Changes

==The [[Silvermaster case]]==

==The [[Silvermaster case]]==

[[Image:Fbisilvermasterfilevol15p4.JPG|right|250px|thumb|CPUSA defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified he could name 400 individuals involved in the [[CPUSA#Secret apparatus|Communist conspiracy]];<ref>[http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft296nb15t&chunk.id=d0e6193&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e4718&brand=eschol FBI Headquarters File 100-63, Louis Francis Budenz, Internal Security—C, Serial 122.]</ref> Hayden Peake, Curator of the [[CIA]]'s Historical Intelligence Collection stated, "[[Venona]] makes absolutely clear that they had active agents in the [[U.S. State Department]], [[Treasury Department]], [[Justice Department]], [[LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee|Senate committee]] staffs, the military services, the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS), the [[Manhattan Project]], and the [[White House]], as well as wartime agencies. No modern government was more thoroughly penetrated."<ref>[[Hayden B. Peake]], [http://web.archive.org/web/20060820054409/http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/2000/summer/re2-su0.htm ''The Venona Progeny''], Naval War College Review, Summer 2000, Vol. LIII, No. 3. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html]</ref>]]

[[Image:Fbisilvermasterfilevol15p4.JPG|right|250px|thumb|CPUSA defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified he could name 400 individuals involved in the [[CPUSA#Secret apparatus|Communist conspiracy]];<ref>[http://content.cdlib.org/xtf/view?docId=ft296nb15t&chunk.id=d0e6193&toc.depth=1&toc.id=d0e4718&brand=eschol FBI Headquarters File 100-63, Louis Francis Budenz, Internal Security—C, Serial 122.]</ref> Hayden Peake, Curator of the [[CIA]]'s Historical Intelligence Collection stated, "[[Venona]] makes absolutely clear that they had active agents in the [[U.S. State Department]], [[Treasury Department]], [[Justice Department]], [[LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee|Senate committee]] staffs, the military services, the [[Office of Strategic Services]] (OSS), the [[Manhattan Project]], and the [[White House]], as well as wartime agencies. No modern government was more thoroughly penetrated."<ref>[[Hayden B. Peake]], [https://web.archive.org/web/20060820054409/http://www.nwc.navy.mil/press/review/2000/summer/re2-su0.htm ''The Venona Progeny''], Naval War College Review, Summer 2000, Vol. LIII, No. 3. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html]</ref>]]

In November 1945 when the War was finally over, a courier from a very large [[CPUSA#Secret apparatus|CPUSA underground apparatus]] operating in numerous federal agencies throughout the [[New Deal]],which included the [[White House]], defected to the [[FBI]].  The [[KGB]] had removed [[Elizabeth Bentley]] from overseeing at least 80 KGB sources late in the war.  When she realized she knew too much, was no longer of use to the KGB and her life was in danger, she told her story in a deposition to the FBI. Bentley was assigned covername "Gregory" to protect her identity, and the highly secret investigation was referred to as "the Gregory Case."   

In November 1945 when the War was finally over, a courier from a very large [[CPUSA#Secret apparatus|CPUSA underground apparatus]] operating in numerous federal agencies throughout the [[New Deal]],which included the [[White House]], defected to the [[FBI]].  The [[KGB]] had removed [[Elizabeth Bentley]] from overseeing at least 80 KGB sources late in the war.  When she realized she knew too much, was no longer of use to the KGB and her life was in danger, she told her story in a deposition to the FBI. Bentley was assigned covername "Gregory" to protect her identity, and the highly secret investigation was referred to as "the Gregory Case."   

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned to Washington, all matters pertaining to the [[United Nations]] organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the UN Charter.<ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]].<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]]—a clear violation of the principals of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September 1939.  What’s more, it was the betrayal of an ally – the Polish Government – which had signed the Atlantic Charter and the [[Allied powers#United Nations Declaration|United Nations Declaration]].

