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==The Agadir Crisis (1911)==

==The Agadir Crisis (1911)==

In earlier diplomatic incidents, the kaiser and his government had asserted Germany's rights while public opinion had remained cautious. This dynamic reversed in the Agadir crisis of 1911. The crisis began on July 1 when Germany sent the gunboat SMS ''Panther'' to the port of Agadir in Morocco. The move was engineered by German Foreign Minister Kiderlen, who left the rest of the government in the dark during much of the crisis that followed. It was a challenge to France, which considered Morocco to be part of its sphere of influence.  

In earlier diplomatic incidents, the kaiser and his government had asserted Germany's rights while public opinion had remained cautious. This dynamic reversed in the Agadir crisis of 1911. The crisis began on July 1 when Germany sent the gunboat SMS ''Panther'' to the port of Agadir in Morocco. The move was engineered by Foreign Minister Kiderlen, who left the rest of the government in the dark during much of the crisis that followed. It was a challenge to France, which considered Morocco to be part of its sphere of influence.  

On July 21, Prime Minister Lloyd George announced that Britain was prepared to go to war to avoid French humiliation in Morocco. In Germany, this intervention triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref>

On July 21, Prime Minister Lloyd George announced that Britain was prepared to go to war to avoid French humiliation in Morocco. In Germany, this intervention triggered a wave of Anglophobia.<ref>Röhl, p. 874. "The British decision of July 1911 to protect France by threatening Germany with war and mobilizing the Royal Navy had strengthened to an alarming degree the aversion felt in broad sections of the public in Germany and among the ruling elite towards Great Britain. The fatalistic belief gained ground that sooner or later war with the naval Power and its Entente partner France was inevitable."</ref>

In November 1911, Crown Prince Wilhelm told his father that, "I am convinced that the political situation at home, so fragmented and muddled with its internal party interests, would improve at a stroke if all the country’s sons had to take up arms for their land."<ref>Röhl, p. 876.</ref> German historian Fritz Fischer, author of the most influential theory concerning the origin of the First World War, argues that the elite's anxiety with the domestic political situation was the driving force toward war.

In November 1911, Crown Prince Wilhelm told his father that, "I am convinced that the political situation at home, so fragmented and muddled with its internal party interests, would improve at a stroke if all the country’s sons had to take up arms for their land."<ref>Röhl, p. 876.</ref> German historian Fritz Fischer, author of the most influential theory concerning the origin of the First World War, argues that the elite's anxiety with the domestic political situation was the driving force toward war.

The French emerged from the crisis with a confidence that frightened the Germans. The French army adopted a doctrine called "the cult of the offense" (''guerre à outrance'') and a plan to recover Alsace Lorraine called Plan XVII.

The French emerged from the crisis with a confidence that frightened the Germans. The French army adopted a doctrine called "the cult of the offense" (''guerre à outrance'') and a plan to recover Alsace-Lorraine called Plan XVII.

Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had devoted a great deal of resources to its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval buildup would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. Faced with a combined Anglo-French fleet, German attention shifted to the army.

Unlike Wilhelm's desire to be a modern Napoleon, colonies were a war aim that the average German could relate to. Many argued that it was hugely unfair that Britain, with its vast colonial empire, was thwarting Germany's far more modest ambitions, or "place in the sun." Germany had devoted a great deal of resources to its "naval race" with Britain. The Naval League was a source of propaganda and a focus of German patriotic sentiment. Lloyd George showed that a naval buildup would not deter Britain from interfering in Germany's colonial ambitions. Faced with a combined Anglo-French fleet, German attention shifted to the army.