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Line 43: − − [[Liberal]]s, including those in the Supreme Court, supported race-based [[gerrymandering]] from a constitutional perspective during and in the years after the [[Civil Rights movement]] because it would lead to the highest rates of minority elected officials, but they changed their position (again from a constitutional standpoint) after it became clear they could gain more seats through having courts strike down race-based gerrymandering.<ref>Sammin, Kyle (May 30, 2017). [https://thefederalist.com/2017/05/30/why-the-supreme-courts-liberals-flipflopped-on-race-based-gerrymandering/ Why The Supreme Court’s Liberals Flipflopped On Race-Based Gerrymandering]. ''The Federalist''. Retrieved May 31, 2017.</ref>
Doesn't this belong on the Gerrymandering page?
The courts have worked under the idea that the Constitution is living and breathing, long before announcing it. As early as 1926, in ''Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.'', the courts held:
The courts have worked under the idea that the Constitution is living and breathing, long before announcing it. As early as 1926, in ''Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.'', the courts held:
<blockquote>Regulations the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for, while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances which, after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution of course must fall.<ref>[https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/272/365/case.html Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)]</ref></blockquote>
<blockquote>Regulations the wisdom, necessity and validity of which, as applied to existing conditions, are so apparent that they are now uniformly sustained a century ago, or even half a century ago, probably would have been rejected as arbitrary and oppressive. Such regulations are sustained, under the complex conditions of our day, for reasons analogous to those which justify traffic regulations, which, before the advent of automobiles and rapid transit street railways, would have been condemned as fatally arbitrary and unreasonable. And in this there is no inconsistency, for, while the meaning of constitutional guaranties never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible that it should be otherwise. But although a degree of elasticity is thus imparted not to the meaning, but to the application of constitutional principles, statutes and ordinances which, after giving due weight to the new conditions, are found clearly not to conform to the Constitution of course must fall.<ref>[https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/272/365/case.html Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)]</ref></blockquote>
==Debate==
==Debate==