When the Office of Special Political Affairs (OSPA) was created in 1944, [[Alger Hiss]] became the deputy director - a sensitive and key position. In August 1944, Hiss was executive secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference. When he returned to Washington, all matters pertaining to the [[United Nations]] organization came under his direct supervision. With [[Harry Hopkins]], [[Cordell Hull]], and others, Hiss worked on the first drafts of the UN Charter.<ref>Ralph de Toledano and Victor Lasky, [http://www.americandeception.com/index.php?action=downloadpdf&photo=/PDFsml_AD/Seeds_Of_Treason-Ralph_de_Toledano_and_Victor_Lasky-1950-278pgs-POL.sml.pdf&id=343&PHPSESSID=b964065077a1de19538c4c7b1cf9e825 ''Seeds of Treason''], (NY: Funk and Wagnalls, 1950), pg. 107.</ref> Hiss negotiated privately with the ailing U.S. president, [[Franklin Roosevelt]], and [[CPSU]] General Secretary [[Josef Stalin]] at the [[Yalta conference]].<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 109.</ref>  It was here that FDR agreed to allow the Soviet Union to occupy Poland and set up a [[Comintern]] affiliated [[puppet state]]—a clear violation of the principals of self-determination expressed in the [[Atlantic Charter]], and the very cause over which Great Britain went to war with Germany in September 1939.  What’s more, it was the betrayal of an ally – the Polish Government – which had signed the Atlantic Charter and the [[Allied powers#United Nations Declaration|United Nations Declaration]].

On March 3, 1945, the director of the [[KGB]], Lt. General [[Pavel Fitin]] instructed [[Ishkak Akhmerov]], head of [[KGB Illegal]] operations in the United States to learn what he could about American plans for the forthcoming United Nations San Francisco Conference. Assigning top priority to the task,  Fitin ordered an early report. Hiss was responsible for planning the conference.  Hiss had been working with [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU), since the mid 1930s.  Ordinarily security procedures dictated that a Case officer from one Soviet Intelligence organization would not contact an agent working for another, however under the extraordinary circumstances of the approaching UN organizational conference late in the war, Akhmerov did so, and reported on his contact with Hiss.<ref>[http://carnellknowledge.townhall.com/g/3d62b172-7492-4d6c-8062-c91c1e2d3266 McCarthy Was Right], Excerpts from The Venona Program, September 04, 2006.  Retrieved from Townhall.com September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/foxpaper.htm In the Enemy’s House: Venona and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence], John F. Fox, Jr., Presented at the 2005 Symposium on Cryptologic History, 10/27/2005.</ref><ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. United States Government Printing Office. Appendix A, Part 6, [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/12hist1.pdf Page 36] pdf.</ref>  Akhmerov reported how after the Yalta conference Hiss traveled to Moscow where [[Andrey Vyshinsky]] passed on to him the GRU's gratitude.<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00006.cfm 1822 Venona Washington to Moscow 30 March 1945]. National Security Agency National Cryptologic Museum.  Retrieved September 04, 2007.</ref>  A codename was assigned by one Soviet Intelligence agency for an agent working for another Soviet Intelligence agency which created confusion among investigators.<ref>[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html Secrets, Lies, and Atomic Spies], NOVA Transcript, PBS Airdate: February 5, 2002. Retrieved from PBS.org September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>Who was Venona's “Ales”? Cryptanalysis and the Hiss case. Eduard Mark, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 18, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 45-72(28)</ref> A [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] investigation determined that Hiss was responsible for the employment of 494 persons on the United Nations initial staff.<ref>Activities of U.S. Citizens Employed by the UN, second report of the [[SISS]] (March 22, 1954), p. 12.</ref>  With the leaks in the Silvermaster case, Elizabeth Bentley was called to testify in late July 1948, and [[Whittaker Chambers]], a [[CPUSA]] defector from the 1930s, a few days later repeated information he had given to President Franklin Roosevelt's Assistant Secretary of State [[Adolf Berle]] in 1939 - firsthand knowledge of Hiss's espionage activity - information that Berle in person relayed to President Roosevelt.<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 83 (pg. 91 pdf).</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,811892-1,00.html The Case of Alger Hiss], Time magazine, Feb. 13, 1950. Contemporaneous report 3 days after Sen. McCarthy's Wheeling, West Virginia Speech.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_47_17/ai_80900413 Hiss defenders covering for the `old man'], by Ralph De Toledano, Insight on the News, Dec 17, 2001.</ref> Ambassador to the Soviet Union [[William Bullitt]] had likewise warned FDR as early as 1939 that Hiss was an agent of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 86 (pg. 94 pdf).</ref>

