| − | In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the kaiser jointly by both Bethmann<ref>"As Kurt Riezler, the chancellor's private secretary, recorded retrospectively in 1915 (p.212): 'Bethmann can blame the coming of the war . on the answer that Moltke gave him.. He did say yes! We would succeed.'" ("[http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/199 Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]")</ref> and Moltke, as well as by Kiderlen, the foreign secretary. These advisers misled the kaiser into believing that the British might support an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia. In December, Lichnowsky, the German ambassador to Britain, informed the kaiser that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 /> Wilhelm was anxious that 1913, his jubilee, be a year of peace.<ref>Röhl, p. 954.</ref> | + | In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the kaiser jointly by both Bethmann and Moltke, as well as by Kiderlen, the foreign secretary.<ref>Moltke understood the war would be long and bloody, but he misled the civilian leadership: "As Kurt Riezler, the chancellor's private secretary, recorded retrospectively in 1915 (p.212): 'Bethmann can blame the coming of the war . on the answer that Moltke gave him.. He did say yes! We would succeed.'" ("[http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/199 Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]")</ref> These advisers misled the kaiser into believing that the British might support an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia. In December, Lichnowsky, the German ambassador to Britain, informed the kaiser that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 /> Wilhelm was anxious that 1913, his jubilee, be a year of peace.<ref>Röhl, p. 954.</ref> |
| | Fischer identifies a meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 as the moment when the imperial government resolved upon war.<ref name=rohl18 /> The meeting was attended by the kaiser and four advisors.<ref name=stemple /> The passage of the Army Law in June 1913 may also be viewed as a decisive moment. It was the largest expansion since 1871. This expanded the army from 544,000 soldiers to 870,000 soldiers.<ref name="ArmyExpand" /> | | Fischer identifies a meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 as the moment when the imperial government resolved upon war.<ref name=rohl18 /> The meeting was attended by the kaiser and four advisors.<ref name=stemple /> The passage of the Army Law in June 1913 may also be viewed as a decisive moment. It was the largest expansion since 1871. This expanded the army from 544,000 soldiers to 870,000 soldiers.<ref name="ArmyExpand" /> |