Changes

===Operation Snow===

===Operation Snow===

With the signing of the [[Molotov-Ribbentrop pact]] and the truce with Japan after the [[Mongolia#Khalkhin_Gol|Battle of Khalkhin-Gol]], Stalin had non-aggression agreements with the major powers on his borders. Stalin initiated negotiations with Hitler about joining the Tripartite Pact of [[Nazi Germany]], [[Fascist Italy]] and Japan.<ref>"The participation of Russia in the Tripartite Pact appeared to [Molotov] entirely acceptable in principle, provided that Russia was to cooperate as a partner and not be merely an object." [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/nsr/nsr-06.html#17 Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Führer and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in the Presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, the Deputy People's Commissar, Dekanosov, as Well as of Counselor of Embassy Hilger and Herr Pavlov, Who Acted as Interpreters, on November 12, 1940]. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/nsr/nsr-06.html VI. The U.S.S.R. and the Three Power Pact, September 25-November 26, 1940]: Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie. United States Department of State. Publication 3023. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1948. Cf. Winston S. Churchill, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=z2n8MO3DQ68C Their Finest Hour]'', Vol. 2 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1986), ISBN 0395410568, p. 515</ref> Still, Moscow was uneasy about its security.  Moscow's intelligence services took an active role in attempting to deflect the Japanese away from the Soviet Union. First was their spymaster in Tokyo, [[Richard Sorge]]. Sorge was attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo. His assistant was [[Hotsumi Ozaki]], an adviser to Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] and spokesman for the South Manchurian Railroad. Mr. Ozaki was aided by [[Kinkazu Saionji]], Secretary of the Japanese Council of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]].<ref> Testimony of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, pp. 363-364; p. 505.</ref><ref>Jerrold and Leona Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets:  How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History'', Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, pg. 12, 36-39.</ref>

With the signing of the [[Molotov-Ribbentrop pact]] and the truce with Japan after the [[Mongolia#Khalkhin Gol|Battle of Khalkhin-Gol]], Stalin had non-aggression agreements with the major powers on his borders. Stalin initiated negotiations with Hitler about joining the Tripartite Pact of [[Nazi Germany]], [[Fascist Italy]] and Japan.<ref>"The participation of Russia in the Tripartite Pact appeared to [Molotov] entirely acceptable in principle, provided that Russia was to cooperate as a partner and not be merely an object." [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/nsr/nsr-06.html#17 Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Führer and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in the Presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, the Deputy People's Commissar, Dekanosov, as Well as of Counselor of Embassy Hilger and Herr Pavlov, Who Acted as Interpreters, on November 12, 1940]. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 [http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/nsr/nsr-06.html VI. The U.S.S.R. and the Three Power Pact, September 25-November 26, 1940]: Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie. United States Department of State. Publication 3023. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1948. Cf. Winston S. Churchill, ''[http://books.google.com/books?id=z2n8MO3DQ68C Their Finest Hour]'', Vol. 2 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1986), ISBN 0395410568, p. 515</ref> Still, Moscow was uneasy about its security.  Moscow's intelligence services took an active role in attempting to deflect the Japanese away from the Soviet Union. First was their spymaster in Tokyo, [[Richard Sorge]]. Sorge was attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo. His assistant was [[Hotsumi Ozaki]], an adviser to Japanese Premier [[Fumimaro Konoe]] and spokesman for the South Manchurian Railroad. Mr. Ozaki was aided by [[Kinkazu Saionji]], Secretary of the Japanese Council of the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]].<ref>Testimony of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, pp. 363-364; p. 505.</ref><ref>Jerrold and Leona Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets:  How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History'', Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, pg. 12, 36-39.</ref>

'''Japanese sanctions'''

'''Japanese sanctions'''

In May of 1941 White met for lunch with [[Vitaly Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who had served in the United States running the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose of "Operation Snow" was to present a series of policy initiatives to White which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S. Japanese relations. The Soviets' intent was for White to inject them into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion concerning Japan.  The objective was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, not Russia, as its main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes for White to promote among key U.S. policymakers, among them was a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China. <ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  White got the message and acted on it.

