Changes

[[File:Afghan-war.jpg|thumb|460px]]

[[File:Afghan-war.jpg|thumb|460px]]

==Origins==

==Origins==

The world was stunned in 1979 when the Soviets sent their army into Afghanistan, which had always been neutral and uninvolved.<ref>Christian Ostermann, “CWIHP Conference Report: New Evidence on the 1979-1989 War in Afghanistan.  “ (May 20 20020 [http://lists101.his.com/pipermail/intelforum/2002-May/006251.html online]</ref>  

The world was stunned in 1979 when the Soviets sent their army into Afghanistan, which had always been neutral and uninvolved.<ref>Christian Ostermann, “CWIHP Conference Report: New Evidence on the 1979-1989 War in Afghanistan.  “ (May 20 2002) [http://lists101.his.com/pipermail/intelforum/2002-May/006251.html online]</ref>  

The old monarchy was replaced by democratization and the rise of the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).  The Afghanistan crisis began in April 1978 with a [[coup d'état]] by Afghan Communists called "the Saur Revolution".<ref>A. Z. Hilali, "The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the Marxist Coup." ''Journal of Slavic Military Studies'' 2005 18(4): 673-716. Issn: 1351-8046</ref> They tried to impose scientific socialism on a country that did not want to be modernized—indeed, which was heading in the opposite direction under the lure of Muslim fundamentalism of the sort that had topped the [[Shah]] in next-door [[Iran]]. Disobeying orders from [[Moscow]], the coup leaders systematically executed the leadership of the large [[Parcham clan]], thus guaranteeing a civil war among the country's many feuding ethnic groups. In addition the Communists in Afghanistan were themselves bitterly divided between the Khalq and Parcham factions. Moscow confronted a quandary. Afghanistan had been neutralized for sixty years, and had never been part of the Cold War system. Now it appeared that radical fundamentalist Muslims, supported by Pakistan and Iran, and probably by [[China]] and the United States, were about to seize power. The Communist regime in Kabul had no popular support; its 100,000-man army had fallen apart and was worthless. Only the Soviet army could possibly quell the growing rebellion by Parcham, the fundamentalist "mujahideen", and allied tribes who opposed the anti-religious, feminist modernizers.

The old monarchy was replaced by democratization and the rise of the Marxist People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA).  The Afghanistan crisis began in April 1978 with a [[coup d'état]] by Afghan Communists called "the Saur Revolution".<ref>A. Z. Hilali, "The Soviet Penetration into Afghanistan and the Marxist Coup." ''Journal of Slavic Military Studies'' 2005 18(4): 673-716. Issn: 1351-8046</ref> They tried to impose scientific socialism on a country that did not want to be modernized—indeed, which was heading in the opposite direction under the lure of Muslim fundamentalism of the sort that had topped the [[Shah]] in next-door [[Iran]]. Disobeying orders from [[Moscow]], the coup leaders systematically executed the leadership of the large [[Parcham clan]], thus guaranteeing a civil war among the country's many feuding ethnic groups. In addition the Communists in Afghanistan were themselves bitterly divided between the Khalq and Parcham factions. Moscow confronted a quandary. Afghanistan had been neutralized for sixty years, and had never been part of the Cold War system. Now it appeared that radical fundamentalist Muslims, supported by Pakistan and Iran, and probably by [[China]] and the United States, were about to seize power. The Communist regime in Kabul had no popular support; its 100,000-man army had fallen apart and was worthless. Only the Soviet army could possibly quell the growing rebellion by Parcham, the fundamentalist "mujahideen", and allied tribes who opposed the anti-religious, feminist modernizers.

