| | France and West Germany were brought together by common interests starting from 1955, but did not agree with regard to European union and relations with the United States. In 1955 France was pleased by the Geneva conferences that left Germany divided. Furthermore, the Rome treaties of 1957 established the [[Common Market]] limited to six countries, a solution advocated by France against the larger union envisioned by Adenauer. [[Charles De Gaulle]] proposed establishing a European political organization anchored on a Franco-German alliance independent of the United States. Adenauer agreed to this project as preferable to a London-Paris-Washington alliance. However, Adenauer underestimated De Gaulle's intent to destroy the Atlantic alliance, and De Gaulle did not understand that West Germany would never substitute French support for that of the United States. [[John F. Kennedy]]'s policy toward the Soviets and the fear of American abandonment of Europe contributed to the agreements between De Gaulle and Adenauer that culminated in the Elysée treaty in 1963. | | France and West Germany were brought together by common interests starting from 1955, but did not agree with regard to European union and relations with the United States. In 1955 France was pleased by the Geneva conferences that left Germany divided. Furthermore, the Rome treaties of 1957 established the [[Common Market]] limited to six countries, a solution advocated by France against the larger union envisioned by Adenauer. [[Charles De Gaulle]] proposed establishing a European political organization anchored on a Franco-German alliance independent of the United States. Adenauer agreed to this project as preferable to a London-Paris-Washington alliance. However, Adenauer underestimated De Gaulle's intent to destroy the Atlantic alliance, and De Gaulle did not understand that West Germany would never substitute French support for that of the United States. [[John F. Kennedy]]'s policy toward the Soviets and the fear of American abandonment of Europe contributed to the agreements between De Gaulle and Adenauer that culminated in the Elysée treaty in 1963. |
| − | To achieve European unity, Adenauer needed the cooperation of the labor union, which mostly supported the opposition SPD. The German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) saw itself in a political role, and largely favored the idea of European integration. A key test of its European credentials was its attitude toward the [[Schuman Plan]], proposed by France, for a common market for coal, iron, and steel. The DGB accepted the plan following its entry in 1949 into the International Federation of Free Trade Unions, though it was aware of the risk of internal tensions and friction with SPD politicians. The issue also became interwoven with the Pleven Plan to create a European defense community. The agreement that was finally reached between Adenauer and the DGB involved some compromise on the issue of equal union participation in the coal and steel industry, but was not a "deal" based on prior concessions. Adenauer's dealings with the DGB leadership showed cool calculation, and their close cooperation reflected the DGB's sense of political responsibility and general enthusiasm for Europe. | + | To achieve European centralization, Adenauer needed the cooperation of the labor union, which mostly supported the opposition SPD. The German Federation of Trade Unions (DGB) saw itself in a political role, and largely favored the idea of "European integration". A key test of its European credentials was its attitude toward the [[Schuman Plan]], proposed by France, for a common market for coal, iron, and steel. The DGB accepted the plan following its entry in 1949 into the International Federation of Free Trade Unions, though it was aware of the risk of internal tensions and friction with SPD politicians. The issue also became interwoven with the Pleven Plan to create a European defense community. The agreement that was finally reached between Adenauer and the DGB involved some compromise on the issue of equal union participation in the coal and steel industry, but was not a "deal" based on prior concessions. Adenauer's dealings with the DGB leadership showed cool calculation, and their close cooperation reflected the DGB's sense of political responsibility and general enthusiasm for European centralization. |