In May 1941 White met for lunch with [[Vitaly Pavlov]], [[KGB]] assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by [[Iskhak Akhmerov]], who had served in the United States running the [[Silvermaster group]] and knew White.  The purpose of "Operation Snow" was to present a series of policy initiatives to White which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S. Japanese relations. The Soviets' intent was for White to inject them into Washington's [[foreign policy]] discussion concerning Japan.  The objective was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, not Russia, as its main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes for White to promote among key U.S. policymakers, among them was a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China.<ref>Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3827/is_200101/ai_n8935656 Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look], Allan H Ryskind, ''Human Events'', Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, ''The Venona Secrets''.</ref>  White got the message and acted on it.

Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan. On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. virtually ending trade between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was made to negotiate with the US into the Fall. The Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington. <ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all plans against Soviet Siberia and looked to the south instead for  resources it needed. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref> Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan. On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. virtually ending trade between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was made to negotiate with the US into the Fall. The Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> Japan abandoned all plans against Soviet Siberia and looked to the south instead for  resources it needed. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.<ref>Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.</ref>

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] at Honolulu. US Ambassador Grew in Japan was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoe's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to US Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific." <ref>Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, l94l. Japan:1931-1941, II, p. 565.</ref> On August 26, Japanese Ambassador Nomura in Washington received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the  two leaders. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." <ref>Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.</ref>

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with [[Franklin Roosevelt|President Roosevelt]] at Honolulu. US Ambassador Grew in Japan was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoe's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to US Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific." <ref>Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, l94l. Japan:1931-1941, II, p. 565.</ref> On August 26, Japanese Ambassador Nomura in Washington received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the  two leaders. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." <ref>Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.</ref>

'''Lauchlin Currie'''

'''Lauchlin Currie'''

[[White House]] adviser and [[KGB]] agent [[Lauchlin Currie]] likewise was unalterably opposed to an American agreement with Japan because it could result in a breakdown of efforts to maintain a [[united front]].<ref>Memorandum by Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt, September 13, 1941.</ref> The British attitude was generally affirmative with regards to Konoe’s offer. Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, was "firmly of the opinion…it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude." <ref> The Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. October 3, l94l, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part l2, p. 5l.</ref>  Craigie stated to the British Foreign Office "Time suitable for real peace with Japan. Hope this time American cynicism will not be allowed to interfere with realistic statesmanship." <ref>[[Owen Lattimore]], American Political Advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, November 2, 194l, Foreign Relations, 1941, V, p. 747.</ref>

[[White House]] adviser and [[KGB]] agent [[Lauchlin Currie]] likewise was unalterably opposed to an American agreement with Japan because it could result in a breakdown of efforts to maintain a [[united front]].<ref>Memorandum by Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt, September 13, 1941.</ref> The British attitude was generally affirmative with regards to Konoe’s offer. Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, was "firmly of the opinion…it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude." <ref>The Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. October 3, l94l, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part l2, p. 5l.</ref>  Craigie stated to the British Foreign Office "Time suitable for real peace with Japan. Hope this time American cynicism will not be allowed to interfere with realistic statesmanship." <ref>[[Owen Lattimore]], American Political Advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, November 2, 194l, Foreign Relations, 1941, V, p. 747.</ref>

'''The Sorge ring'''

'''The Sorge ring'''

With the rejection of Konoe's offer, Richard Sorge dismantled his spy apparatus, confident both of a Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain, and of continued Japanese neutrality towards the Soviet Union. Dr. Anthony Kubek writes this suggests a motive for Communist agents in Washington. If Sorge had penetrated far enough into the Japanese military establishment as he seems to have done, to be certain that a preponderance of Japanese admirals would never fight a two-front war, the Soviet Union might conclude that precipitating an Anglo-American-Japanese war was a means of safeguarding Siberia. <ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