The Kremlin fully realized the dangers involved. Foreign Minister [[Andrei Gromyko]] warned the [[Politburo]] in March 1979 that Soviet intervention in an Afghan civil war would violate international law and would be sharply condemned worldwide.<ref>After the intervention the UN General Assembly voted by 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions to "strongly deplore" the "recent armed intervention" and called for the "total withdrawal of foreign troops" from the country.</ref> According to Leninist principles, Afghanistan was not ready for revolution in the first place. Furthermore intervention would destroy détente with the United States and Western Europe. On the other hand, Gromyko insisted, "We cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy." Despite urgent calls from Kabul, the Kremlin hesitated. But factions within the Afghan People's Democratic Party (Communist) government that were hostile to Soviet interests gained ascendancy and raised the specter of an independently minded Communist state located on the southern border that might cause future trouble inside the Muslim parts of the USSR.<ref>David N. Gibbs, "Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: a Declassified History." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2006 38(2): 239-263.</ref>  At this point Moscow decided not to send troops but instead stepped up shipments of military equipment such as artillery, armored personnel carriers and 48,000 machine guns; they also sent 100,000 tons of wheat (ironically, the latter was purchased from the U.S.) Washington followed events closely, worried about Soviet expansion plans and a possible breakthrough to the south.  

The Kremlin fully realized the dangers involved. Foreign Minister [[Andrei Gromyko]] warned the [[Politburo]] in March 1979 that Soviet intervention in an Afghan civil war would violate international law and would be sharply condemned worldwide.<ref>After the intervention the UN General Assembly voted by 104 to 18 with 18 abstentions to "strongly deplore" the "recent armed intervention" and called for the "total withdrawal of foreign troops" from the country.</ref> According to Leninist principles, Afghanistan was not ready for revolution in the first place. Furthermore, intervention would destroy détente with the United States and Western Europe. On the other hand, Gromyko insisted, "We cannot surrender Afghanistan to the enemy." Despite urgent calls from Kabul, the Kremlin hesitated. But factions within the Afghan People's Democratic Party (Communist) government that were hostile to Soviet interests gained ascendancy and raised the specter of an independently minded Communist state located on the southern border that might cause future trouble inside the Muslim parts of the USSR.<ref>David N. Gibbs, "Reassessing Soviet Motives for Invading Afghanistan: a Declassified History." ''Critical Asian Studies'' 2006 38(2): 239-263.</ref>  At this point Moscow decided not to send troops but instead stepped up shipments of military equipment such as artillery, armored personnel carriers and 48,000 machine guns; they also sent 100,000 tons of wheat (ironically, the latter was purchased from the U.S.) Washington followed events closely, worried about Soviet expansion plans and a possible breakthrough to the south.  

Moscow's man in Kabul was prime minister Nur Mohammed Taraki (1913–79), who was murdered and replaced by his deputy  Hafizullah Aminin (1929–79) of the Khalq  faction in September 1979. Although Amin called himself a loyal Communist, and begged for more Soviet military intervention, Moscow thought Amin was planning to double-cross them and switch over to China and the US. They therefore double crossed him first. Moscow had Amin officially invite the Soviet Army to enter Afghanistan; it did so in December 1979, and immediately executed Amin and installed a Soviet puppet [[Babrak Karmal]]  (1929–96), the leader of the more moderate Parcham faction pf the PDPA. Pressure for intervention seems to have come primarily from the KGB (secret police), whose efforts to assassinate Amin had failed, and from the Soviet Army, which perhaps was worried about the danger of a mutiny on the part of its many Muslim soldiers.  

Moscow's man in Kabul was prime minister Nur Mohammed Taraki (1913–79), who was murdered and replaced by his deputy  Hafizullah Aminin (1929–79) of the Khalq  faction in September 1979. Although Amin called himself a loyal Communist, and begged for more Soviet military intervention, Moscow thought Amin was planning to double-cross them and switch over to China and the US. They therefore double crossed him first. Moscow had Amin officially invite the Soviet Army to enter Afghanistan; it did so in December 1979, and immediately executed Amin and installed a Soviet puppet [[Babrak Karmal]]  (1929–96), the leader of the more moderate Parcham faction pf the PDPA. Pressure for intervention seems to have come primarily from the KGB (secret police), whose efforts to assassinate Amin had failed, and from the Soviet Army, which perhaps was worried about the danger of a mutiny on the part of its many Muslim soldiers.  

