Harry Dexter White

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Harry Dexter White

Harry Dexter White (October 9, 1892 – August 16, 1948) was an American economist and senior U.S. Department of Treasury official. He was the first head of the International Monetary Fund, played an important role in formation of the World Bank. He was also a Soviet secret agent—"the most highly-placed asset the Soviets possessed in the American government."[1] White succeeded in subverting American policy to favor Soviet interests over U.S. interests. Unlike other Comintern operatives such as Alger Hiss or Julius Rosenberg, White died before he could be brought to trial. Consequently, Harry Dexter White's case has not been publicly scrutinized as closely as the Hiss and Rosenberg cases, yet in some respects, White's subversion of US foreign policy may have been even more damaging.

Early life

The son of Lithuanian immigrants, White was born in Boston, Massachusetts. As a young man, he served in the U.S. Army, fighting in France during World War I.

After leaving the military, he began his education at Columbia University, then transferred to Stanford where he earned a degree in economics. He received a doctorate degree in economics from Harvard University in 1932. White also studied Russian with the intent of gaining a fellowship to study economic planning in Russia. White took up a teaching post at Lawrence University in Appleton, Wisconsin. He moved to Washington, D.C. in 1933.

New Dealer

In 1934, Jacob Viner, a professor at the University of Chicago working at the U.S. Treasury Department, wrote to White offering him a job in the US Treasury. In his early years White concentrated on the relationship that gold and silver had to currency management. He also became an expert on Japanese and Chinese monetary policy. As early as 1935 White agreed to pass on Treasury documents for Whitaker Chambers to photograph and return. In the latter half of the thirties met with John Maynard Keynes and other leading economists.

In December 1941 after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau gave White the responsibility to "take supervision over and assume full responsibility for Treasury's participation in all economic and financial matters...in connection with the operation of the Army and Navy and the civilian affairs in the foreign areas in which our armed forces are operating or are likely to operate" and to act as liaison between the Treasury and the State Department on all matters having a bearing on foreign relations. White was also given "responsibility for the management and operation of the Exchange Stabilization Fund without a change in its procedures."

Another of White's value to Soviet intelligence was his ability to place in the Treasury Department individuals the Silvermaster ring wanted to have assigned in the department. Among them were Lud Ullman, William Henry Taylor, and Sonia Gold.

After the war, White was closely involved with setting up what were called the Bretton Woods institutions - the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. These institutions were intended to prevent some of the economic problems that occurred after the First World War. However, since White was a Soviet agent, & Stalin sought to undermine capitalism whenever the opportunity availed itself, one cannot be sure of White's intentions.

Policy subversion

The accusations against White revolve around four incidents with which White was involved.

  • White was the real author of the Morgenthau plan to "turn Germany into a potato field," which when leaked, united non-Nazis with Nazis, stiffened resistance, and prolonged the war.
  • White used his position in the Treasury Department to develop a hostile U.S. policy toward Japan. The reason was to distract Japan from their plans to attack the Soviet Union and draw the U.S. into the war as an ally with the Soviet Union. White was the author of an extreme ultimatum that Japan could not comply with in the days just prior to the attack on Pearl Harbor.
  • White delayed financial support mandated by law to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist Chinese government causing the triumph of Mao Tse-Tung's Communist Chinese government.
  • White was instrumental in handing over the Allied Military mark printing plates to the Soviets. This caused a $250,000,000 deficit in the occupational government budget paid out by the U.S. Treasury. This in effect amounted to the US taxpayer paying the salaries of Soviet occupation troops at a time when US/Soviet relations were deteriorating precisely because of the presence and behavior of Soviet occupation forces in Eastern Europe.

White's accusers claim all this was done at the behest of Soviet intelligence to the detriment of U.S. policy and national security.

Operation Snow

With the signing of the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact and the truce with Japan after the Battle of Khalkhin-Gol, Stalin had non-aggression agreements with the major powers on his borders. Stalin initiated negotiations with Hitler about joining the Tripartite Pact of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and Japan.[2] Still, Moscow was uneasy about its security. Moscow's intelligence services took an active role in attempting to deflect the Japanese away from the Soviet Union. First was their spymaster in Tokyo, Richard Sorge. Sorge was attached to the German Embassy in Tokyo. His assistant was Hotsumi Ozaki, an adviser to Japanese Premier Fumimaro Konoe and spokesman for the South Manchurian Railroad. Mr. Ozaki was aided by Kinkazu Saionji, Secretary of the Japanese Council of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[3][4]

