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[[Image:Clausewitz.jpg|right|thumb|Carl von Clausewitz]]

[[Image:Clausewitz.jpg|right|thumb|Carl von Clausewitz]]

'''Carl von Clausewitz''' (1780-1831)<ref> also known as: Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz, Carl Maria von Clausewitz, Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz, Karl von Clausewitz</ref> was an influential Prussian military theorist. His major work ''On War'' remains a central treatise on military and general strategy in the 21st century.  

'''Carl von Clausewitz''' (1780-1831)<ref>also known as: Carl Phillip Gottfried von Clausewitz, Carl Maria von Clausewitz, Carl Philipp Gottlieb von Clausewitz, Karl von Clausewitz</ref> was an influential Prussian military theorist. His major work ''On War'' remains a central treatise on military and general strategy in the 21st century.  

Clausewitz stressed the moral and political aspects of war. His great work ''On War'' was unfinished at his death. He used a romantic or Hegelian conception of warfare, stressing the dialectic of how opposite factors interact, and noting how unexpected new developments unfolded under the "fog of war" and called for rapid decisions by alert commanders. Clausewitz saw history as a complex check on abstractions that did not accord with experience. In opposition to his great intellectual rival [[Antoine-Henri Jomini]] he argued war could not be quantified or graphed or reduced to mapwork and graphs.  Clausewitz had many aphorisms, of which the most famous is, "War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means," a working definition of war which has won wide acceptance.  

Clausewitz stressed the moral and political aspects of war. His great work ''On War'' was unfinished at his death. He used a romantic or Hegelian conception of warfare, stressing the dialectic of how opposite factors interact, and noting how unexpected new developments unfolded under the "fog of war" and called for rapid decisions by alert commanders. Clausewitz saw history as a complex check on abstractions that did not accord with experience. In opposition to his great intellectual rival [[Antoine-Henri Jomini]] he argued war could not be quantified or graphed or reduced to mapwork and graphs.  Clausewitz had many aphorisms, of which the most famous is, "War is not merely a political act, but also a political instrument, a continuation of political relations, a carrying out of the same by other means," a working definition of war which has won wide acceptance.  

==Influence==

==Influence==

Clausewitz had a strong influence on German military thought,  and after 1890 on British thought, as typified by naval historian Julian Corbett (1854-1922).  He had little influence on American military thought before 1945.  But he influenced [[Lenin]] and the Soviet tradition, as Lenin emphasized the inevitability of wars among capitalist states in the age of imperialism and presented the armed struggle of the working class as the only path toward the eventual elimination of war.<ref>Jacob W. Kipp, "Lenin and Clausewitz: the Militarization of Marxism, 1914-1921."  ''Military Affairs'' 1985 49(4): 184-191. Issn: 0026-3931 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931(198510)49%3A4%3C184%3ALACTMO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 in Jstor] </ref>  Clausewitz directly influenced Chinese leader [[Mao Zedong]]. Mao read Clausewitz's ''On War'' in 1938 and organized a seminar on Clausewitz as part of the educational program for the Party leadership in Yan'an. Thus the "Clausewitzian" content in many of Mao's writings is not merely secondhand knowledge, via Lenin (as many have supposed), but reflects Mao's own in-depth study.

Clausewitz had a strong influence on German military thought,  and after 1890 on British thought, as typified by naval historian Julian Corbett (1854-1922).  He had little influence on American military thought before 1945.  But he influenced [[Lenin]] and the Soviet tradition, as Lenin emphasized the inevitability of wars among capitalist states in the age of imperialism and presented the armed struggle of the working class as the only path toward the eventual elimination of war.<ref>Jacob W. Kipp, "Lenin and Clausewitz: the Militarization of Marxism, 1914-1921."  ''Military Affairs'' 1985 49(4): 184-191. Issn: 0026-3931 [http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0026-3931(198510)49%3A4%3C184%3ALACTMO%3E2.0.CO%3B2-1 in Jstor]</ref>  Clausewitz directly influenced Chinese leader [[Mao Zedong]]. Mao read Clausewitz's ''On War'' in 1938 and organized a seminar on Clausewitz as part of the educational program for the Party leadership in Yan'an. Thus the "Clausewitzian" content in many of Mao's writings is not merely secondhand knowledge, via Lenin (as many have supposed), but reflects Mao's own in-depth study.

Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, and even more since the [[9-11 Attack]] on the United states in 2001, many commentators have argued that ''On War'' has lost its analytical edge as a tool for understanding war. Since Clausewitz focused solely on wars between countries by well-defined armies, they say the sorts of conflicts which he interpreted are limited chiefly to Europe between 1648 and 1990. Some have gone further, and suggested that Clausewitz's best known aphorism, that war is a continuation of policy by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically.<ref>For an opposing view see Hew Strachan, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. ''Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century'' (2007) </ref>  

Since the end of the Cold War in 1990, and even more since the [[9-11 Attack]] on the United states in 2001, many commentators have argued that ''On War'' has lost its analytical edge as a tool for understanding war. Since Clausewitz focused solely on wars between countries by well-defined armies, they say the sorts of conflicts which he interpreted are limited chiefly to Europe between 1648 and 1990. Some have gone further, and suggested that Clausewitz's best known aphorism, that war is a continuation of policy by other means, is not only irrelevant today but also inapplicable historically.<ref>For an opposing view see Hew Strachan, and Andreas Herberg-Rothe, eds. ''Clausewitz in the Twenty-First Century'' (2007)</ref>  

== Career==

== Career==

Most studies of war soon became obsolete. Books that have survived the passage of time include [[Sun-tzu]]'s "The Art of War" (500 B.C.), [[Thucydides]]': "The Peloponnesian War" (400 B.C.), Jomini's ''The Art of War'' (1838) and von Clausewitz's ''On War'' (1832).   

Most studies of war soon became obsolete. Books that have survived the passage of time include [[Sun-tzu]]'s "The Art of War" (500 B.C.), [[Thucydides]]': "The Peloponnesian War" (400 B.C.), Jomini's ''The Art of War'' (1838) and von Clausewitz's ''On War'' (1832).   

Von Clausewitz did not recommend any detailed strategic program nor did he advise any specific tactical solutions. He had a keen understanding that future readers of his books had to live in a world distinctively different from his own. Von Clausewitz knew this future world would be unpredictable for him due to unimaginable changes in technology, social structure and political status. Therefore, he has chosen to use a descriptive theoretical approach suitable for analysis of any conflict, at any time. A descriptive nature of his theory allows readers to develop their own strategic way of thinking, which may be practically applied to solve, strategic problems in virtually any environment.<ref> Recently, some authors noticed many similarities between von Clauzewitz's theses and modern theories of nonlinearity and complexity. D.S. Alberts, et al., ''Complexity, global politics, and national security.'' 1997, Washington: National Defense University</ref>

Von Clausewitz did not recommend any detailed strategic program nor did he advise any specific tactical solutions. He had a keen understanding that future readers of his books had to live in a world distinctively different from his own. Von Clausewitz knew this future world would be unpredictable for him due to unimaginable changes in technology, social structure and political status. Therefore, he has chosen to use a descriptive theoretical approach suitable for analysis of any conflict, at any time. A descriptive nature of his theory allows readers to develop their own strategic way of thinking, which may be practically applied to solve, strategic problems in virtually any environment.<ref>Recently, some authors noticed many similarities between von Clauzewitz's theses and modern theories of nonlinearity and complexity. D.S. Alberts, et al., ''Complexity, global politics, and national security.'' 1997, Washington: National Defense University</ref>

Von Clausewitz saw himself as a modern "scientist". Yet he ridiculed the popular thesis, attributed to Jomini, that one can create a "science of war."

Von Clausewitz saw himself as a modern "scientist". Yet he ridiculed the popular thesis, attributed to Jomini, that one can create a "science of war."

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==See Also==

==See also==

* [[Sun Tzu]] - The [[Art of Warfare]]

* [[Sun Tzu]] - The [[Art of Warfare]]

* [[List of military strategies and concepts]]

* [[List of military strategies and concepts]]

{{DEFAULTSORT:Clausewitz, Carl von}}

{{DEFAULTSORT:Clausewitz, Carl von}}

[[category:Military]]

[[Category:Military]]

[[category:Military History]]

[[Category:Military History]]

[[Category:Napoleonic Wars]]

[[Category:Napoleonic Wars]]