Changes

The memorandum listed the names of nine State Department officials and said that they were "only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security." On June 24, 1947, Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy notified the chairman of the Senate subcommittee that ten persons had been dismissed from the department, five of whom had been listed in the memorandum. But from June 1947 until McCarthy's Wheeling speech in February 1950, the State Department did not fire one person as a loyalty or security risk.<ref>[http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jepeurifoy.htm John Emil Peurifoy, Foreign Service Office & United States Ambassador],  Arlington National Cemetery Website, retrieved 21 March 2007.</ref>

The memorandum listed the names of nine State Department officials and said that they were "only a few of the hundreds now employed in varying capacities who are protected and allowed to remain despite the fact that their presence is an obvious hazard to national security." On June 24, 1947, Assistant Secretary of State John Peurifoy notified the chairman of the Senate subcommittee that ten persons had been dismissed from the department, five of whom had been listed in the memorandum. But from June 1947 until McCarthy's Wheeling speech in February 1950, the State Department did not fire one person as a loyalty or security risk.<ref>[http://www.arlingtoncemetery.net/jepeurifoy.htm John Emil Peurifoy, Foreign Service Office & United States Ambassador],  Arlington National Cemetery Website, retrieved 21 March 2007.</ref>

In 1947,<ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages."</ref> it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks.<ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages".</ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  [[Leak]]s in the investigation into the [[Greg Silvermaster#Silvermaster group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges...there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

In 1947,<ref>NSA Archives, National Cryptological Museum, [http://www-personal.umich.edu/~sanders/214/other/handouts/VenonaChrono.html Venona Chronology]; "~September 1: Col. Carter Clarke briefs the FBI's liaison officer Robert J. Lamphere on the break into Soviet diplomatic traffic. September: Carter W. Clarke of G-2 advises S. Wesley Reynolds, FBI, of successes at Arlington Hall on KGB espionage messages."</ref> it was apparent that no individual in the U.S. Government realized that evidence of massive Soviet espionage within the government was developing on twin tracks.<ref>Robert Louis Benson, and Michael Warner, eds. [https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/venona-soviet-espionage-and-the-american-response-1939-1957/preface.htm VENONA: Soviet Espionage and the American Response, 1939-1957,] pg. 9. Washington, DC: National Security Agency/Central Intelligence Agency, 1996. Laguna Hills, CA: Aegean Park Press, 1996. Robert L. Benson, works in the Office of Security, National Security Agency; Michael Warner, Deputy Chief of the CIA History Staff.</ref>  There was an [[FBI]] counterintelligence investigation <ref>Moynihan Commission on Government Secrecy, [http://www.fas.org/sgp/library/moynihan/foreword.html Appendix A, 7. The Cold War]; "In November 1945 Elizabeth Bentley informed the FBI of her activities as a Soviet courier, which in turn led to renewed interest in Chambers. In late August or early September 1947, the FBI was informed that the Army Security Agency had begun to break into Soviet espionage messages".</ref> which empanelled a grand jury in New York to look into defector [[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s allegations, and the [[Army Signal Intelligence Service]] reading Soviet cipher decrypts <ref>National Security Agency, Venona Archives, Introductory History of VENONA and Guide to the Translations,[http://permanent.access.gpo.gov/lps33230/www.nsa.gov/docs/venona/monographs/monograph-1.html  The VENONA Breakthroughs]; "An Arlington Hall report on 22 July 1947 showed that the Soviet message traffic contained dozens, probably hundreds, of covernames, many of KGB agents, including ANTENNA and LIBERAL (later identified as Julius Rosenberg). One message mentioned that LIBERAL's wife was named "Ethel." General Carter W. Clarke, the assistant G-2, called the FBI liaison officer to G-2 and told him that the Army had begun to break into Soviet intelligence service traffic, and that the traffic indicated a massive Soviet espionage effort in the U.S.</ref> at [[Arlington Hall]].  It was a case of one hand not knowing what the other was doing.  [[Leak]]s in the investigation into the [[Greg Silvermaster#Silvermaster group|Silvermaster case]] began to threaten the successful prosecution.<ref>FBI Silvermaster file, Vol. 93, February 1947. Summary: Hoover memo expressing doubts about successful prosecution and statement that, because of leaks by the Department, "there is little which can be expected from any action now." Further Hoover memo of February 4, 1947, saying "investigative reports in this case would not be furnished to the Criminal Division [of Justice] because of the possibility that some of the material therein would be publicized."  See also January 27, 1947 J. Edgar Hoover Memorandum for the Attorney General, [http://education-research.org/PDFs/Silvermaster093.pdf pgs. 31 -32].</ref>  So when McCarthy later made charges that the Truman administration knowingly protected Soviet agents, on the surface, this appeared to large sectors <ref>National Counterintelligence Center (NACIC), [http://www.nacic.gov/history/CIReaderPlain/Vol3Chap1.pdf Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, Chap. 1, pg.47], "Polls taken at the time revealed that a majority of Americans believed that Communism at home and abroad was a serious threat to US security".</ref> of the American public<ref>Margaret Chase Smith, [https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/SmithDeclaration.pdf Declaration of Conscience, pg. 2], 1 June 1950, U.C. Congress, Senate, Congressional Record, 81st Congress, 2nd sess., pp. 7894-95.  "The Democratic administration has greatly lost the confidence of the American people by its complacency to the threat of communism here at home and the leak of vital secrets to Russia through key officials of the Democratic administration.  There are enough proved cases to make this point without diluting our criticism with unproved charges...there have been enough proved cases, such as the ''[[Amerasia]]'' case, the [[Hiss]] case, the [[Coplon]] case, the [[Harry Gold|Gold]] case, to cause nationwide distrust and strong suspicion that there may be something to the unproved, sensational accusations".</ref> as true.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associates of real espionage suspects.  Hoover told a House Committee in 3 days before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