Japanese sanctions

In May 1941 White met for lunch with Vitaly Pavlov, KGB assistant to the Chief of Military Section for work in the United States and Canada. White had been carefully selected by Iskhak Akhmerov, who had served in the United States running the Silvermaster group and knew White. The purpose of "Operation Snow" was to present a series of policy initiatives to White which involved Soviet efforts to worsen U.S. Japanese relations. The Soviets' intent was for White to inject them into Washington's foreign policy discussion concerning Japan. The objective was to encourage Japan's war party to view the United States, not Russia, as its main enemy. Pavlov handed White an outline of themes for White to promote among key U.S. policymakers, among them was a demand, to be wrapped in tough rhetoric, that Japan recall its armed forces from China.[5][6] White got the message and acted on it.

Roosevelt accepted White's proposals for economic sanctions against Japan. On July 26, 1941, Roosevelt implemented a full scale economic blockade, froze all Japanese financial assets in the U.S. virtually ending trade between the two countries. Japan found itself in a position where its oil reserves would be exhausted in two years, its aluminum reserves in seven months. The chief of the Navy told the emperor that if Japan resorted to war, it would be very doubtful that it could win. The decision was made to negotiate with the US into the Fall. The Cabinet sought desperately to reach an agreement in Washington.[7] Japan abandoned all plans against Soviet Siberia and looked to the south instead for resources it needed. Due to White's involvement and influence, the U.S. set up a foreign policy that placed the Kremlin's interests ahead of the White House's.[8]

In August, 1941, Prime Minister Konoe, realizing the situation with the United States was getting worse, made a proposal to meet with President Roosevelt at Honolulu. US Ambassador Grew in Japan was so deeply impressed with the sincerity of Konoe's plea that he immediately sent a dispatch to US Secretary of State Cordell Hull and urged, "with all the force at his command, for the sake of avoiding the obviously growing possibility of an utterly futile war between Japan and the United States, that this Japanese proposal not be turned aside without very prayerful consideration.... The opportunity is here presented... for an act of the highest statesmanship... with the possible overcoming thereby of apparently insurmountable obstacles to peace hereafter in the Pacific." [9] On August 26, Japanese Ambassador Nomura in Washington received an urgent message which expressed an almost frantic desire to arrange a meeting between the two leaders. The instruction stated: "Now the international as well as our internal situation is strained in the extreme and we have reached the point where we will pin our last hope on an interview between the Premier and the President." [10]

Since the end of 1940 Ambassador Grew stressed US and Japanese differences "could and would be solved if the proposed meeting between Prince Konoe and the President should take place." [11] When Ambassador Grew urged President Roosevelt to make a speech at the earliest possible moment in order that the Japanese public would gain knowledge of the United States true intentions, his "recommendation was not carried out." "Why?" Grew asked: "History will wish to know." In his opinion this gesture "might well have turned the whole trend in Japan at this critical time." [12] Following the outbreak of war Grew asked the Secretary why Konoe's important proposal had not been accepted. Grew "wondered whether Mr. Hull had been given and had read all of the dispatches from Tokyo." [13]

Lauchlin Currie

White House adviser and KGB agent Lauchlin Currie likewise was unalterably opposed to an American agreement with Japan because it could result in a breakdown of efforts to maintain a united front.[14] The British attitude was generally affirmative with regards to Konoe's offer. Sir Robert Craigie, British Ambassador in Tokyo, was "firmly of the opinion…it would be a foolish policy if this superb opportunity is permitted to slip by assuming an unduly suspicious attitude." [15] Craigie stated to the British Foreign Office "Time suitable for real peace with Japan. Hope this time American cynicism will not be allowed to interfere with realistic statesmanship." [16]

The Sorge ring

With the rejection of Konoe's offer, Richard Sorge dismantled his spy apparatus, confident both of a Japanese war against the United States and Great Britain, and of continued Japanese neutrality towards the Soviet Union. Dr. Anthony Kubek writes this suggests a motive for Communist agents in Washington. If Sorge had penetrated far enough into the Japanese military establishment as he seems to have done, to be certain that a preponderance of Japanese admirals would never fight a two-front war, the Soviet Union might conclude that precipitating an Anglo-American-Japanese war was a means of safeguarding Siberia.[17]

Major General Charles A. Willoughby, American Intelligence Chief in the Far East, testified that Prince Konoe "was desperately serious in effecting a last minute understanding with the United States." There were certain "unidentified" persons in the United States who "were opposed to such an understanding." [18] Roosevelt intimate adviser Harry Hopkins, at this very time, took Currie on as deputy for Lend-Lease aid to the Kuomintang. Currie and one of the Hiss brothers were at this time, in daily consultation with Harry Dexter White.

