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::Here we start to get into the politics of [[demonization]] by [[pacifist]]s against [[militarism]] which started after 1918. And a simple looking at the facts destroys any argument they had, no matter how widespread and popular. I just don't see the point of keeping alive in the 21st century such widely discredited and disproven notions. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]<sup>[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]</sup> 21:05, 27 March 2017 (EDT)
 
::Here we start to get into the politics of [[demonization]] by [[pacifist]]s against [[militarism]] which started after 1918. And a simple looking at the facts destroys any argument they had, no matter how widespread and popular. I just don't see the point of keeping alive in the 21st century such widely discredited and disproven notions. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]<sup>[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]</sup> 21:05, 27 March 2017 (EDT)
 
:::Here is a review of Zuber's book so you don't have read the whole thing:[https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/reviews/43881/mcfall-zuber-inventing-schlieffen-plan-german-war-planning-1871-1914]<br/>The reason the German offensive failed is because they ran out of supplies at the time of the Marne. While the Germans waited for their supply train to catch up, the French and British dug trenches. Even if the supply situation had been better, the Germans had already done a heroic amount of marching at that point. To have outflanked the French would have required a whole lot more marching. It's hard to see how the plan could have worked, with or without the divisions transferred to the East. Hans Delbrück (1919) and Gerhard Ritter (1956) exposed these flaws long ago.<br/>Most sources say the Schlieffen plan dates from 1905.[https://www.britannica.com/event/Schlieffen-Plan] That's talking about the copy of the plan that survives. That copy is an extremely preliminary rough draft compared to the documentation that would be needed to send an army marching. I don't know where you got 1892 from. [[User:PeterKa|PeterKa]] ([[User talk:PeterKa|talk]]) 01:21, 28 March 2017 (EDT)
 
:::Here is a review of Zuber's book so you don't have read the whole thing:[https://networks.h-net.org/node/35008/reviews/43881/mcfall-zuber-inventing-schlieffen-plan-german-war-planning-1871-1914]<br/>The reason the German offensive failed is because they ran out of supplies at the time of the Marne. While the Germans waited for their supply train to catch up, the French and British dug trenches. Even if the supply situation had been better, the Germans had already done a heroic amount of marching at that point. To have outflanked the French would have required a whole lot more marching. It's hard to see how the plan could have worked, with or without the divisions transferred to the East. Hans Delbrück (1919) and Gerhard Ritter (1956) exposed these flaws long ago.<br/>Most sources say the Schlieffen plan dates from 1905.[https://www.britannica.com/event/Schlieffen-Plan] That's talking about the copy of the plan that survives. That copy is an extremely preliminary rough draft compared to the documentation that would be needed to send an army marching. I don't know where you got 1892 from. [[User:PeterKa|PeterKa]] ([[User talk:PeterKa|talk]]) 01:21, 28 March 2017 (EDT)
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::::Ok, [http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/schlieffen_alfred_graf_von technically you could say he pulled it all together into a single memorandum in 1905] but he worked on it more than 10 years, and it was a problem the whole General Staff had been concerned with since Schieffen attended the military academy. I'm really on Gordon Crsig, ''Politics of the Prussian'' which I don't ha copy at hand.
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::::Ok, [http://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/schlieffen_alfred_graf_von technically you could say he pulled it all together into a single memorandum in 1905] but he worked on it more than 10 years, and it was a problem the whole General Staff had been concerned with since Schieffen attended the military academy. I'm relying on Gordon Craig, ''Politics of the Prussian Army'' which I don't have a copy at hand.
    
::::The key elements were manpower and timing. But as I said earlier, if the plan was never implemented, you can't blame Schlieffen for the disaster of the Marne. This just outdated pacifist rhetoric from the 1920s and beyond. The lessen of Schlieffen fits into a larger paradigm in military science of operation planning. Schlieffen did not work on this alone, his entire staff was concerned with it nite and day for 12 years. When it came to be used, all that effort was ignored. And the plan did work in 1940 when the Germans faked a move thru Belgium but the main thrust came thru the Ardenne.
 
::::The key elements were manpower and timing. But as I said earlier, if the plan was never implemented, you can't blame Schlieffen for the disaster of the Marne. This just outdated pacifist rhetoric from the 1920s and beyond. The lessen of Schlieffen fits into a larger paradigm in military science of operation planning. Schlieffen did not work on this alone, his entire staff was concerned with it nite and day for 12 years. When it came to be used, all that effort was ignored. And the plan did work in 1940 when the Germans faked a move thru Belgium but the main thrust came thru the Ardenne.
    
::::Bottomline: Schlieffen is part of a model used by all the world's military establishments to in operational planning and implementation, and the organizational structure that produced it. The disaster at the Marne was not Schlieffen's failure, Schlieffen's plan was devised to avoid that. And his name and ideas now are used, unfairly, to attack the senseless military strategies, operations, and failures he  spent a lifetime working to avoid. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]<sup>[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]</sup> 02:47, 28 March 2017 (EDT)
 
::::Bottomline: Schlieffen is part of a model used by all the world's military establishments to in operational planning and implementation, and the organizational structure that produced it. The disaster at the Marne was not Schlieffen's failure, Schlieffen's plan was devised to avoid that. And his name and ideas now are used, unfairly, to attack the senseless military strategies, operations, and failures he  spent a lifetime working to avoid. [[User:RobSmith|RobS]]<sup>[[User talk:RobSmith|''CIA v Trump updated score'':CIA 3, Trump 2]]</sup> 02:47, 28 March 2017 (EDT)
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