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*They believed that Cubans would be grateful to be liberated from Fidel Castro and would quickly join the battle. This support failed to materialize; many hundreds of thousands of others were arrested, and some executed, prior to the landings. (see also Priestland 2003; Grayston, 2000).

*They believed that Cubans would be grateful to be liberated from Fidel Castro and would quickly join the battle. This support failed to materialize; many hundreds of thousands of others were arrested, and some executed, prior to the landings. (see also Priestland 2003; Grayston, 2000).

The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Castro's counterintelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including [[Enrique Lister]],<ref name="SPlister.htm"/> had infiltrated most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated."  CIA operative [[E. Howard Hunt]] had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a future interview with [[CNN]], he said, "...all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<ref>http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt/</ref>  [[Grayston Lynch]] among others, also points to Castro's rounding up of hundreds thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003) to destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28, 1959,[http://aguadadepasajeros.bravepages.com/cubahistoria/congreso_catolico_cuba_1959.htm] were gone or silent.  

The CIA's near certainty that the Cuban people would rise up and join them was based on the agency's extremely weak presence on the ground in Cuba. Castro's counterintelligence, trained by Soviet Bloc specialists including [[Enrique Lister]],<ref name="SPlister.htm"/> had infiltrated most resistance groups. Because of this, almost all the information that came from exiles and defectors was "contaminated."  CIA operative [[E. Howard Hunt]] had interviewed Cubans in Havana prior to the invasion; in a future interview with [[CNN]], he said, "...all I could find was a lot of enthusiasm for Fidel Castro."<ref>https://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/18/interviews/hunt/</ref>  [[Grayston Lynch]] among others, also points to Castro's rounding up of hundreds thousands of anti-Castro and potentially anti-Castro Cubans across the island prior and during the invasion (e.g. Priestland, 2003) to destroying any chances for a general uprising against the Castro regime. Thus the million voices that had cried "Cuba si, comunismo NO!" on November 28, 1959,[http://aguadadepasajeros.bravepages.com/cubahistoria/congreso_catolico_cuba_1959.htm] were gone or silent.  

Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full-scale war and abandoned the exiles.

Many military leaders almost certainly expected the invasion to fail but thought that Kennedy would send in [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]] to save the exiles. Kennedy, however, did not want a full-scale war and abandoned the exiles.