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→Journal of Contemporary Religion on schisms within U.S. atheism
The findings of this most recent survey support the argument that atheists are persistent cultural outsiders in the United States because they are perceived to have rejected cultural values and practices understood as essential to private morality, civic virtue, and national identity. Moreover, any refusal to embrace a religious identity of any type is troubling for a large portion of Americans.<ref>[http://cla.umn.edu/news-events/news/atheists-remain-most-disliked-religious-minority-us Atheists Remain Most Disliked Religious Minority in the US]</ref>}}
The findings of this most recent survey support the argument that atheists are persistent cultural outsiders in the United States because they are perceived to have rejected cultural values and practices understood as essential to private morality, civic virtue, and national identity. Moreover, any refusal to embrace a religious identity of any type is troubling for a large portion of Americans.<ref>[http://cla.umn.edu/news-events/news/atheists-remain-most-disliked-religious-minority-us Atheists Remain Most Disliked Religious Minority in the US]</ref>}}
== Demographics and trends in American secularism ==
[[File:Bread for the world.jpg|thumbnail|right|150px|Due to Hispanic [[evangelicalism|evangelicals]], church attendance was up in New York City in 2013.<ref>[http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/news/2013/11/hispanics-turning-evangelical-jews-secular.php Hispanics turning evangelical, Jews secular], Beliefnet.com, November 2103</ref>
With the continued rise in the number of Hispanic, Roman Catholics and evangelical Christians in North America and the rise of evangelicalism in Latin America and South America, [[secular left]]ism is not going to be dominant in America's long term future.<ref>
*[http://global.christianpost.com/news/3-reasons-america-may-become-more-religious-102859/ 3 Reasons America May Become More Religious] By Napp Nazworth, ''Christian Post'', August 22, 2013
*[http://questionevolution.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-writing-is-on-wall-godless.html The writing is on the wall amigos: Godless progressivism will not be dominant in the USA's future], August 14, 2013
*[http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/news/2013/11/hispanics-turning-evangelical-jews-secular.php Hispanics turning evangelical, Jews secular], Beliefnet.com, November 2013
*[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/hispanic-evangelical-church_n_3055752.html Rise Of Hispanic Evangelical Church: Time Magazine Discusses Influence Of Latinos In America's Religion], Huffington Post, April 11, 2013
*[http://nation.time.com/2013/04/04/the-rise-of-evangelicos/ The Rise of Evangélicos] By Elizabeth ''Time'' magazine, April 4, 2013</ref>]]
''See also:'' [[Demographics and American secularism]] and [[Demographics of agnosticism]]
Professor [[Eric Kaufmann]], Birkbeck College, University of London, specializes on how demographics affects religion/irreligion/politics.
Steve Turley wrote:
{{Cquote|According to a recent a demographic study by University of London Professor Eric Kaufmann, there is a significant demographic deficit between secularists and conservative religionists. For example, in the U.S., while self-identified secular women averaged only 1.5 children per couple in 2002, conservative evangelical women averaged 2 to 3 children per couple, which amounts to a 28 percent fertility advantage. Now Kaufmann notices that this demographic deficit has dramatic effects over time. In a population evenly divided, these numbers indicate that conservative evangelicals would increase from 50 to 62.5 percent of the population in a single generation. In two generations, their number would increase to 73.5 percent, and over the course of 200 years, they would represent 99.4 percent.
Kaufmann noticed further that the more religiously conservative, the more children. For example, the Amish double in population every twenty years, and are projected to number over a million in the U.S. and Canada in just a few decades. We're seeing a similar trend among Mormons, who have averaged a 40 percent growth per decade, which means that by the end of the century, there will be as many as 300 million Mormons in the world, or six percent of the world's population. And note: Mormons vote overwhelmingly Republican.