With the rejection of Konoe's offer, Richard Sorge dismantled his spy apparatus, confident both of a Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain, and of continued Japanese neutrality towards the Soviet Union. Dr. Anthony Kubek writes this suggests a motive for Communist agents in Washington. If Sorge had penetrated far enough into the Japanese military establishment as he seems to have done, to be certain that a preponderance of Japanese admirals would never fight a two-front war, the Soviet Union might conclude that precipitating an Anglo-American-Japanese war was a means of safeguarding Siberia.<ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, testified that Prince Konoe "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States."  There were certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding." <ref> Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.</ref> Roosevelt intimate adviser [[Harry Hopkins]], at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for [[Lend-Lease]] aid to the [[Kuomintang]]. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, testified that Prince Konoe "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States."  There were certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding." <ref>Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.</ref> Roosevelt intimate adviser [[Harry Hopkins]], at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for [[Lend-Lease]] aid to the [[Kuomintang]]. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.

'''Morgenthau Diaries'''

'''Morgenthau Diaries'''

At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>

At noon on November 25, Secretary of War [[Henry Stimson]] and Secretary of the Navy [[Frank Knox]] met at the White House with General [[George C. Marshall]]. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." <ref>Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.</ref>

In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Konoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941. <ref> Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref>

In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the [[attack on Pearl Harbor]], General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Konoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in [[World War II]] at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941.<ref>Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.</ref>

The pressure exerted by Harry Dexter White cannot be overlooked. A letter signed "Henry Morgenthau, Jr." was dispatched to President Roosevelt on the 24th or 25th of November. The President was reminded of the "supreme part" he was "to play in world affairs." This role could be played  

The pressure exerted by Harry Dexter White cannot be overlooked. A letter signed "Henry Morgenthau, Jr." was dispatched to President Roosevelt on the 24th or 25 November. The President was reminded of the "supreme part" he was "to play in world affairs." This role could be played  

{{Cquote|with complete effectiveness if only you retain the people's confidence in your courage and steadfastness…it is because you are the one statesman whose record has never been besmirched by even a trace of appeasement that the United States holds its unique and supreme position in world affairs today. Not the potential power of our great country, but your record, Mr. President, has placed the United States and you, its titular head and spokesman, in a position to exercise the leading force which will bring ultimate victory over aggression and Fascism.

{{Cquote|with complete effectiveness if only you retain the people's confidence in your courage and steadfastness…it is because you are the one statesman whose record has never been besmirched by even a trace of appeasement that the United States holds its unique and supreme position in world affairs today. Not the potential power of our great country, but your record, Mr. President, has placed the United States and you, its titular head and spokesman, in a position to exercise the leading force which will bring ultimate victory over aggression and Fascism.

Mr. President, I want to explain in language as strong as I can command… No matter what explanation is offered the public of a "truce" with Japan the American people, the Chinese people, and the oppressed peoples of Europe, as well as those forces in Britain and Russia who are with us in this fight, will regard it as a confession of American weakness and vacillation…The parallel with [[Munich conference|Munich]] is inescapable. <ref>White MS, Princeton University. Quoted in ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959.</ref>}}

Mr. President, I want to explain in language as strong as I can command… No matter what explanation is offered the public of a "truce" with Japan the American people, the Chinese people, and the oppressed peoples of Europe, as well as those forces in Britain and Russia who are with us in this fight, will regard it as a confession of American weakness and vacillation…The parallel with [[Munich conference|Munich]] is inescapable.<ref>White MS, Princeton University. Quoted in ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959.</ref>}}

On November 18, 1941, Secretary Morgenthau sent to Hull a long memorandum drafted by White with reference to the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan. <ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>

On November 18, 1941, Secretary Morgenthau sent to Hull a long memorandum drafted by White with reference to the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan.<ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>

'''Institute of Pacific Relations'''

'''Institute of Pacific Relations'''

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative [[Owen Lattimore]], whom FDR appointed special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]] at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence  Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the intransigent ultimatum when Congress investigated the Pearl Harbor attack. <ref> Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative [[Owen Lattimore]], whom FDR appointed special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]] at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence  Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the intransigent ultimatum when Congress investigated the Pearl Harbor attack.<ref>Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>

On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape the ultimatum. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by White. In other words, Harry Dexter White, agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim  of the Soviet Union in the Far East.