On March 3, 1945, the director of the [[KGB]], Lt. General [[Pavel Fitin]] instructed [[Ishkak Akhmerov]], head of [[KGB Illegal]] operations in the United States to learn what he could about American plans for the forthcoming United Nations San Francisco Conference. Assigning top priority to the task,  Fitin ordered an early report. Hiss was responsible for planning the conference.  Hiss had been working with [[Soviet Military Intelligence]] (GRU), since the mid 1930s.  Ordinarily security procedures dictated that a Case officer from one Soviet Intelligence organization would not contact an agent working for another, however under the extraordinary circumstances of the approaching UN organizational conference late in the war, Akhmerov did so, and reported on his contact with Hiss.<ref>[http://carnellknowledge.townhall.com/g/3d62b172-7492-4d6c-8062-c91c1e2d3266 McCarthy Was Right], Excerpts from The Venona Program, September 04, 2006.  Retrieved from Townhall.com September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>[http://www.fbi.gov/libref/historic/history/foxpaper.htm In the Enemy’s House: Venona and the Maturation of American Counterintelligence], John F. Fox, Jr., Presented at the 2005 Symposium on Cryptologic History, 10/27/2005.</ref><ref>Report of the Commission on Protecting and Reducing Government Secrecy. United States Government Printing Office. Appendix A, Part 6, [http://www.gpo.gov/congress/commissions/secrecy/pdf/12hist1.pdf Page 36] pdf.</ref>  Akhmerov reported how after the Yalta conference Hiss traveled to Moscow where [[Andrey Vyshinsky]] passed on to him the GRU's gratitude.<ref>[http://www.nsa.gov/venona/venon00006.cfm 1822 Venona Washington to Moscow 30 March 1945]. National Security Agency National Cryptologic Museum.  Retrieved September 04, 2007.</ref>  A codename was assigned by one Soviet Intelligence agency for an agent working for another Soviet Intelligence agency which created confusion among investigators.<ref>[https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/transcripts/2904_venona.html Secrets, Lies, and Atomic Spies], NOVA Transcript, PBS Airdate: February 5, 2002. Retrieved from PBS.org September 04, 2007.</ref><ref>Who was Venona's “Ales”? Cryptanalysis and the Hiss case. Eduard Mark, Intelligence and National Security, Volume 18, Number 3, September 2003 , pp. 45-72(28)</ref> A [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] investigation determined that Hiss was responsible for the employment of 494 persons on the United Nations initial staff.<ref>Activities of U.S. Citizens Employed by the UN, second report of the [[SISS]] (March 22, 1954), p. 12.</ref>  With the leaks in the Silvermaster case, Elizabeth Bentley was called to testify in late July 1948, and [[Whittaker Chambers]], a [[CPUSA]] defector from the 1930s, a few days later repeated information he had given to President Franklin Roosevelt's Assistant Secretary of State [[Adolf Berle]] in 1939 - firsthand knowledge of Hiss's espionage activity - information that Berle in person relayed to President Roosevelt.<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 83 (pg. 91 pdf).</ref><ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,811892-1,00.html The Case of Alger Hiss], Time magazine, Feb. 13, 1950. Contemporaneous report 3 days after Sen. McCarthy's Wheeling, West Virginia Speech.</ref><ref>[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_47_17/ai_80900413 Hiss defenders covering for the `old man'], by Ralph De Toledano, Insight on the News, Dec 17, 2001.</ref> Ambassador to the Soviet Union [[William Bullitt]] had likewise warned FDR as early as 1939 that Hiss was an agent of the [[Soviet Union]].<ref>Toledano and Lasky, ''Seeds of Treason'', pg. 86 (pg. 94 pdf).</ref>