Morgenthau Diaries

Harry Dexter White, who was in the habit of preparing notes to the President for Secretary Morgenthau to sign.[19] submitted an appeal to the President:

Oil - rivers of oil - will soon be flowing to the Japanese … To sell China to her enemies for the thirty blood-stained coins of gold will not only weaken our national policy in Europe as well as in the Far East, but will dim the bright lustre of America's world leadership… On this day, Mr. President, the whole country looks to you to save America's power as well as her sacred honor….

The Soviet Union stood to gain vitally from a U.S.- Japanese war. Roosevelt-Konoe in agreement would have left Japanese troops as a threat to Siberia, immobilizing Soviet forces as far as the European war was concerned.

At noon on November 25, Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox met at the White House with General George C. Marshall. Stimson wrote in his diary the main question was "how we should maneuver them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too much danger to ourselves. It was a difficult proposition." [20]

In his testimony before the Congressional Committee investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor, General Marshall said that if the 90-day truce which was the substance of the Konoe-Roosevelt proposal had been effected, the United States might never have become involved in World War II at all; that a delay by the Japanese from December, 1941 into January, 1942 might have resulted in a change of Japanese opinion as to the wisdom of the attack because of the collapse of the German front before Moscow in December, 1941.[21]

The pressure exerted by Harry Dexter White cannot be overlooked. A letter signed "Henry Morgenthau, Jr." was dispatched to President Roosevelt on the 24th or 25 November. The President was reminded of the "supreme part" he was "to play in world affairs." This role could be played

with complete effectiveness if only you retain the people's confidence in your courage and steadfastness…it is because you are the one statesman whose record has never been besmirched by even a trace of appeasement that the United States holds its unique and supreme position in world affairs today. Not the potential power of our great country, but your record, Mr. President, has placed the United States and you, its titular head and spokesman, in a position to exercise the leading force which will bring ultimate victory over aggression and Fascism.

Mr. President, I want to explain in language as strong as I can command… No matter what explanation is offered the public of a "truce" with Japan the American people, the Chinese people, and the oppressed peoples of Europe, as well as those forces in Britain and Russia who are with us in this fight, will regard it as a confession of American weakness and vacillation…The parallel with Munich is inescapable.[22]

On November 18, 1941, Secretary Morgenthau sent to Hull a long memorandum drafted by White with reference to the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan.[23]

Institute of Pacific Relations

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative Owen Lattimore, whom FDR appointed special advisor to Chiang Kai-shek at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan. Currie's assistant in the White House, Michael Greenberg, was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.[24] Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the intransigent ultimatum when Congress investigated the Pearl Harbor attack.[25]

On the afternoon of November 26, 1941, Hull abandoned all thought of a truce with Japan and put in final shape the ultimatum. Hull's use of the harsh, demanding language only strengthened the position of the war party in Tokyo. Nomura found it impossible to reach an agreement because the demands were extreme.[26] In this ten-point ultimatum, eight of the drastic demands were written by White. In other words, Harry Dexter White, agent of the Soviet Union, helped in a decisive way to draft the ultimatum that provoked war between Japan and the United States. This was the primary aim of the Soviet Union in the Far East.

Betrayal of the Kuomintang

Chiang Kai-shek himself would claim that White and his staff sabotaged the Chinese government's economic policies. The U.S. government had made a commitment to Chiang in writing to supply $200 million in gold to curb inflation in Nationalist China.[27] White's policy prevented the shipment until it was too late to be effective in stemming the inflation. In a December 9, 1944 memo to Treasury Secretary Morgenthau, White wrote,

We have stalled as much as we have dared and have succeeded in limiting gold shipments to $26 million during the past year. We think it would be a serious mistake to permit further large shipments at this time.[28]

Senator William Jenner's Interlocking Subversion in Government Departments Investigation by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee looked extensively into the problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials, specifically Harry Dexter White. Part of its report looked into the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China and was published as the Morgenthau Diary.[29] The Report stated, "The concentration of Communist sympathizers in the Treasury Department, and particularly the Division of Monetary Research, is now a matter of record. White was the first director of that division; those who succeeded him in the directorship were Frank Coe and Harold Glasser. Also attached to the Division of Monetary Research were William Ludwig Ullman, Irving Kaplan, and Victor Perlo. White, Coe, Glasser, Kaplan, and Perlo were all identified as participants in the Communist conspiracy."[30]

