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The world was stunned in 1979 when the Soviets sent their army into Afghanistan, which had always been neutral and uninvolved.<ref>Christian Ostermann, “CWIHP Conference Report: New Evidence on the 1979-1989 War in Afghanistan.  “ (May 20 20020 [http://lists101.his.com/pipermail/intelforum/2002-May/006251.html online]</ref>  

The world was stunned in 1979 when the Soviets sent their army into Afghanistan, which had always been neutral and uninvolved.<ref>Christian Ostermann, “CWIHP Conference Report: New Evidence on the 1979-1989 War in Afghanistan.  “ (May 20 20020 [http://lists101.his.com/pipermail/intelforum/2002-May/006251.html online]</ref>  

The old monarchy was replaced by democratization and the rise of the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).  The Afghanistan crisis began in April 1978 with a [[coup d'etat]] by Afghan Communists called "the Saur Revolution".<ref>A. Z. Hilali, "The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the Marxist Coup." ''Journal of Slavic Military Studies'' 2005 18(4): 673-716. Issn: 1351-8046</ref> They tried to impose scientific socialism on a country that did not want to be modernized—indeed, which was heading in the opposite direction under the lure of Muslim fundamentalism of the sort that had topped the [[Shah]] in next-door [[Iran]]. Disobeying orders from [[Moscow]], the coup leaders systematically executed the leadership of the large [[Parcham clan]], thus guaranteeing a civil war among the country's many feuding ethnic groups. In addition the Communists in Afghanistan were themselves bitterly divided between the Khalq and Parcham factions. Moscow confronted a quandary. Afghanistan had been neutralized for sixty years, and had never been part of the Cold War system. Now it appeared that radical fundamentalist Muslims, supported by Pakistan and Iran, and probably by [[China]] and the United States, were about to seize power. The Communist regime in Kabul had no popular support; its 100,000-man army had fallen apart and was worthless. Only the Soviet army could possibly quell the growing rebellion by Parcham, the fundamentalist "mujahideen", and allied tribes who opposed the anti-religious, feminist modernizers.

The old monarchy was replaced by democratization and the rise of the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).  The Afghanistan crisis began in April 1978 with a [[coup d'état]] by Afghan Communists called "the Saur Revolution".<ref>A. Z. Hilali, "The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the Marxist Coup." ''Journal of Slavic Military Studies'' 2005 18(4): 673-716. Issn: 1351-8046</ref> They tried to impose scientific socialism on a country that did not want to be modernized—indeed, which was heading in the opposite direction under the lure of Muslim fundamentalism of the sort that had topped the [[Shah]] in next-door [[Iran]]. Disobeying orders from [[Moscow]], the coup leaders systematically executed the leadership of the large [[Parcham clan]], thus guaranteeing a civil war among the country's many feuding ethnic groups. In addition the Communists in Afghanistan were themselves bitterly divided between the Khalq and Parcham factions. Moscow confronted a quandary. Afghanistan had been neutralized for sixty years, and had never been part of the Cold War system. Now it appeared that radical fundamentalist Muslims, supported by Pakistan and Iran, and probably by [[China]] and the United States, were about to seize power. The Communist regime in Kabul had no popular support; its 100,000-man army had fallen apart and was worthless. Only the Soviet army could possibly quell the growing rebellion by Parcham, the fundamentalist "mujahideen", and allied tribes who opposed the anti-religious, feminist modernizers.

The Kremlin fully realized the dangers involved. Foreign Minister [[Andrei Gromyko]] warned the [[Politburo]] in March 1979 that Soviet intervention in an Afghan civil war would violate international law and would be sharply condemned worldwide.<ref>After the intervention the UN General Assembly voted by 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions to "strongly deplore" the "recent armed intervention" and called for the "total withdrawal of foreign troops" from the country.</ref> According to Leninist principles, Afghanistan was not ready for revolution in the first place. Furthermore intervention would destroy détente with the United States and Western Europe. On the other hand, Gromyko insisted, "We cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy." Despite urgent calls from Kabul, the Kremlin hesitated. But factions within the Afghan People's Democratic Party (Communist) government that were hostile to Soviet interests gained ascendancy and raised the specter of an independently minded Communist state located on the southern border that might cause future trouble inside the Muslim parts of the USSR.<ref>David N. Gibbs, "Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: a Declassified History." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2006 38(2): 239-263.</ref>  At this point Moscow decided not to send troops but instead stepped up shipments of military equipment such as artillery, armored personnel carriers and 48,000 machine guns; they also sent 100,000 tons of wheat (ironically, the latter was purchased from the U.S.) Washington followed events closely, worried about Soviet expansion plans and a possible breakthrough to the south.  

The Kremlin fully realized the dangers involved. Foreign Minister [[Andrei Gromyko]] warned the [[Politburo]] in March 1979 that Soviet intervention in an Afghan civil war would violate international law and would be sharply condemned worldwide.<ref>After the intervention the UN General Assembly voted by 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions to "strongly deplore" the "recent armed intervention" and called for the "total withdrawal of foreign troops" from the country.</ref> According to Leninist principles, Afghanistan was not ready for revolution in the first place. Furthermore intervention would destroy détente with the United States and Western Europe. On the other hand, Gromyko insisted, "We cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy." Despite urgent calls from Kabul, the Kremlin hesitated. But factions within the Afghan People's Democratic Party (Communist) government that were hostile to Soviet interests gained ascendancy and raised the specter of an independently minded Communist state located on the southern border that might cause future trouble inside the Muslim parts of the USSR.<ref>David N. Gibbs, "Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: a Declassified History." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2006 38(2): 239-263.</ref>  At this point Moscow decided not to send troops but instead stepped up shipments of military equipment such as artillery, armored personnel carriers and 48,000 machine guns; they also sent 100,000 tons of wheat (ironically, the latter was purchased from the U.S.) Washington followed events closely, worried about Soviet expansion plans and a possible breakthrough to the south.