==White and the IMF==

==White and the IMF==

An 86 year old [[Pavel Sudoplatov]] wrote in his memoirs,  

An 86 year old [[Pavel Sudoplatov]] wrote in his memoirs,  

{{Cquote|My Administration for Special Tasks was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination of our enemies beyond the country's borders. It was a special department working in the Soviet security service....I was also in charge <ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_id=43900&group_id=13349 Was Oppenheimer a Soviet Spy?] A Roundtable Discussion with Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Gregg Herken and [[Hayden Peake]]. The Cold War International History Project. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  Peake, curator of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]’s (CIA) Historical Intelligence Collection [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html], states, "The content of the ''Sacred Secrets'' Merkulov letter is also questioned on the point of whether it is or is not "smoking gun" evidence that Robert Oppenheimer was a Soviet source or agent while he worked on the atom bomb project during WWII. ...In short, I accept the letter and its implications."</ref> of the Soviet espionage effort to obtain the secrets of the [[atomic bomb]] from America and Great Britain. I set up a network of illegals <ref>H.B. Laes, Theory of Fielding, [http://web.archive.org/web/20050204173143/http://www.tof.blogspot.com/#kgborg KGB Organization]. Retieved September 04, 2007. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/spycases_folder/bomb_folder/bombgenm-q.html]</ref> who convinced [[Robert Oppenheimer]],<ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034F6F1-96B6-175C-9170648C02EA02F8&sort=Collection&item=Post%20Stalin%20succession%20struggle Merkulov to Beria], 2 October 1944.  The letter states, "In 1942 one of the leaders of scientific work on [uranium] in the USA, Professor Oppenheimer while being an unlisted (nglastny) member of the apparat of [[Comrade Browder]] informed us about the beginning of work.  On the request of Comrade Kheifitz, confirmed by Comrade Browder, he provided cooperation in access to research for several of our tested sources including a relative of [Comrade Browder]"</ref> [[Enrico Fermi]], [[Leo Szilard]], [[Bruno Pontecorvo]], [[Alan Nunn May]], [[Klaus Fuchs]], and other scientists in America and Great Britain to share atomic secrets with us.<ref>Pavel Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks : Memoirs of an Unwanted Spymaster'', Little Brown and Company, London, 1994,  pg. 3.</ref>}}

{{Cquote|My Administration for Special Tasks was responsible for sabotage, kidnapping, and assassination of our enemies beyond the country's borders. It was a special department working in the Soviet security service....I was also in charge <ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.publications&doc_id=43900&group_id=13349 Was Oppenheimer a Soviet Spy?] A Roundtable Discussion with Jerrold and Leona Schecter, Gregg Herken and [[Hayden Peake]]. The Cold War International History Project. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  Peake, curator of the [[Central Intelligence Agency]]’s (CIA) Historical Intelligence Collection [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/alpha_folder/P_folder/peake.html], states, "The content of the ''Sacred Secrets'' Merkulov letter is also questioned on the point of whether it is or is not "smoking gun" evidence that Robert Oppenheimer was a Soviet source or agent while he worked on the atom bomb project during WWII. ...In short, I accept the letter and its implications."</ref> of the Soviet espionage effort to obtain the secrets of the [[atomic bomb]] from America and Great Britain. I set up a network of illegals <ref>H.B. Laes, Theory of Fielding, [https://web.archive.org/web/20050204173143/http://www.tof.blogspot.com/#kgborg KGB Organization]. Retieved September 04, 2007. [http://intellit.muskingum.edu/spycases_folder/bomb_folder/bombgenm-q.html]</ref> who convinced [[Robert Oppenheimer]],<ref>[http://www.wilsoncenter.org/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=va2.document&identifier=5034F6F1-96B6-175C-9170648C02EA02F8&sort=Collection&item=Post%20Stalin%20succession%20struggle Merkulov to Beria], 2 October 1944.  The letter states, "In 1942 one of the leaders of scientific work on [uranium] in the USA, Professor Oppenheimer while being an unlisted (nglastny) member of the apparat of [[Comrade Browder]] informed us about the beginning of work.  On the request of Comrade Kheifitz, confirmed by Comrade Browder, he provided cooperation in access to research for several of our tested sources including a relative of [Comrade Browder]"</ref> [[Enrico Fermi]], [[Leo Szilard]], [[Bruno Pontecorvo]], [[Alan Nunn May]], [[Klaus Fuchs]], and other scientists in America and Great Britain to share atomic secrets with us.<ref>Pavel Sudoplatov, ''Special Tasks : Memoirs of an Unwanted Spymaster'', Little Brown and Company, London, 1994,  pg. 3.</ref>}}

