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| | On July 21, Prime Minister Lloyd George announced that Britain was prepared to go to war to avoid French humiliation in Morocco. In Germany, this intervention triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref> | | On July 21, Prime Minister Lloyd George announced that Britain was prepared to go to war to avoid French humiliation in Morocco. In Germany, this intervention triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref> |
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| − | Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had devoted a great deal of resources to its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval build up would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. In 1912, France and Britain signed a deal dividing up naval responsibilities. Faced with a combined allied fleet, German attention shifted to the army, ending the naval race. | + | Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had devoted a great deal of resources to its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval buildup would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. In 1912, France and Britain signed a deal dividing up naval responsibilities. Faced with a combined allied fleet, German attention shifted to the army, ending the naval race. |
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| | The French emerged from the crisis with a confidence that frightened the Germans. The French army adopted doctrine that emphasized offensive action and a plan to recover Alsace Lorraine called Plan XVII. | | The French emerged from the crisis with a confidence that frightened the Germans. The French army adopted doctrine that emphasized offensive action and a plan to recover Alsace Lorraine called Plan XVII. |
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| | The long-planned French offensive in Lorraine proved to be an enormous suicide mission. From August 7 to September 13, French soldiers flung themselves at well-prepared German fortifications, faithfully following Plan XVII. Losses were staggering, but only a few villages were acquired. The German anxieties that had led to war were shown to be without foundation. | | The long-planned French offensive in Lorraine proved to be an enormous suicide mission. From August 7 to September 13, French soldiers flung themselves at well-prepared German fortifications, faithfully following Plan XVII. Losses were staggering, but only a few villages were acquired. The German anxieties that had led to war were shown to be without foundation. |
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| − | Meanwhile, German infantry advanced through Belgium and northeastern France until September 6-12, when they reached the Marne river north of Paris. At this point the Germans ran out of supplies and both sides began digging trenches. It was the beginning of four years of trench warfare. | + | Meanwhile, German infantry advanced through Belgium and northeastern France until September 6–12, when they reached the Marne river north of Paris. At this point the Germans ran out of supplies and both sides began digging trenches. It was the beginning of four years of trench warfare. |
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| | When Antwerp fell in October 1914, Wilhelm made a speech in which he stated that the city must remain German.<ref name=rohl142>Röhl, p. 11</ref> He wanted Belgians to be evacuated from Belgium and replaced with German military colonists.<ref name=rohl142 /> Wilhelm insisted on retaining control of the Belgian coastline in the hope that a German naval base could eventually be built there. This position was an obstacle to peace negotiations throughout the war.<ref name=rohl142 /> | | When Antwerp fell in October 1914, Wilhelm made a speech in which he stated that the city must remain German.<ref name=rohl142>Röhl, p. 11</ref> He wanted Belgians to be evacuated from Belgium and replaced with German military colonists.<ref name=rohl142 /> Wilhelm insisted on retaining control of the Belgian coastline in the hope that a German naval base could eventually be built there. This position was an obstacle to peace negotiations throughout the war.<ref name=rohl142 /> |