On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape the ultimatum. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.<ref>[http://sandiego.indymedia.org/media/2006/10/119975.pdf ''Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time''], Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X</ref> In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by White. In other words, Harry Dexter White, agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim  of the Soviet Union in the Far East.

===Betrayal of the Kuomintang===

===Betrayal of the Kuomintang===

[[Chiang Kai-shek]] himself would claim that White and his staff sabotaged the Chinese government's economic policies.  The U.S. government had made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to curb inflation in Nationalist China. <ref>[[David Rees]], ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref>  White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote,  

[[Chiang Kai-shek]] himself would claim that White and his staff sabotaged the Chinese government's economic policies.  The U.S. government had made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to curb inflation in Nationalist China.<ref>[[David Rees]], ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', London, 1974, pg. 333.</ref>  White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote,  

{{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year.  We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time.<ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}}

{{Cquote|We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year.  We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time.<ref>David Rees, ''Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox'', pg. 326.</ref>}}

Senator William Jenner's Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments Investigation by the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] looked extensively into the problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials, specifically Harry Dexter White. Part of its report looked into the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in [[China]] and was published as the ''Morgenthau Diary''. <ref>[http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103 Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, Records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65].</ref> The Report stated,  

Senator William Jenner's Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments Investigation by the [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] looked extensively into the problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials, specifically Harry Dexter White. Part of its report looked into the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in [[China]] and was published as the ''Morgenthau Diary''.<ref>[http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103 Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, Records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65].</ref> The Report stated,  

"The concentration of Communist sympathizers in the [[Treasury Department]], and particularly the Division of Monetary Research, is now a matter of record. White was the first director of that division; those who succeeded him in the directorship were [[Frank Coe]] and [[Harold Glasser]]. Also attached to the Division of Monetary Research were [[Lud Ullman|William Ludwig Ullman]], [[Irving Kaplan]], and [[Victor Perlo]]. White, Coe, Glasser, Kaplan, and Perlo were all identified as participants in the Communist conspiracy."<ref>United States Government Printing Office, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Introduction, by Dr. Anthony Kubek, Professor of History at Dallas University, November 1967, two volumes, v.i., pg. 80.</ref>

"The concentration of Communist sympathizers in the [[Treasury Department]], and particularly the Division of Monetary Research, is now a matter of record. White was the first director of that division; those who succeeded him in the directorship were [[Frank Coe]] and [[Harold Glasser]]. Also attached to the Division of Monetary Research were [[Lud Ullman|William Ludwig Ullman]], [[Irving Kaplan]], and [[Victor Perlo]]. White, Coe, Glasser, Kaplan, and Perlo were all identified as participants in the Communist conspiracy."<ref>United States Government Printing Office, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Introduction, by Dr. Anthony Kubek, Professor of History at Dallas University, November 1967, two volumes, v.i., pg. 80.</ref>

===Transfer of Occupation Currency Plates===

===Transfer of Occupation Currency Plates===

Shortly after the [[Teheran conference]], Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) requested that a common currency be prepared for the occupation of Germany. It was decided that the U.S. would print the Allied Marks (AM). <ref>Vladimir Petrov, ''Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II'', Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, pgs. 110 - 112.</ref>

Shortly after the [[Teheran conference]], Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) requested that a common currency be prepared for the occupation of Germany. It was decided that the U.S. would print the Allied Marks (AM).<ref>Vladimir Petrov, ''Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II'', Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, pgs. 110 - 112.</ref>

Moscow printed up enough AM marks to provide their entire army six years of back pay. Black market activity thrived. A GI could buy a package of cigarettes for eight cents and resell them to a Russian soldier for 100 AM marks or $10. A 5-cent candy bar sold for $5. K-rations brought $20 and a pound of coffee $25. G.I.s sold watches for the equivalent of $500 to $2500 each. By one estimate, more than 33,000 GIs sent home an average of $12,000 from Berlin. Only when the U.S. Army reached an overdraft of $271,000,000 did Congress act. <ref>George Racey Jordan, with Richard L. Stokes, ''From Major Jordan's Diaries'', New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952, pg. 230.</ref><ref>Schecter and Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets'', pgs. 122-123.</ref>