Now in stark contrast to all of this, Kaufmann's data projects that secularists consistently exemplify a low fertility rate of around 1.5 percent per couple, which is significantly below the replacement level of 2.1 percent. And so he sees a steady decline of secular populations after 2030 or 2050 to potentially no more than a mere 14 to 15 percent of the American population. He notices that similar projections apply to Europe as well.<ref>[http://www.christianpost.com/news/feminist-futility-why-the-womens-march-promises-a-conservative-future-173350/ Feminist Futility: Why the Women's March Promises a Conservative Future] by Steve Turley, ''Christian Post''</ref>
In 2012, Kaufmann wrote:
{{Cquote| In the United States, they manage 1.5, considerably lower than the national 2.1. This disadvantage is not enough to prevent religious decline in much of Europe and America today, but secularism must run to stand still. Since the history of religious decline in Europe suggests that secularization rates tend to drop over time, this portends the end of secularization. Projections I recently published with Skirbekk and Goujon in the journal Sociology of Religion show secularism losing momentum and beginning to decline in both Europe and America by 2050, largely because of low fertility and religious immigration.<ref>[The Future Will Be More Religious and Conservative Than You Think] by Eric Kaufmann, American Enterprise Institute</ref>}}
Kaufamann wrote about irreligion/irreligion and the [[culture war]] in America:
{{cquote|High evangelical fertility rates more than compensated for losses to liberal Protestant sects during the twentieth century. In recent decades, white secularism has surged, but Latino and Asian religious immigration has taken up the slack, keeping secularism at bay. Across denominations, the fertility advantage of religious fundamentalists of all colours is significant and growing. After 2020, their demographic weight will begin to tip the balance in the [[Culture War|culture wars]] towards the conservative side, ramping up pressure on hot-button issues such as [[abortion]]. By the end of the century, three quarters of America may be pro-life. Their activism will leap over the borders of the 'Redeemer Nation' to evangelize the world. Already, the rise of the World Congress of Families has launched a global religious right, its arms stretching across the bloody lines of the War on Terror to embrace the entire Abrahamic family.<ref>[http://questionevolution.blogspot.com/2012/05/why-are-years-2012-and-2020-key-years.html Why are 2012 and 2020 key years for Christian creationists and pro-lifers?]</ref>}}
Kaufmann, who is an agnostic, wrote about the higher fertility rate of the religious right, "Furthermore, the demography of the nation suggests that God may ultimately be on the side of the
[[Religious Right]]."<ref>[http://www.sneps.net/RD/uploads/1-Shall%20the%20Religious%20Inherit%20the%20Earth.pdf Shall the Religious Inherit the Earth?: Demography and Politics in the Twenty-First Century] by Eric Kaufmann, Belfer Center, Harvard University/Birkbeck College, University of London</ref>
=== Demography research indicating that religiosity in the United States may experience growth ===
In 2013, citing experts in demography and survey data, the ''Christian Post'' declared that there were three trends pointing to the United States potentially becoming more religious in coming years - namely an aging population becoming more religious over time, religious immigrants and the higher fertility rate of religious conservatives.<ref>[http://global.christianpost.com/news/3-reasons-america-may-become-more-religious-102859/ 3 Reasons America May Become More Religious]</ref>
=== Hispanic evangelicalism ===
Due to Hispanic [[evangelicalism|evangelicals]], church attendance was up in New York City in 2013.<ref>[http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/news/2013/11/hispanics-turning-evangelical-jews-secular.php Hispanics turning evangelical, Jews secular], Beliefnet.com, November 2103</ref>
With the continued rise in the number of Hispanic, evangelical Christians in North America and the rise of evangelicalism in Latin America and South America, [[secular left]]ism is not going to be dominant in America's future.<ref>
*[http://global.christianpost.com/news/3-reasons-america-may-become-more-religious-102859/ 3 Reasons America May Become More Religious] By Napp Nazworth, ''Christian Post'', August 22, 2013
*[http://questionevolution.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-writing-is-on-wall-godless.html The writing is on the wall amigos: Godless progressivism will not be dominant in the USA's future], August 14, 2013
*[http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/news/2013/11/hispanics-turning-evangelical-jews-secular.php Hispanics turning evangelical, Jews secular], Beliefnet.com, November 2013
*[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/hispanic-evangelical-church_n_3055752.html Rise Of Hispanic Evangelical Church: Time Magazine Discusses Influence Of Latinos In America's Religion], Huffington Post, April 11, 2013
*[http://nation.time.com/2013/04/04/the-rise-of-evangelicos/ The Rise of Evangélicos] By Elizabeth ''Time'' magazine, April 4, 2013</ref>
==== Hispanics and the future of religion/irreligion in the United States ====
*[http://www.beliefnet.com/columnists/news/2013/11/hispanics-turning-evangelical-jews-secular.php Hispanics turning evangelical, Jews secular], Beliefnet.com, November 2013
*[http://questionevolution.blogspot.com/2013/11/hasta-luego-american-godless.html Hasta luego, American godless progressivism! Worship service attendance is up in New York City amigos!], November 7, 2013
*[http://questionevolution.blogspot.com/2013/08/the-writing-is-on-wall-godless.html The writing is on the wall amigos: Godless progressivism will not be dominant in the USA's future], August 14, 2013
*[http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/10/hispanic-evangelical-church_n_3055752.html Rise Of Hispanic Evangelical Church: Time Magazine Discusses Influence Of Latinos In America's Religion], Huffington Post, April 11, 2013
*[http://nation.time.com/2013/04/04/the-rise-of-evangelicos/ The Rise of Evangélicos] By Elizabeth ''Time'' magazine, April 4, 2013
*[http://latino.foxnews.com/latino/lifestyle/2013/05/10/switching-sides-latinos-ditching-catholicism-for-evangelical-churches/ Switching Sides: Latinos Ditching Catholicism For Evangelical Churches]
=== Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon religion/irreligion demographic projections ===
[[File:Loc of United States.png|thumbnail|200px|left|Current religious demography scholarship suggest that the relatively low fertility of secular Americans and the religiosity of the immigrant inflow provide a countervailing force that will cause the secularization process within the total population to plateau before 2043.
