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Spelling, grammar, and general cleanup, typos fixed: Napolean → Napoleon, 1904-1905 → 1904–1905 (2)
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Wilhelm was a constitutional monarch and shared power with his ministers and an elected parliament, or Reichstag. However, the kaiser had the final say on all significant matters, including appointments.<ref name=rohl18>Röhl, John C. G., ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=FN9GAgAAQBAJ&dq= Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941]'', Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. xxviii.</ref> His supporters boasted that he was the "mightiest ruler on earth."<ref name=rohl17>Röhl, p. xxvii.</ref> His manic depressive personality led to chaotic policymaking.
 
Wilhelm was a constitutional monarch and shared power with his ministers and an elected parliament, or Reichstag. However, the kaiser had the final say on all significant matters, including appointments.<ref name=rohl18>Röhl, John C. G., ''[https://books.google.com/books?id=FN9GAgAAQBAJ&dq= Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss of War and Exile, 1900–1941]'', Cambridge University Press, 2014, p. xxviii.</ref> His supporters boasted that he was the "mightiest ruler on earth."<ref name=rohl17>Röhl, p. xxvii.</ref> His manic depressive personality led to chaotic policymaking.
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Wilhelm's foreign policy aimed at "Napoleanic supremacy" over France and Russia. In the kaiser's view, Napolean's mistake was to go to war with Britain, something he hoped to avoid. Wilhelm had great enthusiasm for naval matters, and Germany began building a high seas fleet in 1900. The kaiser hoped that this fleet would intimidate Britain into severing its alliance with France. He realized that this approach was not effective in 1911 when the British intervened in the Agadir Crisis in support of French interests. Provoked by the British intervention, the military and the right-wing parties began to agitate in favor of a military solution. The Reichstag approved army expansion in July 1913. Treating this vote as a mandate, the General Staff adopted the "Schlieffen Plan" to invade France by way of Belgium as Germany's sole war plan.
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Wilhelm's foreign policy aimed at "Napoleanic supremacy" over France and Russia. In the kaiser's view, Napoleon's mistake was to go to war with Britain, something he hoped to avoid. Wilhelm had great enthusiasm for naval matters, and Germany began building a high seas fleet in 1900. The kaiser hoped that this fleet would intimidate Britain into severing its alliance with France. He realized that this approach was not effective in 1911 when the British intervened in the Agadir Crisis in support of French interests. Provoked by the British intervention, the military and the right-wing parties began to agitate in favor of a military solution. The Reichstag approved army expansion in July 1913. Treating this vote as a mandate, the General Staff adopted the "Schlieffen Plan" to invade France by way of Belgium as Germany's sole war plan.
    
The assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke [[Franz Ferdinand]] in Sarajevo in July 1914 led to a European diplomatic crisis. The planned invasion of Belgium and France was launched in early August, triggering [[World War I]]. The British were outraged by the invasion of neutral Belgium. They responded with a declaration of war against Germany, as well as full military support for the Belgians and French. Wilhelm's desire to establish a German naval base in Antwerp was an obstacle to later proposals that aimed at a negotiated settlement.
 
The assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke [[Franz Ferdinand]] in Sarajevo in July 1914 led to a European diplomatic crisis. The planned invasion of Belgium and France was launched in early August, triggering [[World War I]]. The British were outraged by the invasion of neutral Belgium. They responded with a declaration of war against Germany, as well as full military support for the Belgians and French. Wilhelm's desire to establish a German naval base in Antwerp was an obstacle to later proposals that aimed at a negotiated settlement.
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In the early years of his reign, the kaiser had great enthusiasm for military adventures, including proposals to invade Denmark<ref>Röhl, pp. 386-392.</ref> and America.<ref>"[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1393690/How-Kaiser-Bill-planned-to-invade-United-States.html How Kaiser Bill planned to invade United States]" ''Telegraph'', 09 May 2002</ref> It was the job of Schlieffen, the chief General Staff or war planning division, to remind the all highest that the army needed to remain on the eastern frontier to deter the Russians.
 