Moscow printed up enough AM marks to provide their entire army six years of back pay. Black market activity thrived. A GI could buy a package of cigarettes for eight cents and resell them to a Russian soldier for 100 AM marks or $10. A 5-cent candy bar sold for $5. K-rations brought $20 and a pound of coffee $25. G.I.s sold watches for the equivalent of $500 to $2500 each. By one estimate, more than 33,000 GIs sent home an average of $12,000 from Berlin. Only when the U.S. Army reached an overdraft of $271,000,000 did Congress act.<ref>George Racey Jordan, with Richard L. Stokes, ''From Major Jordan's Diaries'', New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952, pg. 230.</ref><ref>Schecter and Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets'', pgs. 122-123.</ref>

Original Allied plans called for approximately fifteen billion AM marks to be printed. The Soviets printed more than seventy-eight billion of their own. <ref>Schecter and Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets'', p. 122.</ref>

Original Allied plans called for approximately fifteen billion AM marks to be printed. The Soviets printed more than seventy-eight billion of their own.<ref>Schecter and Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets'', p. 122.</ref>

A KGB document, dated 15 April 1944, has come to light in the last few years and put [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s accusation into a broader context. This document states "[on] 14 April that Harry Dexter White following our instructions passed through to [[Greg Silvermaster|Silvermaster]] attained the positive decision of the Treasury Department to provide the Soviet side with the plates for engraving German occupation marks...." <ref>Schecter and Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets''.</ref>

A KGB document, dated 15 April 1944, has come to light in the last few years and put [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s accusation into a broader context. This document states "[on] 14 April that Harry Dexter White following our instructions passed through to [[Greg Silvermaster|Silvermaster]] attained the positive decision of the Treasury Department to provide the Soviet side with the plates for engraving German occupation marks...." <ref>Schecter and Schecter, ''Sacred Secrets''.</ref>

On December 4, 1945, the FBI transmitted to President Truman a report entitled "Soviet Espionage in the United States." The report summarized White's espionage activities. Copies of the report were sent to Attorney General [[Tom C. Clark|Thomas Clark]] too. The evidence indicated a substantial spy ring operating within the Government and involving White. Six weeks later President Truman, on Jan. 23, 1946, publicly announced his nomination of Harry Dexter White for appointment to head the International Monetary Fund.

On December 4, 1945, the FBI transmitted to President Truman a report entitled "Soviet Espionage in the United States." The report summarized White's espionage activities. Copies of the report were sent to Attorney General [[Tom C. Clark|Thomas Clark]] too. The evidence indicated a substantial spy ring operating within the Government and involving White. Six weeks later President Truman, on Jan. 23, 1946, publicly announced his nomination of Harry Dexter White for appointment to head the International Monetary Fund.

On July 31st 1948, [[Elizabeth Bentley]] told the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] that White had been involved in espionage activities on behalf of the [[Soviet Union]] during [[World War II]].<ref> [http://foia.fbi.gov/silversm/silversm2b.pdf Elizabeth Bentley Deposition, FBI Silvermaster file, p. 27].</ref> Bentley said she received information passed information to her from him.  

On July 31, 1948, [[Elizabeth Bentley]] told the [[House Committee on Un-American Activities]] that White had been involved in espionage activities on behalf of the [[Soviet Union]] during [[World War II]].<ref>[http://foia.fbi.gov/silversm/silversm2b.pdf Elizabeth Bentley Deposition, FBI Silvermaster file, p. 27].</ref> Bentley said she received information passed information to her from him.  

[[Whittaker Chambers]] subsequently testified on August 3rd of his association with White in the [[Communist]] underground secret apparatus up to 1938. <ref>[http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-3testimony.html Testimony of Whittaker Chambers before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (August 3, 1948)].</ref> FBI laboratories established a highly confidential handwritten memorandum provided to Chambers in 1938 was White's handwriting. Bentley said White’s colleagues had passed information to her from him and accused White of providing stolen U.S. currency plates to the Soviet Union. The plates were used to print unlimited amounts of occupation currency in the eastern zone of postwar Germany precipitating the [[Berlin Blockade|Berlin Crisis]].  