Transfer of Occupation Currency Plates

Shortly after the Teheran conference, Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) requested that a common currency be prepared for the occupation of Germany. It was decided that the U.S. would print the Allied Marks (AM).[31]

Moscow printed up enough AM marks to provide their entire army six years of back pay. Black market activity thrived. A GI could buy a package of cigarettes for eight cents and resell them to a Russian soldier for 100 AM marks or $10. A 5-cent candy bar sold for $5. K-rations brought $20 and a pound of coffee $25. G.I.s sold watches for the equivalent of $500 to $2500 each. By one estimate, more than 33,000 GIs sent home an average of $12,000 from Berlin. Only when the U.S. Army reached an overdraft of $271,000,000 did Congress act.[32][33]

Original Allied plans called for approximately fifteen billion AM marks to be printed. The Soviets printed more than seventy-eight billion of their own.[34]

A KGB document, dated 15 April 1944, has come to light in the last few years and put Elizabeth Bentley's accusation into a broader context. This document states "[on] 14 April that Harry Dexter White following our instructions passed through to Silvermaster attained the positive decision of the Treasury Department to provide the Soviet side with the plates for engraving German occupation marks...." [35]

Post war

Washington Evening Star May 4, 1946 announcement of White's appointment to head the IMF. President Truman said, "I am confident that in your new position you will add distinction to your already distinguished career with Treasury." The appointment came after the White House had been alerted by J. Edgar Hoover to White's suspected espionage activity.

On December 4, 1945, the FBI transmitted to President Truman a report entitled "Soviet Espionage in the United States." The report summarized White's espionage activities. Copies of the report were sent to Attorney General Thomas Clark too. The evidence indicated a substantial spy ring operating within the Government and involving White. Six weeks later President Truman, on Jan. 23, 1946, publicly announced his nomination of Harry Dexter White for appointment to head the International Monetary Fund.

On July 31, 1948, Elizabeth Bentley told the House Committee on Un-American Activities that White had been involved in espionage activities on behalf of the Soviet Union during World War II.[36] Bentley said she received information passed information to her from him.

Whittaker Chambers subsequently testified on August 3 of his association with White in the Communist underground secret apparatus up to 1938.[37] FBI laboratories established a highly confidential handwritten memorandum provided to Chambers in 1938 was White's handwriting. Bentley said White's colleagues had passed information to her from him and accused White of providing stolen U.S. currency plates to the Soviet Union. The plates were used to print unlimited amounts of occupation currency in the eastern zone of postwar Germany precipitating the Berlin Crisis.

On August 14, 1948, Harry Dexter White appeared before the House Un-American Activities Committee to defend his reputation. White, though recovering from a series of heart attacks, stoutly proclaimed his lifelong commitment to the principles of democracy and the ideals of Roosevelt's New Deal. He died of a heart attack three days later.

In a memorandum dated 15 October 1950 White was conclusively identified in the Venona papers as a Soviet agent code named "Jurist".[38] Venona ciphers quote him as saying he was willing for any self-sacrifice on behalf of the KGB, but was afraid that his activities, if exposed, might lead to a political scandal and have an effect on the 1944 Presidential election. In 1953 J. Edgar Hoover convinced Attorney General Brownell that White was a spy. White's bronze bust was ignominiously removed to the IMF's basement.

In 1953, Senator Joseph McCarthy and Attorney General Herbert Brownell, Jr. alleged that Truman had known White was a Soviet spy when he appointed him to the IMF.[39] However, this has now been refuted by declassified documents through the Freedom of Information Act which attest President Truman and the White House had not known of the existence of the the Army Signals Intelligence (forerunner of the NSA) Venona project.[40]

The 1997 bipartisan Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, chaired by Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan, states in its findings,

The complicity of Alger Hiss of the State Department seems settled. As does that of Harry Dexter White of the Treasury Department.[41]