In the early years of his reign, the kaiser had great enthusiasm for military adventures, including proposals to invade Denmark<ref>Röhl, pp. 386-392.</ref> and America.<ref>"[https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/1393690/How-Kaiser-Bill-planned-to-invade-United-States.html How Kaiser Bill planned to invade United States]" ''Telegraph'', 09 May 2002</ref> It was the job of Schlieffen, the chief General Staff or war planning division, to remind the all highest that the army needed to remain on the eastern frontier to deter the Russians.
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During Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905, Russian forces were redeployed to the Far East, far from Germany's borders. This inspired great excitement among German officers, who considered how their country could take advantage of the situation. Schlieffen sketched a plan to invade France by deploying through Belgium. His "Memorandum for a War against France," or Schlieffen Plan, ignored Russia altogether as its forces were pre-occupied in the east. The Germans would outflank the French and attack from the rear, according to the plan.
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During Russo-Japanese War of 1904–1905, Russian forces were redeployed to the Far East, far from Germany's borders. This inspired great excitement among German officers, who considered how their country could take advantage of the situation. Schlieffen sketched a plan to invade France by deploying through Belgium. His "Memorandum for a War against France," or Schlieffen Plan, ignored Russia altogether as its forces were pre-occupied in the east. The Germans would outflank the French and attack from the rear, according to the plan.
    
When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in the plan. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not in fact ready for war with France. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref>"There was a Schlieffen Plan" by Gerhard P. Gross in ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' (2014), pp. 100-101.</ref> Schlieffen may have seen his plan more as a tool for obtaining weapons and more soldiers than as a practical battle strategy.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref>
 
When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in the plan. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not in fact ready for war with France. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref>"There was a Schlieffen Plan" by Gerhard P. Gross in ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' (2014), pp. 100-101.</ref> Schlieffen may have seen his plan more as a tool for obtaining weapons and more soldiers than as a practical battle strategy.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref>
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In October 1908, the emperor gave an interview to Britain's ''Daily Telegraph'' in which he stated that, "You English, are mad, mad, mad as March hares," among other tactless comments. An international uproar followed and the kaiser was roundly condemned in the Reichstag and elsewhere. Wilhelm faulted Bülow, his chancellor since 1900, for failing to vet the advance copy of the interview that had been sent to him. The kaiser replaced Bülow with Bethmann, a Prussian bureaucrat with no foreign policy experience. That neither Moltke nor Bethmann were respected by their peers did not give Wilhelm pause. He would personally guide all decision making. Bismarck had done the same, so the German state was already set up to permit one-man rule. But Wilhelm's talents proved to be unequal to those of the Iron Chancellor.
 
In October 1908, the emperor gave an interview to Britain's ''Daily Telegraph'' in which he stated that, "You English, are mad, mad, mad as March hares," among other tactless comments. An international uproar followed and the kaiser was roundly condemned in the Reichstag and elsewhere. Wilhelm faulted Bülow, his chancellor since 1900, for failing to vet the advance copy of the interview that had been sent to him. The kaiser replaced Bülow with Bethmann, a Prussian bureaucrat with no foreign policy experience. That neither Moltke nor Bethmann were respected by their peers did not give Wilhelm pause. He would personally guide all decision making. Bismarck had done the same, so the German state was already set up to permit one-man rule. But Wilhelm's talents proved to be unequal to those of the Iron Chancellor.
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With full control of policymaking apparently established, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912-1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisers.<ref name=rohl18 />
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With full control of policymaking apparently established, Wilhelm repeatedly pushed Europe to the brink of war. The Bosnian crisis of 1908-1909 was followed by the Agadir crisis of 1911 and by the Balkan crisis of 1912–1913. As a constitutional monarch, Wilhelm did not take the initiative on any of these occasions. Instead, he responded to proposals put to him by his advisers.<ref name=rohl18 />
    
==The Agadir Crisis (1911)==
 
==The Agadir Crisis (1911)==
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