Changes

On July 21, Prime Minister Lloyd George announced that Britain was prepared to go to war to avoid French humiliation in Morocco. In Germany, this intervention triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref>

On July 21, Prime Minister Lloyd George announced that Britain was prepared to go to war to avoid French humiliation in Morocco. In Germany, this intervention triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref>

Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had devoted a great deal of resources to its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval buildup would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. In 1912, France and Britain signed a deal dividing up naval responsibilities. Faced with a combined Anglo-French fleet, German attention shifted to the army, ending the naval race.

Agadir was the first diplomatic crisis since the Great Eastern Crisis of 1878 that engaged European public opinion. France and Germany faced each other with pre-war fury. Bernhardi's warmongering opus ''Germany and the Next War'' (1911) became a bestseller. The German Army League, founded in January 1912, soon eclipsed the Naval League. The kaiser's own views were largely unchanged by the episode. But his reluctance to fight the British began to look quaint, even to his own advisers and family.<ref>Future War Minister Falkenhayen, a moderate among military officers, saw the kaiser as an obstacle. A few weeks after Agadir, he wrote, "Outwardly, our political situation has improved...but internally nothing has changed, in so far as H.M. is as determined as before to avoid a war." Röhl, p. 875.</ref>

 

In November 1911, Crown Prince Wilhelm told his father that, "I am convinced that the political situation at home, so fragmented and muddled with its internal party interests, would improve at a stroke if all the country’s sons had to take up arms for their land."<ref>Röhl, p. 876.</ref> German historian Fritz Fischer, author of the most influential theory concerning the origin of the First World War, argues that the elite's anxiety with the domestic political situation was the driving force toward war.

The French emerged from the crisis with a confidence that frightened the Germans. The French army adopted a doctrine called "the cult of the offense" (''guerre à outrance'') and a plan to recover Alsace Lorraine called Plan XVII.

The French emerged from the crisis with a confidence that frightened the Germans. The French army adopted a doctrine called "the cult of the offense" (''guerre à outrance'') and a plan to recover Alsace Lorraine called Plan XVII.

Agadir was the first diplomatic crisis since the Great Eastern Crisis of 1878 that engaged European public opinion. France and Germany faced each other with pre-war fury. Bernhardi's warmongering opus ''Germany and the Next War'' (1911) became a bestseller. The German Army League, founded in January 1912, soon eclipsed the Naval League. The kaiser's own views were largely unchanged by the episode. But his reluctance to fight the British began to look quaint, even to his own advisers and family.<ref>Future War Minister Falkenhayen, a moderate among military officers, saw the kaiser as an obstacle. A few weeks after Agadir, he wrote, "Outwardly, our political situation has improved...but internally nothing has changed, in so far as H.M. is as determined as before to avoid a war." Röhl, p. 875.</ref>

Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had devoted a great deal of resources to its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval buildup would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. Faced with a combined Anglo-French fleet, German attention shifted to the army.

 

In November 1911, Crown Prince Wilhelm told his father that, "I am convinced that the political situation at home, so fragmented and muddled with its internal party interests, would improve at a stroke if all the country’s sons had to take up arms for their land."<ref>Röhl, p. 876.</ref> German historian Fritz Fischer, author of the most influential theory concerning the origin of the First World War, argues that the elite's anxiety with the domestic political situation was the driving force toward war.

==The Haldane mission (1912)==

==The Haldane mission (1912)==