By 1985 the war was largely stalemated. The Soviet forces were mainly tied up in cities and in defending airfields and bases, leaving only roughly 15% of their troops for operations.  There were few pitched battles. The challenge for the Soviets was to maintain control of all the cities, important towns and highways, and to protect the regime from sudden attack by guerrillas who could strike almost anywhere in the rural areas at any time.  The Soviet military depended on [[air mobility]] to cover the large, mountainous land, using small airplanes and helicopters. Their tactic failed when the US in 1986 began supplying the rebels with over 500 shoulder-fired [[FIM-92 Stinger]] [[surface-to-air missile]]s that made it extremely difficult for Soviet aircraft to operate.  

By 1985 the war was largely stalemated. The Soviet forces were mainly tied up in cities and in defending airfields and bases, leaving only roughly 15% of their troops for operations.  There were few pitched battles. The challenge for the Soviets was to maintain control of all the cities, important towns and highways, and to protect the regime from sudden attack by guerrillas who could strike almost anywhere in the rural areas at any time.  The Soviet military depended on [[air mobility]] to cover the large, mountainous land, using small airplanes and helicopters. Their tactic failed when the US in 1986 began supplying the rebels with over 500 shoulder-fired [[FIM-92 Stinger]] [[surface-to-air missile]]s that made it extremely difficult for Soviet aircraft to operate.  

The CIA effort code-named "Operation Cyclone" began with funding of $25 million in 1980 and rose to $630 million per year in 1987, including matching funds from Saudi Arabia.  Anti-Soviet mujahideen received American aid through Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence Agency, which cooperated with the CIA.  About 90,000 men were in the rebel units; about 20,000 were active at any one time, compared with 100,000 Soviet and 40,000 regime soldiers. Meanwhile millions of civilians fled to neighboring countries, especially Pakistan and Iran, where a worldwide relief effort fed them.

The CIA effort code-named "Operation Cyclone" began with funding of $25 million in 1980 and rose to $630 million per year in 1987, including matching funds from Saudi Arabia.  Anti-Soviet mujahideen received American aid through Pakistan's Inter Service Intelligence Agency, which cooperated with the CIA.  About 90,000 men were in the rebel units; about 20,000 were active at any one time, compared with 100,000 Soviet and 40,000 regime soldiers. Meanwhile, millions of civilians fled to neighboring countries, especially Pakistan and Iran, where a worldwide relief effort fed them.

The Soviets had multiple unexpected problems regarding the poor training, low morale and poor sanitation of their troops. They sent 85,000 men in the 40th Army, but it was entirely unprepared for the guerrilla warfare it encountered.  Muslim soldiers in the Soviet forces were treated as second class citizens, had high desertion rates, and proved unreliable and unwilling; and were soon replaced by Slavs from Russia and Ukraine.<ref>Leo J. Daugherty, III, "The Bear and the Scimitar: Soviet Central Asians and the War in Afghanistan 1979-1989." ''Journal of Slavic Military Studies'' 1995 8(1): 73-96. Issn: 1351-8046</ref>   

The Soviets had multiple unexpected problems regarding the poor training, low morale and poor sanitation of their troops. They sent 85,000 men in the 40th Army, but it was entirely unprepared for the guerrilla warfare it encountered.  Muslim soldiers in the Soviet forces were treated as second class citizens, had high desertion rates, and proved unreliable and unwilling; and were soon replaced by Slavs from Russia and Ukraine.<ref>Leo J. Daugherty, III, "The Bear and the Scimitar: Soviet Central Asians and the War in Afghanistan 1979-1989." ''Journal of Slavic Military Studies'' 1995 8(1): 73-96. Issn: 1351-8046</ref>