&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

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===Primary Sources===

* Kissinger, Henry. ''White House Years'' (1979). Nov. 1968-Jan. 1973; ''Years of Upheaval'' (1982). Jan. 1973 to Aug. 1974; ''Years of Renewal'' (1999), Aug. 1974 to Jan. 1977 [http://www.amazon.com/Years-Renewal-Henry-Kissinger/dp/075675383X/ref=sr_1_16?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211577632&sr=8-16 excerpt and text search vol 3]

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* Kissinger, Henry. "The Conservative Dilemma: Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich" ''The American Political Science Review,'' Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 1954), pp. ~~1017-1030~~ [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951008 in JSTOR]

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* Kissinger, Henry. "The Conservative Dilemma: Reflections on the Political Thought of Metternich" ''The American Political Science Review,'' Vol. 48, No. 4 (Dec., 1954), pp. 1017–1030 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1951008 in JSTOR]

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* Kissinger, Henry. "The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal," ''World Politics,'' Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jan., 1956), pp. ~~264-280~~ [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008974 in JSTOR]

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* Kissinger, Henry. "The Congress of Vienna: A Reappraisal," ''World Politics,'' Vol. 8, No. 2 (Jan., 1956), pp. 264–280 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2008974 in JSTOR]

* Kissinger, Henry. ''A World Restored: Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace 1812-22.'' (1957), his revised PhD dissertation.

* Kissinger, Henry. "Acceptance Speech" for The Nobel Peace Prize 1973 [http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1973/kissinger-acceptance.html online edition]

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* Kissinger, Henry. "Address to the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly," ''International Organization,'' Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer, 1974), pp. ~~573-583~~ [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706310 in JSTOR]

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* Kissinger, Henry. "Address to the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly," ''International Organization,'' Vol. 28, No. 3 (Summer, 1974), pp. 573–583 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/2706310 in JSTOR]

* Kissinger, Henry. ''American Foreign Policy'' (3rd ed. 1977), his speeches

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* Kissinger, Henry. "The Kissinger Commission on Population and Development in Central America," ''Population and Development Review,'' Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. ~~381-389~~ [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1973103 in JSTOR]

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* Kissinger, Henry. "The Kissinger Commission on Population and Development in Central America," ''Population and Development Review,'' Vol. 10, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 381–389 [http://www.jstor.org/stable/1973103 in JSTOR]

* Kissinger, Henry. ''Diplomacy'' (1994) an interpretive history since 1815

* Kissinger, Henry. ''Ending the Vietnam War: A History of America's Involvement in and Extrication from the Vietnam War'' (2003) [http://www.amazon.com/Ending-Vietnam-War-Involvement-Extrication/dp/074321532X/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1211741669&sr=8-1 excerpt and text search]

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[[Category:Cold War]]

[[Category:United States History]]

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[[~~category~~:~~diplomacy~~]]

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[[Category:Diplomacy]]

[[Category:Vietnam War]]

[[Category:1960s]]

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