Changes

In earlier diplomatic incidents, the kaiser and his government had asserted Germany's rights while public opinion had remained cautious. This dynamic reversed in the Agadir crisis of 1911. The crisis began on July 1 when Germany sent the gunboat SMS ''Panther'' to the port of Agadir in Morocco. This was a challenge to France, which considered Morocco to be part of its sphere of influence.

In earlier diplomatic incidents, the kaiser and his government had asserted Germany's rights while public opinion had remained cautious. This dynamic reversed in the Agadir crisis of 1911. The crisis began on July 1 when Germany sent the gunboat SMS ''Panther'' to the port of Agadir in Morocco. This was a challenge to France, which considered Morocco to be part of its sphere of influence.

On July 21, Prime Minister Lloyd George announced that Britain was prepared to go to war to avoid French humiliation in Morocco. In Germany, this intervention triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref> Germany had been Europe's dominant power since the Russo-Japanese War. The nation was outraged to learn this was no longer so.

On July 21, Prime Minister Lloyd George announced that Britain was prepared to go to war to avoid French humiliation in Morocco. In Germany, this intervention triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref> Germany had been Europe's dominant power since the Russo-Japanese War. The nation was outraged to learn that this was no longer so.

Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had spent a great deal of money on its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval build up would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. If the Franco-British alliance was solid, the strength of the French and British fleets had to be combined, and the math of naval dominance became steeper.

Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had spent a great deal of money on its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval build up would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. If the Franco-British alliance was solid, the strength of the French and British fleets had to be combined, and the math of naval dominance became steeper.