[[KGB]] Agent and presidential adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] secured for Comintern operative [[Owen Lattimore]] the appointment by Roosevelt as the American adviser for the [[Kuomintang]] and Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]].<ref>Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, February 15, 1952. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Internal Security Subcommittee]], Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part 9, pp. 3209-10.</ref>  During the [[Communazi period]], the FBI issued a notice that Lattimore should be considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency.<ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=453 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], Newly Uncovered Secret Data Confirm Wisconsin Senator's Major Charges, ''Human Events'', M. Stanton Evans, 05/08/2003.</ref>  

[[KGB]] Agent and presidential adviser [[Lauchlin Currie]] secured for Comintern operative [[Owen Lattimore]] the appointment by Roosevelt as the American adviser for the [[Kuomintang]] and Generalissimo [[Chiang Kai-shek]].<ref>Testimony of Stanley K. Hornbeck, February 15, 1952. U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Internal Security Subcommittee]], Institute of Pacific Relations Hearings, 82nd Congress, First Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1951), Part 9, pp. 3209-10.</ref>  During the [[Communazi period]], the FBI issued a notice that Lattimore should be considered for custodial detention in the event of a national emergency.<ref>[http://www.humanevents.com/article.php?id=453 McCarthyism: Waging the Cold War in America], Newly Uncovered Secret Data Confirm Wisconsin Senator's Major Charges, ''Human Events'', M. Stanton Evans, 05/08/2003.</ref>  

On November 25, 1941 Lattimore sent a dispatch from China to Currie in the White House arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the [[Silvermaster group]].<ref>Elizabeth Bentley's testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the harsh ultimatum written by [[KGB]] Agent Harry Dexter White to Japan after Congress investigated the [[Pearl Harbor attack]].<ref>Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> Prof. Anthony Kubek has written that Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan—did more to promote the Sovietization of China than in any other act of Lattimore’s career. All Comintern designs for conquest of China hinged upon destroying Japan and the balance of power in the Pacific.<ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek wrote the Introduction of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

On November 25, 1941 Lattimore sent a dispatch from China to Currie in the White House arguing against a proposed diplomatic understanding between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the [[Silvermaster group]].<ref>Elizabeth Bentley's testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Secretary of State [[Cordell Hull]] testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the harsh ultimatum written by [[KGB]] Agent Harry Dexter White to Japan after Congress investigated the [[Pearl Harbor attack]].<ref>Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref> Prof. Anthony Kubek has written that Lattimore, by this one act, designed to accomplish the Soviet objective of promoting war between the United States and Japan—did more to promote the Sovietization of China than in any other act of Lattimore’s career. All Comintern designs for conquest of China hinged upon destroying Japan and the balance of power in the Pacific.<ref>Communism at Pearl Harbor, How the Communists Helped to Bring on Pearl Harbor and Open up Asia to Communinization, Dr. Anthony Kubek, Dallas Texas, Teaching Publishing Company, 1959. Dr. Anthony Kubek wrote the Introduction of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary, [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]], Report on the ''Morgenthau Diaries''.  The records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65 consist largely of copies of portions of memorandums, correspondence, transcripts of meetings, and other records preserved by Secretary Morgenthau in order to document his tenure. The original records are in the custody of the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, NY. In 1965, the SISS issued a two volume committee print entitled Morgenthau Diary (China), Edited by Dr. Anthony Kubek, containing entries from the records at the Franklin D. Roosevelt Library selected to illustrate the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in China. According to Dr. Kubek, the subcommittee wanted to produce a documentary history on the subject and "also indicate the serious problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials," specifically Harry Dexter White. White was a major figure in Senator William Jenner's investigation of interlocking subversion in Government departments in 1953.  The bipartisan investigation lasted for twelve years, and the Subcommittee's Report took another two years to write. [https://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103]  Dr. Anthony Kubek also is a recognized expert on the subject of U.S. Naval Intelligence's Operation Magic, the effort to crack Japanese diplomatic ciphers. [http://www.fas.org/irp/ops/ci/docs/ci2/2ch2_bibl.pdf]</ref>

