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The problem is, you never know when a leader of such talents may arise, hence, how is it possible to defend against?

The problem is, you never know when a leader of such talents may arise, hence, how is it possible to defend against?

The time of Napolean is known as the [[Enlightenment]], when [[science]] gained a foothold in military planning. So Karl von Clausewitz addressed this question. Is it an Art of War, or  a Science of War? He answered by saying neither, because they exclude genius from the rule. You never know when a charismstic leader able to inspire troops with a genius for battlefield exploits may arise, so the only way to prepare and defend against such an occurrance is to divide up the duties and responsibilities of a battlefield commander is among a staff of experts. Two heads are better than one.  

The time of Napolean is known as the [[Enlightenment]], when [[science]] gained a foothold in military planning. So Karl von Clausewitz addressed this question. Is it an Art of War, or  a Science of War? He answered by saying neither, because they exclude genius from the rule. You never know when a charismstic leader able to inspire troops with a genius for battlefield exploits may arise, so the only way to prepare and defend against such an occurrance is to divide up the duties and responsibilities of a battlefield commander among a staff of experts. Two heads are better than one.  

Since your strategic commander lacks the genius of the opposing man on horseback, his job is to solely focus on the strategic vision aided by a logistical commander at his side concerned with nothing more than transport, supply, and manpower requirements. The two worked as a team, the leader being the chief strategist, and his co-equal (flunky) then known as a Quartermaster General. When the chief strategist, surveying the battlefield, saw an opportunity for an opening for instance, to outflank an opponent, rather than gamble like the man on horseback was likely to do, he would turn to the Quartemaster and ask, "Is it possible to get so many guys up into that far position behind the enemy and keep them supplied?" The Quartermaster would quickly survey the situation, not second guess the strategic commander or debate him, and deliver his expert, technical opinion with a "yes" or "no". It was through this system the Prussians were eventually able to defeat Napolean.

Since your strategic commander lacks the genius of the opposing man on horseback, his job is to solely focus on the strategic vision aided by a logistical commander at his side concerned with nothing more than transport, supply, and manpower requirements. The two worked as a team, the leader being the chief strategist, and his co-equal (flunky) then known as a Quartermaster General. When the chief strategist, surveying the battlefield, saw an opportunity for an opening for instance, to outflank an opponent, rather than gamble like the man on horseback was likely to do, he would turn to the Quartemaster and ask, "Is it possible to get so many guys up into that far position behind the enemy and keep them supplied?" The Quartermaster would quickly survey the situation, not second guess the strategic commander or debate him, and deliver his expert, technical opinion with a "yes" or "no". It was through this system the Prussians were eventually able to defeat Napolean.