Changes

Argentinian artillery responded vigorously and the Argentinian Land Forces Commander, Brigadier-General [[Oscar Luis Jofré]] sent Major Guillermo Rubén Berazay's A Company (3rd ''La Tablada'' Mechanized Infantry Regiment) west of Stanley Racecourse to counterattack. Major Neame’s officers and NCOs rallied the exhausted Paras to capture the final part of their objective and in the face of heavy fire, the rifle platoons of 2d Lieutenant Carlos Javier Aristegui and Lieutenant Víctor Hugo Rodriguez-Pérez having run out of ammunition, broke and retreated, covered by supporting machine gun fire from the rifle platoon of Lieutenant Horacio Alejandro Mones-Ruiz.   

Argentinian artillery responded vigorously and the Argentinian Land Forces Commander, Brigadier-General [[Oscar Luis Jofré]] sent Major Guillermo Rubén Berazay's A Company (3rd ''La Tablada'' Mechanized Infantry Regiment) west of Stanley Racecourse to counterattack. Major Neame’s officers and NCOs rallied the exhausted Paras to capture the final part of their objective and in the face of heavy fire, the rifle platoons of 2d Lieutenant Carlos Javier Aristegui and Lieutenant Víctor Hugo Rodriguez-Pérez having run out of ammunition, broke and retreated, covered by supporting machine gun fire from the rifle platoon of Lieutenant Horacio Alejandro Mones-Ruiz.   

At dawn, a another platoon of Argentinian conscripts under Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores attacked D Company, but were driven off with the help of mortars and British Artillery. Private Gabriel Ricardo Sagastume from the 7th Regiment's A Company recalls:{{cquote|Coming down from Moody Brook we found Carrizo, who wanted to recover that position. We had walked through the ruins of the barracks, bombarded by the English, and we knew that it was impossible to take it again. In those circumstances, Carrizo grouped us, asked what weapons we had and in what conditions and ordered to follow him to climb the hill. A few meters from the front we were being rained with projectiles of all caliber and everywhere. We came back, almost in a generalized disbanded.<ref>[https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-230881-2013-10-09.html El cobarde Carrizo]</ref>}}

At dawn, a another platoon of Argentinian conscripts under Major Carlos Carrizo-Salvadores attacked D Company, but were driven off with the help of mortars and British Artillery. Private Gabriel Ricardo Sagastume from the 7th Regiment's A Company recalls:{{cquote|Coming down from Moody Brook we found Carrizo, who wanted to recover that position. We had walked through the ruins of the barracks, bombarded by the English, and we knew that it was impossible to take it again. In those circumstances, Carrizo grouped us, asked what weapons we had and in what conditions they were in and ordered us to follow him to climb the hill. A few meters from the front projectiles of all caliber were raining everywhere around us. We fell back, almost in complete disorder.<ref>[https://www.pagina12.com.ar/diario/elpais/1-230881-2013-10-09.html El cobarde Carrizo]</ref>}}

2 PARA had suffered three dead and 11 wounded. Four of the paratroopers on the mortar line also required CASEVAC (evacuation of casualties by air), having broken their ankles. The Argentinians suffered approximately 25 dead and about 125 wounded, about 50 were taken prisoner. In the final stages of the battle, the Argentinian  commander, Brigadier-General Jofré had been offered the use of Skyhawks to bomb Wireless Ridge with napalm but he declined, believing that the British response would be equally violent and the chances of a surrender being accepted, non-existent.

2 PARA had suffered three dead and 11 wounded. Four of the paratroopers on the mortar line also required CASEVAC (evacuation of casualties by air), having broken their ankles. The Argentinians suffered approximately 25 dead and about 125 wounded, about 50 were taken prisoner. In the final stages of the battle, the Argentinian  commander, Brigadier-General Jofré had been offered the use of Skyhawks to bomb Wireless Ridge with napalm but he declined, believing that the British response would be equally violent and the chances of a surrender being accepted, non-existent.