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15, 1943, Lattimore instructed [[Joseph Barnes]]<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China."  The [[disinformation]] was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, were later to write in the ''New York Times'' of China's "agrarian reformers." But in July and August 1943, the [[Maoist]]s—in the midst of the war—joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States.<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

Defector [[Louis Budenz]] testified that Lattimore had been hand picked by the Comintern "to change the thinking here in Washington and in America on the Communist activities in China and relations to the Soviet Union." Lattimore was thought to be a man "who could put out [[propaganda]] and conceal the Communist activity, but still have it carry out the policy of the Communists." According to Budenz "the weight of his discussions was always along the lines of the Soviet policy," but the language employed 'Was non-Soviet in character.' " <ref>Testimony of Louis Francis Budenz, August 22, 1951. Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings. Part 2, pp. 522-23.</ref> When, on June 15, 1943, Lattimore instructed [[Joseph Barnes]]<ref>[http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,791284,00.html ''Tongue-Tied''], [[Time magazine]], Feb. 07, 1944.</ref> to replace the non-Communist Chinese of the U.S. [[Office of War Information]] (OWI) with Communists, OWI did so. On July 14 [[Thomas A. Bisson]], in the [[Institute of Pacific Relations]] (IPR) publication, ''Far Eastern Survey'', referred to [[Maoist]] forces as the "democratic China."  The [[disinformation]] was widely repeated among journalists and academics. Lattimore, [[Frederick Field]] and others, were later to write in the ''New York Times'' of China's "agrarian reformers." But in July and August 1943, the [[Maoist]]s—in the midst of the war—joined with the Japanese armies to inflict a serious defeat on Kuomintang troops allied with the United States.<ref>[http://www.geocities.com/Pentagon/6315/yaltabet.html ''The Yalta Betrayal''], Felix Wittmer, Claxton Printers, 1953, pg. 36.</ref>

[[Senator McCarthy]] repeatedly criticized IPR and its former chairman [[Philip Jessup]],  observing that Frederick Field, T.A. Bisson, and Lattimore were very active in IPR and worked to turn American China policy in favor of the CCP. John Carter Vincent, [[John Stewart Service]], [[Alger Hiss]], and [[John Paton Davies]] all had links to IPR. Jessup in 1949 was the principal editor of the State Department "white paper" on China that abandoned Chiang Kai-chek and the Kuomintang.

[[Senator McCarthy]] repeatedly criticized IPR and its former chairman [[Philip Jessup]],  observing that Frederick Field, T.A. Bisson, and Lattimore were very active in IPR and worked to turn American China policy in favor of the CCP. John Carter Vincent, [[John Stewart Service]], [[Alger Hiss]], and [[John Paton Davies]] all had links to IPR. Jessup in 1949 was the principal editor of the State Department "white paper" on China that abandoned Chiang Kai-chek and the Kuomintang.

The [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] (SISS) looked extensively into the problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials, specifically Harry Dexter White. Part of its report looked into the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in [[China]] and was published as the ''Morgenthau Diary''.<ref>[http://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103 Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, Records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65].</ref>  

The [[Senate Internal Security Subcommittee]] (SISS) looked extensively into the problem of unauthorized, uncontrolled and often dangerous power exercised by non-elected officials, specifically Harry Dexter White. Part of its report looked into the implementation of Roosevelt administration policy in [[China]] and was published as the ''Morgenthau Diary''.<ref>[https://www.archives.gov/legislative/guide/senate/chapter-13-judiciary-1947-1968.html#103 Guide to the Records of the U.S. Senate at the National Archives, Records of the Morgenthau Diary Study, 1953-65].</ref>  

The report stated in 1967, [[Image:FrankCoegroup.jpg|frame|right

The report stated in 1967, [[Image:FrankCoegroup.jpg|frame|right

|'''CCP Chairman [[Mao Zedong]] with [[Israel Epstein]] (first left), Soviet spies [[Anna Louise Strong]] (third left), [[Frank Coe]] (second right), and [[Solomon Adler]] (first right). [[New Deal]] economists Coe and Adler defected to Maoist China rather than face prosecution in the United States. Chinese history recalls the time their economic theories were implemented as the [[Three Years of Disasters]].  By 1959, Coe was writing articles justifying the [[Rectification campaign]], which the ''Epoch Times'' in 2004 referred to as the "darkest and most ferocious power game ever played out in the human world".<ref>[http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-11/24830.html Rectification in Yan’an—Creating the Most Fearsome Methods in Persecution], The Beginnings of the Chinese Communist Party, Epoch Times Commentaries on the Chinese Communist Party - Part 2, Dec 11, 2004.</ref>]]