This represents an important theoretical point in that demography permits society to become more religious even as individuals tend to become less religious over time.<ref>[http://www.sneps.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/jssr_15101.pdf ''Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043''], ''Journal for the Sientific Study of Religion'', vol. 49, no. 2 (June) 2010, Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon,</ref>]]
In their 2010 journal article entitled, ''Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043'' published in the ''Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion'', Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon wrote:
{{cquote|We find considerable stability of religious groups over time, but there are some important shifts. Hispanic Catholics experience the strongest growth rates to 2043. Immigration, high fertility, and a young age structure will enable this group to expand from 10 to 18 percent of the American population between 2003 and 2043, despite a net loss of communicants to secularism and Protestantism. This will power the growth of Catholics as a whole, who will surpass Protestants by mid century within the nation’s youngest age groups. This represents a historic moment for a country settled by anti-Catholic Puritans, whose Revolution was motivated in part by a desire to spread dissenting Protestantism and whose populationon the eve of revolution was 98 percent Protestant (Huntington 2004; Kaufmann 2004). Another important development concerns the growth of the Muslim population and decline of the Jews. High Muslim fertility and a young Muslim age structure contrasts with low Jewish childbearing levels and a mature Jewish age structure. Barring an unforeseen shift in the religious composition and size of the immigrant flow, Muslims will surpass Jews in the population by 2023 and in the electorate by 2028. This could have profound effects on the course of American foreign policy. Within the non-Hispanic white population, we expect to see continued Liberal Protestant decline due to low fertility and a net loss in exchanges with other groups. White Catholics will also lose due to a net outflow of converts. Fundamentalist and Moderate Protestant denominations will hold their own within the white population, but will decline overall as the white share of the population falls.
The finding that Protestant fundamentalism may decline in relative terms over the medium
term contrasts with a prevailing view that envisions the continued growth of “strong religion”
(Stark and Iannaccone 1994a). This is the result of an older age structure, which increases
loss through mortality, and immigration, which reduces the size of all predominantly white
denominations — all of which are poorly represented in the immigration flow. Fundamentalists’
relatively high fertility and net surplus from the religious marketplace is not sufficient to counteract the effects of immigration. Obviously, this could change if significant immigration begins to arrive from more Pentecostalist source countries such as Guatemala or parts of sub-Saharan Africa.
Our work also sheds light on the religious restructuring paradigm, though we do not find a
clear victor between secularism and fundamentalism. The secular population will grow substantially in the decades ahead because it has a young age structure and more people leave religion
than enter it. The sharpest gains for secularism will be within the white population, where seculars
will surpass fundamentalists by 2030. On the other hand, there are important demographic limits
to secularism, demonstrating the power of religious demography. The relatively low fertility of
secular Americans and the religiosity of the immigrant inflow provide a countervailing force that
will cause the secularization process within the total population to plateau before 2043. This
represents an important theoretical point in that demography permits society to become more
religious even as individuals tend to become less religious over time.<ref>[http://www.sneps.net/wp-content/uploads/2010/04/jssr_15101.pdf ''Secularism, Fundamentalism or Catholicism? The Religious Composition of the United States to 2043''], ''Journal for the Sientific Study of Religion'', vol. 49, no. 2 (June) 2010, Vegard Skirbekk and Anne Goujon,</ref>}}
For more information, please see: [[Growth of global desecularization#Growth of evangelicalism in the world and in the United States|Growth of evangelicalism in the world and in the United States]] and [[Desecularization#American culture war, demographics and expected tipping point after 2020|American culture war, demographics and expected tipping point after 2020]]
== Journal of Contemporary Religion on schisms within U.S. atheism ==
== Journal of Contemporary Religion on schisms within U.S. atheism ==
The ''Journal of Contemporary Religion'' say that internal divisions within the American atheist movement have to do with:
The ''Journal of Contemporary Religion'' say that internal divisions within the American atheist movement have to do with:
{{Cquote|internal divisions within the movement around issues relating to goals, strategies, and direction. These can be seen most notably in debates about the formation of a collective ‘atheist’ identity, in disputes about the effectiveness of confrontationalism and accommodationism, and in concerns about the movement’s ethnic, racial, and gender profile.<ref>[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537903.2014.945722 Divided We Stand: The Politics of the Atheist Movement in the United States] by Steven Kettell, ''Journal of Contemporary Religion'', Volume 29, Issue 3, 2014</ref>}}
{{Cquote|internal divisions within the movement around issues relating to goals, strategies, and direction. These can be seen most notably in debates about the formation of a collective ‘atheist’ identity, in disputes about the effectiveness of confrontationalism and accommodationism, and in concerns about the movement’s ethnic, racial, and gender profile.<ref>[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13537903.2014.945722 Divided We Stand: The Politics of the Atheist Movement in the United States] by Steven Kettell, ''Journal of Contemporary Religion'', Volume 29, Issue 3, 2014</ref>}}
== American atheism and atheist feminism related online schism ==
== American atheism and atheist feminism related online schism ==