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Americans had no inkling that a war was approaching in 1914. Over 100,000 were caught unawares when the war started, having traveled to Europe for tourism, business or to visit relatives. Their repatriation was handled by [[Herbert Hoover]], an American private citizen based in London.  The U.S. government, under the firm control of President [[Woodrow Wilson]], called for neutrality "in thought and deed."  Apart from an Anglophile element supporting Britain, public opinion went along at first.  Wilson kept the economy on a peacetime basis, and made no preparations or plans for the war. He insisted on keeping the army and navy on its small peacetime bases. Indeed, Washington refused even to study the lessons of military or economic mobilization that had been learned so painfully across the sea.

Americans had no inkling that a war was approaching in 1914. Over 100,000 were caught unawares when the war started, having traveled to Europe for tourism, business or to visit relatives. Their repatriation was handled by [[Herbert Hoover]], an American private citizen based in London.  The U.S. government, under the firm control of President [[Woodrow Wilson]], called for neutrality "in thought and deed."  Apart from an Anglophile element supporting Britain, public opinion went along at first.  Wilson kept the economy on a peacetime basis, and made no preparations or plans for the war. He insisted on keeping the army and navy on its small peacetime bases. Indeed, Washington refused even to study the lessons of military or economic mobilization that had been learned so painfully across the sea.

==Submarine issue==

==Submarine issue==

The most important indirect strategy used by the belligerents was the blockade: starve the enemy of food and the military machine will be crippled and perhaps the civilians will demand an end to the war. The Royal Navy successfully stopped the shipment of most war supplies and food to Germany. Neutral American ships that tried to trade with Germany (which international law clearly allowed), were seized or turned back. The strangulation came about very slowly, because Germany and its allies controlled extensive farmlands and raw materials, but it eventually worked because Germany and Austria took so many farmers into their armies. By 1918 the German cities were on the verge of starvation; the front-line soldiers were on short rations and were running out of essential supplies. The Allied blockade had done its job. The Germans also considered a blockade. "England wants to starve us," said Admiral [[Alfred von Tirpitz]], the man who built the German fleet and who remained a key advisor to the Kaiser. "We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and destroy every ship that endeavors to break the blockade."<ref> Ernest May, ''The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917'' p.115 quote from Dec 1914</ref>  Unable to challenge the more powerful Royal Navy on the surface, Tirpitz wanted to scare off merchant and passenger ships en route to Britain. He knew from his close reading of Captain [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]] that a blockade would not itself win the war. But he reasoned that since the island of Britain depended on imports of food, raw materials and manufactured goods, scaring off even half the ships would effectively undercut its long-term ability to maintain an army on the Western Front. While Germany only had nine long-range U-boats at the start of the war, it had ample shipyard capacity to build the hundreds that would be needed. The problem was that the U.S. demanded Germany respect international law, which protected neutral American ships on the high seas from seizure or sinking by either belligerent. (Other neutral nations made the same point; Berlin was probably more solicitous of Italy in than the US because Italy had an army.) Furthermore, Americans insisted that the drowning of innocent civilians was barbaric and grounds for a declaration of war. The British frequently violated America's neutral rights by seizing ships, but they did not drown anyone.<ref>Charles Cruttwell, '' A history of the great war, 1914-1918‎'' (1940) p 191 </ref>  As Wilson's top advisor, [[Colonel House]] commented, "The British have gone as far as they possibly could in violating neutral rights, though they have done it in the most courteous way." When Wilson exploded in protest at British violations of American neutrality, the British backed down (or the American ambassador, notoriously biased toward Britain, softened his chief's angry words.) German submarines torpedoed ships without warning, and some sailors and passengers drowned. Berlin explained that submarines were so vulnerable that they dare not surface near merchant ships that might be carrying guns, and anyway the subs were so small they could not rescue crews. Military "necessity" again. Britain armed most of its merchant ships with medium calibre guns that could sink a submarine, making an above-water attacks too risky.  