|'''CCP Chairman [[Mao Zedong]] with [[Israel Epstein]] (first left), Soviet spies [[Anna Louise Strong]] (third left), [[Frank Coe]] (second right), and [[Solomon Adler]] (first right). [[New Deal]] economists Coe and Adler defected to Maoist China rather than face prosecution in the United States. Chinese history recalls the time their economic theories were implemented as the [[Three Years of Disasters]].  By 1959, Coe was writing articles justifying the [[Rectification campaign]], which the ''Epoch Times'' in 2004 referred to as the "darkest and most ferocious power game ever played out in the human world".<ref>[http://english.epochtimes.com/news/4-12-11/24830.html Rectification in Yan’an—Creating the Most Fearsome Methods in Persecution], The Beginnings of the Chinese Communist Party, Epoch Times Commentaries on the Chinese Communist Party - Part 2, Dec 11, 2004.</ref>]]

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

In sum, some 205 total true identities of persons involved in espionage during World War II were known to the FBI by 1950, some being corroborated by multiple sources.  Given the secret nature of Venona, and the unwillingness to let the Soviet Union know the US was reading its codes, the known spies were eased out of government positions, and where prosecution could occur using sources other than Venona, a few cases were attempted.  But the priority was always to maintain the secrecy regarding the breaking of Soviet codes, remove security risks, and forego law enforcement while cryptographers and field investigators continued working to identify others.

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the White House, the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision.<ref>Thomas Patrick Carroll, ''The Case Against Intelligence Openness'', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2001, Vol. 14, Nol. 4, pgs. 559 - 574. [https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600152617164]</ref> General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowledge of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise.<ref>[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

So secret was Venona, that not even [[President Truman]] was informed. The revelation Truman had never been informed was the subject of much controversy and discussion when the Venona documents were declassified in 1995.  Given the extent of the Soviet penetration of the U.S. Government, including virtually all the U.S. security and intelligence services, the State and Treasury Departments, and even the White House, the decision not to inform Truman appears to have been the logical and appropriate decision.<ref>Thomas Patrick Carroll, ''The Case Against Intelligence Openness'', International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 2001, Vol. 14, Nol. 4, pgs. 559 - 574. [https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600152617164]</ref> General [[Omar Bradley]] took it upon himself not to inform Truman, and told the few others with the knowledge of the Soviet attack on American security that he would inform the President if the need were to arise.<ref>[https://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/002/830wsuop.asp?pg=2 The Origins of McCarthyism], What did Harry Truman know, and when did he know it? by Robert D. Novak, ''The Weekly Standard'', 06/30/2003, Volume 008, Issue 41.</ref>  

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the knowhow from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese Comintern forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various [[communist front]] organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spy’s contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the United States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.

After the Soviet Union exploded its first nuclear test, and it became apparent to the public that the Soviet Union obtained the knowhow from American citizens employed by the federal government during the [[New Deal]], with the growing tensions of the times over the [[Berlin Airlift]], the loss of the U.S.'s wartime ally in China to the Chinese Comintern forces, and later the [[Korean War]], those with knowledge of Venona had as an immediate priority to remove Soviet operatives from sensitive positions.  President Truman instituted a system of Loyalty checks through review boards, but Truman himself was unaware of the extent of the real danger. Hoover approached McCarthy with a plan to (a) ease more security risks out of government positions, (b) put pressure on friends and relatives to reveal what they knew about Soviet operatives based upon familial relations or association in various [[communist front]] organizations, and (c) gain more knowledge of spy’s contacts and operations.  It took a willingness on McCarthy's part to stretch the limits of Senate Rules, and there is no indication Hoover disclosed completely to McCarthy  the FBI's full knowledge of Soviet espionage activity in the United States for the prior two and half decades. The immediate crisis was so large and potentially catastrophic that McCarthy was willing to act with Hoover and the FBI to help remove the remaining security risks.