FBI Director [[J. Edgar Hoover]] was among only a handful of people in the U.S. Government who was aware of the Venona project, and there is no indication Hoover shared Venona information with McCarthy.  In fact, Hoover may have actually fed McCarthy dead end files on family relatives or close associates of real espionage suspects.  Hoover told a House Committee in 3 days before McCarthy’s Wheeling speech that counterespionage required "an objective different from the handling of criminal cases. It is more important to ascertain his contacts, his objectives, his sources of information and his methods of communication" as "arrest and public disclosure are steps to be taken only as a matter of last resort." He concluded that "we can be secure only when we have a full knowledge of the operations of an espionage network, because then we are in a position to render their efforts ineffective." <ref>J. Edgar Hoover, Testimony before House Appropriations Committee, 2/7/1950.</ref>  And there is no indication McCarthy might have known he was being used by Hoover in this way.

{{Cquote|The most vital information for developing the first Soviet atomic bomb came from scientists designing the American atomic bomb at [[Los Alamos]], New Mexico...Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard, and Szilard's secretary were often quoted in the NKVD files from 1942 to 1945 as sources for information on the development of the first American atomic bomb. It is in the record that on several occasions they agreed to share information on [[nuclear weapons]] with Soviet scientists. At first they were motivated by fear of [[Hitler]]; they believed that the Germans might produce the first atomic bomb. Then the Danish physicist [[Niels Bohr]] helped strengthen their own inclinations to share nuclear secrets with the world academic community. By sharing their knowledge with the Soviet Union, the chance of beating the Germans to the bomb would be increased.<ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 172.</ref>}}

{{Cquote|The most vital information for developing the first Soviet atomic bomb came from scientists designing the American atomic bomb at [[Los Alamos]], New Mexico...Oppenheimer, Fermi, Szilard, and Szilard's secretary were often quoted in the NKVD files from 1942 to 1945 as sources for information on the development of the first American atomic bomb. It is in the record that on several occasions they agreed to share information on [[nuclear weapons]] with Soviet scientists. At first they were motivated by fear of [[Hitler]]; they believed that the Germans might produce the first atomic bomb. Then the Danish physicist [[Niels Bohr]] helped strengthen their own inclinations to share nuclear secrets with the world academic community. By sharing their knowledge with the Soviet Union, the chance of beating the Germans to the bomb would be increased.<ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 172.</ref>}}

{{Cquote|[[Gregory Kheifetz]], our operative who had been successful in atomic espionage...described Oppenheimer as a man who thought of problems on a global scale. Oppenheimer saw the threat and promise of the atomic age and understood the ramifications for both military and peaceful applications. We always stressed that contacts with him should be carefully planned to maintain security, and should not be used for acquiring routine information.<ref>FBI Special Agent in Charge William Borden, who investigated Oppenheimer's [[CPUSA]] connections and was requested to make a determinaion of his findings, wrote "He was a vigorous supporter of the H-bomb program until August 6, 1945, (Hiroshima), on which day he personally urged each senior individual working in this field to desist... The central problem is assessing the degree of likelihood that he in fact... during the crucial 1939-1942 period...became an actual espionage and policy instrument of the Soviets. ... my opinion is that...the worst is in fact truth.” [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Letter_from_William_L._Borden_to_J._Edgar_Hoover,_November_7,_1953 Letter from William L. Borden to J. Edgar Hoover], November 7, 1953.</ref> We knew that Oppenheimer would remain an influential person in America after the war <ref>McCarthy stated during the Executive Session hearings, "I noticed with some interest Oppenheimer’s articles in regard to the H-bomb, for example; he vigorously opposed our proceeding with any experimentation in the development of the H-bomb. When he lost out in that, he now has taken the position that we should not have an air force capable of delivering that bomb. Maybe I am simplifying it a bit, but in fact that is his argument. His argument has been that we should build a screen of defense around this nation."  McCarthy Hearings, Executive Session Transcripts, September 15, 1953, [http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Volume3.pdf Vol. 3, Pgs. 37 - 38] pdf.</ref> and therefore our relations with him should not take the form of running a controlled agent. We understood that he and other members of the scientific community were best approached as friends, not as agents. Since Oppenheimer, Bohr, and Fermi were fierce opponents of violence, they would seek to prevent a nuclear war, creating a balance of power through sharing the secrets of atomic energy. This would be a crucial factor in establishing the new world order after the war, and we took advantage of this.<ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 195.</ref> }}