[[Whittaker Chambers]] subsequently testified on August 3 of his association with White in the [[Communist]] underground secret apparatus up to 1938.<ref>[http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/hiss/8-3testimony.html Testimony of Whittaker Chambers before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (August 3, 1948)].</ref> FBI laboratories established a highly confidential handwritten memorandum provided to Chambers in 1938 was White's handwriting. Bentley said White’s colleagues had passed information to her from him and accused White of providing stolen U.S. currency plates to the Soviet Union. The plates were used to print unlimited amounts of occupation currency in the eastern zone of postwar Germany precipitating the [[Berlin Blockade|Berlin Crisis]].  

On August 14th 1948, Harry Dexter White appeared before the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]] to defend his reputation. White, though recovering from a series of heart attacks, stoutly proclaimed his lifelong commitment to the principles of democracy and the ideals of Roosevelt's New Deal. He died of a heart attack three days later.

On August 14, 1948, Harry Dexter White appeared before the [[House Un-American Activities Committee]] to defend his reputation. White, though recovering from a series of heart attacks, stoutly proclaimed his lifelong commitment to the principles of democracy and the ideals of Roosevelt's New Deal. He died of a heart attack three days later.

In a memorandum dated 15 October 1950 White was [[conclusive]]ly identified in the [[Venona]] papers as a Soviet agent code named "Jurist". <ref>Posthumous [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memorandum_identifying_Harry_Dexter_White_as_agent_Jurist| FBI Memorandum conclusively identifies Harry Dexter White as KGB Agent Jurist] (1950).</ref>Venona ciphers quote him as saying he was willing for any self-sacrifice on behalf of the [[KGB]], but was afraid that his activities, if exposed, might lead to a political scandal and have an effect on the 1944 Presidential election. In 1953 [[J. Edgar Hoover]] convinced [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[Herbert Brownell, Jr.|Brownell]] that White was a spy. White's bronze bust was ignominiously removed to the IMF's basement.

In a memorandum dated 15 October 1950 White was [[conclusive]]ly identified in the [[Venona]] papers as a Soviet agent code named "Jurist".<ref>Posthumous [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/FBI_Memorandum_identifying_Harry_Dexter_White_as_agent_Jurist FBI Memorandum conclusively identifies Harry Dexter White as KGB Agent Jurist] (1950).</ref> Venona ciphers quote him as saying he was willing for any self-sacrifice on behalf of the [[KGB]], but was afraid that his activities, if exposed, might lead to a political scandal and have an effect on the 1944 Presidential election. In 1953 [[J. Edgar Hoover]] convinced [[United States Attorney General|Attorney General]] [[Herbert Brownell, Jr.|Brownell]] that White was a spy. White's bronze bust was ignominiously removed to the IMF's basement.

In 1953, Senator [[Joseph McCarthy]] and Attorney General [[Herbert Brownell, Jr.]] alleged that Truman had known White was a Soviet spy when he appointed him to the IMF. <ref>[http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,823119,00.html Time Magazine, ''The White Case Record'', Nov. 30, 1953].</ref>However, this has now been refuted by declassified documents through the [[Freedom of Information Act]] which attest President Truman and the White House had not known of the existence of the Venona project. <ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Chairman's Forward, Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy] (1997).</ref>  

In 1953, Senator [[Joseph McCarthy]] and Attorney General [[Herbert Brownell, Jr.]] alleged that Truman had known White was a Soviet spy when he appointed him to the IMF.<ref>[http://time-proxy.yaga.com/time/archive/preview/0,10987,823119,00.html Time Magazine, ''The White Case Record'', Nov. 30, 1953].</ref> However, this has now been refuted by declassified documents through the [[Freedom of Information Act]] which attest President Truman and the White House had not known of the existence of the Venona project.<ref>[http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Chairman's Forward, Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy] (1997).</ref>  

The 1997 [[bipartisan]] [[Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy]], chaired by Senator [[Daniel Patrick Moynihan]], states in its findings,

The 1997 [[bipartisan]] [[Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy]], chaired by Senator [[Daniel Patrick Moynihan]], states in its findings,