  1. John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr and Alexander Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), ISBN 0300123906, p. 258
  2. "The participation of Russia in the Tripartite Pact appeared to [Molotov] entirely acceptable in principle, provided that Russia was to cooperate as a partner and not be merely an object." Memorandum of the Conversation Between the Führer and the Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars and People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, Molotov, in the Presence of the Reich Foreign Minister, the Deputy People's Commissar, Dekanosov, as Well as of Counselor of Embassy Hilger and Herr Pavlov, Who Acted as Interpreters, on November 12, 1940. Nazi-Soviet Relations 1939-1941 VI. The U.S.S.R. and the Three Power Pact, September 25-November 26, 1940: Documents from the Archives of The German Foreign Office. Edited by Raymond James Sontag and James Stuart Beddie. United States Department of State. Publication 3023. U. S. Government Printing Office. 1948. Cf. Winston S. Churchill, Their Finest Hour, Vol. 2 (Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 1986), ISBN 0395410568, p. 515
  3. Testimony of Major General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951, Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, pp. 363-364; p. 505.
  4. Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Sacred Secrets: How Soviet Intelligence Operations Changed American History, Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 2002, pg. 12, 36-39.
  5. Vitali Pavlov, "Operation Snow," News of Intelligence and Counter Intelligence, Moscow, August 1995, pgs. 5-6.
  6. Soviet penetration of the U.S. gets fresh look, Allan H Ryskind, Human Events, Jan 29, 2001. Review of Romerstein and Breindel, The Venona Secrets.
  7. Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time, Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 739. ISBN 0-945001-10-X
  8. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pp. 31, 33.
  9. Ambassador Grew to Secretary Hull, Tokyo, August 18, l94l. Japan:1931-1941, II, p. 565.
  10. Far Eastern Military Tribunal (Manuscript). The Japan Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. August 26, 1941. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 12, p. 20.
  11. Joseph C. Grew, Turbulent Era: A Diplomatic Record of Forty Years, 1904-1945 (Cambridge: Riverside Press, 1952), II, 1264.
  12. Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1343.
  13. Grew, Turbulent Era, II, 1330.
  14. Memorandum by Lauchlin Currie to President Roosevelt, September 13, 1941.
  15. The Japanese Foreign Office to Ambassador Nomura. October 3, l94l, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part l2, p. 5l.
  16. Owen Lattimore, American Political Advisor to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, to Mr. Lauchlin Currie, Administrative Assistant to President Roosevelt, November 2, 194l, Foreign Relations, 1941, V, p. 747.
  17. Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek was the Editor of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries. The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953. The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [1] Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [2]
  18. Testimony of General Charles A. Willoughby, August 9, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, p. 382.
  19. Communism at Pearl Harbor, Kubek, 1959.
  20. Henry L Stimson's Diary, November 25, 1941, Pearl Harbor Attack, Part II, p. 5433. For other interpretations of Stimson's statement Cf. Charles Beard, President Roosevelt and the Coming of the War, 1941 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948). Chapter XVII; Charles C. Tansil, Back Door to War (Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1952), pp. 645-652; George Morgenstern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-Adair Company, 1947), Chapter XlX. Roosevelt's fear was not that Japan would attack the United States, but that she might not.
  21. Pearl Harbor Attack. Part 39, p. 502; Part 2, p. 5177; Part 3, p. 1149.
  22. White MS, Princeton University. Quoted in Communism at Pearl Harbor, Kubek, 1959.
  23. Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation." This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. Communism at Pearl Harbor, Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.
  24. Elizabeth Bentley's testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.
  25. Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.
  26. Tragedy and Hope: A History of the World in Our Time, Carroll Quigley, Collier-Macmillan, 1966, pg. 741. ISBN 0-945001-10-X
  27. David Rees, Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox, London, 1974, pg. 333.
  28. David Rees, Harry Dexter White; a Study in Paradox, pg. 326.
  29. Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, Records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65.
  30. United States Government Printing Office, Report on the Morgenthau Diaries prepared by the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee of the Judiciary appointed to investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and other Internal Security Laws, Introduction, by Dr. Anthony Kubek, Professor of History at Dallas University, November 1967, two volumes, v.i., pg. 80.
  31. Vladimir Petrov, Money and Conquest: Allied Occupation Currencies in World War II, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967, pgs. 110 - 112.
  32. George Racey Jordan, with Richard L. Stokes, From Major Jordan's Diaries, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1952, pg. 230.
  33. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, pgs. 122-123.
  34. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets, p. 122.
  35. Schecter and Schecter, Sacred Secrets.
  36. Elizabeth Bentley Deposition, FBI Silvermaster file, p. 27.
  37. Testimony of Whittaker Chambers before the House Committee on Un-American Activities (August 3, 1948).
  38. Posthumous FBI Memorandum conclusively identifies Harry Dexter White as KGB Agent Jurist (1950).
  39. Time Magazine, The White Case Record, Nov. 30, 1953.
  40. Chairman's Forward, Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy (1997).
  41. Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, Appendix A, 7. The Cold War (1997).

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