{{Cquote|[[Gregory Kheifetz]], our operative who had been successful in atomic espionage...described Oppenheimer as a man who thought of problems on a global scale. Oppenheimer saw the threat and promise of the atomic age and understood the ramifications for both military and peaceful applications. We always stressed that contacts with him should be carefully planned to maintain security, and should not be used for acquiring routine information.<ref>FBI Special Agent in Charge William Borden, who investigated Oppenheimer's [[CPUSA]] connections and was requested to make a determinaion of his findings, wrote "He was a vigorous supporter of the H-bomb program until August 6, 1945, (Hiroshima), on which day he personally urged each senior individual working in this field to desist... The central problem is assessing the degree of likelihood that he in fact... during the crucial 1939-1942 period...became an actual espionage and policy instrument of the Soviets. ... my opinion is that...the worst is in fact truth.” [http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Letter_from_William_L._Borden_to_J._Edgar_Hoover,_November_7,_1953 Letter from William L. Borden to J. Edgar Hoover], November 7, 1953.</ref> We knew that Oppenheimer would remain an influential person in America after the war <ref>McCarthy stated during the Executive Session hearings, "I noticed with some interest Oppenheimer’s articles in regard to the H-bomb, for example; he vigorously opposed our proceeding with any experimentation in the development of the H-bomb. When he lost out in that, he now has taken the position that we should not have an air force capable of delivering that bomb. Maybe I am simplifying it a bit, but in fact that is his argument. His argument has been that we should build a screen of defense around this nation."  McCarthy Hearings, Executive Session Transcripts, September 15, 1953, [https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/resources/pdf/Volume3.pdf Vol. 3, Pgs. 37 - 38] pdf.</ref> and therefore our relations with him should not take the form of running a controlled agent. We understood that he and other members of the scientific community were best approached as friends, not as agents. Since Oppenheimer, Bohr, and Fermi were fierce opponents of violence, they would seek to prevent a nuclear war, creating a balance of power through sharing the secrets of atomic energy. This would be a crucial factor in establishing the new world order after the war, and we took advantage of this.<ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 195.</ref> }}

{{Cquote|In developing Oppenheimer as a source, [[Vassili Zarubin]]'s wife, Elizabeth, was essential. ...In 1941 [[Elizabeth Zarubina]] was a captain in the [[KGB]]. After her husband's posting to Washington, she traveled to California frequently to cultivate the Oppenheimer family through social contacts arranged by Kheifets. Kheifets then introduced Elizabeth to Oppenheimer's wife, Katherine, who was sympathetic to the Soviet Union and Communist ideals, and the two worked out a system for future meetings." <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 190.</ref>}}

{{Cquote|In developing Oppenheimer as a source, [[Vassili Zarubin]]'s wife, Elizabeth, was essential. ...In 1941 [[Elizabeth Zarubina]] was a captain in the [[KGB]]. After her husband's posting to Washington, she traveled to California frequently to cultivate the Oppenheimer family through social contacts arranged by Kheifets. Kheifets then introduced Elizabeth to Oppenheimer's wife, Katherine, who was sympathetic to the Soviet Union and Communist ideals, and the two worked out a system for future meetings." <ref>Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks'', pg. 190.</ref>}}

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the White House, the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision.<ref>Thomas Patrick Carroll, ''The Case Against Intelligence Openness'', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2001, Vol. 14, Nol. 4, pgs. 559 - 574. [http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600152617164]</ref> General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowledge of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise.<ref>[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the White House, the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision.<ref>Thomas Patrick Carroll, ''The Case Against Intelligence Openness'', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2001, Vol. 14, Nol. 4, pgs. 559 - 574. [https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600152617164]</ref> General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowledge of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise.<ref>[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the knowhow from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese Comintern forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various [[communist front]] organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spy’s contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the United States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the knowhow from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese Comintern forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various [[communist front]] organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spy’s contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the United States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.