When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in the plan. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not in fact ready for war with France. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref>"There was a Schlieffen Plan" by Gerhard P. Gross in ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' (2014), pp. 100-101.</ref> Schlieffen may have seen his plan more as a tool for obtaining weapons and more soldiers than as a practical battle strategy.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref> | When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in the plan. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not in fact ready for war with France. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref>"There was a Schlieffen Plan" by Gerhard P. Gross in ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' (2014), pp. 100-101.</ref> Schlieffen may have seen his plan more as a tool for obtaining weapons and more soldiers than as a practical battle strategy.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref> |