The most important indirect strategy used by the belligerents was the blockade: starve the enemy of food and the military machine will be crippled and perhaps the civilians will demand an end to the war. The Royal Navy successfully stopped the shipment of most war supplies and food to Germany. Neutral American ships that tried to trade with Germany (which international law clearly allowed), were seized or turned back. The strangulation came about very slowly, because Germany and its allies controlled extensive farmlands and raw materials, but it eventually worked because Germany and Austria took so many farmers into their armies. By 1918 the German cities were on the verge of starvation; the front-line soldiers were on short rations and were running out of essential supplies. The Allied blockade had done its job. The Germans also considered a blockade. "England wants to starve us," said Admiral [[Alfred von Tirpitz]], the man who built the German fleet and who remained a key advisor to the Kaiser. "We can play the same game. We can bottle her up and destroy every ship that endeavors to break the blockade."<ref> Ernest May, ''The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917'' p.115 quote from Dec 1914</ref>  Unable to challenge the more powerful Royal Navy on the surface, Tirpitz wanted to scare off merchant and passenger ships en route to Britain. He knew from his close reading of Captain [[Alfred Thayer Mahan]] that a blockade would not itself win the war. But he reasoned that since the island of Britain depended on imports of food, raw materials and manufactured goods, scaring off even half the ships would effectively undercut its long-term ability to maintain an army on the Western Front. While Germany only had nine long-range U-boats at the start of the war, it had ample shipyard capacity to build the hundreds that would be needed. The problem was that the U.S. demanded Germany respect international law, which protected neutral American ships on the high seas from seizure or sinking by either belligerent. (Other neutral nations made the same point; Berlin was probably more solicitous of Italy in than the US because Italy had an army.) Furthermore, Americans insisted that the drowning of innocent civilians was barbaric and grounds for a declaration of war. The British frequently violated America's neutral rights by seizing ships, but they did not drown anyone.<ref>Charles Cruttwell, '' A history of the great war, 1914-1918‎'' (1940) p 191 </ref>  As Wilson's top advisor, [[Colonel House]] commented, "The British have gone as far as they possibly could in violating neutral rights, though they have done it in the most courteous way." When Wilson exploded in protest at British violations of American neutrality, the British backed down (or the American ambassador, notoriously biased toward Britain, softened his chief's angry words.) German submarines torpedoed ships without warning, and some sailors and passengers drowned. Berlin explained that submarines were so vulnerable that they dare not surface near merchant ships that might be carrying guns, and anyway the subs were so small they could not rescue crews. Military "necessity" again. Britain armed most of its merchant ships with medium calibre guns that could sink a submarine, making an above-water attacks too risky.  

===Lusitania torpedoed===

===Lusitania torpedoed===

In February, 1915, the U.S. sharply warned Germany about misuse of submarines but on May 7, the British passenger liner ''[[Lusitania]]'' was torpedoed with the loss of 1,198 civilians, including 128 Americans. The American outcry was far more intense than would accompany the deliberate shooting down or sabotage of a civilian airliner in the 1980s or 1990s, but not as sharp as the response to the [[9-11 Attack]] in 2001. The ''Lusitania'' sinking was the event that decisively swung American opinion. Washington gave Berlin an ultimatum--never do that again! Berlin acquiesced, ordering its submarines to avoid passenger ships. But by January 1917 Generals [[Hindenburg]] and [[Ludendorff]] decided that unrestricted submarine blockade was the only way to break the stalemate on the Western Front. They demanded that Kaiser [[Wilhelm II]] order unrestricted submarine warfare be resumed. Berlin knew that meant war with the United States, but they gambled that they could win before America's potential strength could be mobilized. They vastly exaggerated how many ships they could sink and how much that would weaken Britain; they did not figure out that convoys would defeat their efforts. They were correct in seeing that the United States was so weak militarily that it could not be a factor on the Western Front for more than a year. The civilian government in Berlin objected, but the Kaiser was controlled by the military and ordered the attacks to begin.<ref>  Ernest May, ''The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917''  p 414</ref>   

In February, 1915, the U.S. sharply warned Germany about misuse of submarines but on May 7, the British passenger liner ''[[Lusitania]]'' was torpedoed with the loss of 1,198 civilians, including 128 Americans. The American outcry was far more intense than would accompany the deliberate shooting down or sabotage of a civilian airliner in the 1980s or 1990s, but not as sharp as the response to the [[9-11 Attack]] in 2001. The ''Lusitania'' sinking was the event that decisively swung American opinion. Washington gave Berlin an ultimatum--never do that again! Berlin acquiesced, ordering its submarines to avoid passenger ships. But by January 1917 Generals [[Hindenburg]] and [[Ludendorff]] decided that unrestricted submarine blockade was the only way to break the stalemate on the Western Front. They demanded that Kaiser [[Wilhelm II]] order unrestricted submarine warfare be resumed. Berlin knew that meant war with the United States, but they gambled that they could win before America's potential strength could be mobilized. They vastly exaggerated how many ships they could sink and how much that would weaken Britain; they did not figure out that convoys would defeat their efforts. They were correct in seeing that the United States was so weak militarily that it could not be a factor on the Western Front for more than a year. The civilian government in Berlin objected, but the Kaiser was controlled by the military and ordered the attacks to begin.<ref>  Ernest May, ''The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917''  p 414</ref>