Changes

When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in the plan. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not in fact ready for war with France. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref>"There was a Schlieffen Plan" by Gerhard P. Gross in ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' (2014), pp. 100-101.</ref>

When the Japanese defeated the Russians in 1905, the kaiser expressed interest in the plan. Schlieffen had to confess that the German army was not in fact ready for war with France. The French had recoilless artillery, which the Germans lacked.<ref>Röhl, p. 416.</ref> The plan contemplated a significantly larger army than the one Schlieffen commanded.<ref>"There was a Schlieffen Plan" by Gerhard P. Gross in ''[https://books.google.fi/books?id=IVjCBAAAQBAJ&hl=fi&source=gbs_navlinks_s The Schlieffen Plan: International Perspectives on the German Strategy for World War I],'' (2014), pp. 100-101.</ref>

Schlieffen may have seen his plan a tool for obtaining weapons and more soldiers rather than as a practical battle strategy.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref> It is also possible that the plan was more diplomatic than military. Wilhelm was attempting to woo Tsar Nicholas away from France at this time. A treaty of alliance between Germany and Russia was briefly concluded at a summit in Björkö, Sweden in July 1905. Despite the opportunity presented by the Russo-Japanese War, the kaiser would not have wanted spies to report that Germany was planning an offensive against Russia.

Schlieffen may have seen his plan a tool for obtaining weapons and more soldiers rather than as a practical battle strategy.<ref>Gross, pp. 103-104. Schlieffen's memorandum is, "A program for further expansion of the army and its mobilization," according to the archive's official description.</ref>

 

It is possible that the Schlieffen plan was more diplomatic than military. Wilhelm was attempting to woo Tsar Nicholas away from France at this time. In 1897, the kaiser made a decision that France should be target of military planning. Despite the opportunity presented by the Russo-Japanese War, he would not have wanted spies to report that Germany was preparing an offensive against Russia.<ref>Mombauer, Annika, ''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 76. See footnote.</ref>

When Schlieffen retired in 1906, Wilhelm replaced him with Moltke, the emperor's former adjutant. "The personal favour of the emperors...coupled with his great name, elevated him to offices for which he was completely unqualified," as ''Britannica'' puts it.<ref>"Moltke, Helmuth (Johannes Ludwig) von." ''Encyclopædia Britannica'', 2013.</ref> Schlieffen himself strongly advised against the appointment.<ref>Röhl, p. 660.</ref> In 1912, Ludendorff, who later served as figurehead for Hitler's "Beerhall putsch" of 1923, was appointed to the No. 2 position in the General Staff.

When Schlieffen retired in 1906, Wilhelm replaced him with Moltke, the emperor's former adjutant. "The personal favour of the emperors...coupled with his great name, elevated him to offices for which he was completely unqualified," as ''Britannica'' puts it.<ref>"Moltke, Helmuth (Johannes Ludwig) von." ''Encyclopædia Britannica'', 2013.</ref> Schlieffen himself strongly advised against the appointment.<ref>Röhl, p. 660.</ref> In 1912, Ludendorff, who later served as figurehead for Hitler's "Beerhall putsch" of 1923, was appointed to the No. 2 position in the General Staff.

==Decision for war (1912-1914)==

==Decision for war (1912-1914)==

In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the kaiser jointly by both Bethmann and Moltke, as well as by Kiderlen, the foreign secretary.<ref>Moltke understood the war would be long and bloody, but he misled the civilian leadership: "As Kurt Riezler, the chancellor's private secretary, recorded retrospectively in 1915 (p.212): 'Bethmann can blame the coming of the war . on the answer that Moltke gave him.. He did say yes! We would succeed.'" ("[http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/199 Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]")</ref> These advisers misled the kaiser into believing that the British might support an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia. In December, Lichnowsky, the German ambassador to Britain, informed the kaiser that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 /> Wilhelm was anxious that 1913, his jubilee, be a year of peace.<ref>Röhl, p. 954.</ref>

In November 1912, Wilhelm approved a proposal to support Austria-Hungary against Serbia even if this led to war with both France and Russia. This proposal was presented to the kaiser jointly by both Bethmann and Moltke, as well as by Kiderlen, the foreign secretary.<ref>Moltke understood the war would be long and bloody, but he misled the civilian leadership: "As Kurt Riezler, the chancellor's private secretary, recorded retrospectively in 1915 (p.212): 'Bethmann can blame the coming of the war on the answer that Moltke gave him. He did say yes! We would succeed.'" ("[http://www.history.ac.uk/reviews/review/199 Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]")</ref> These advisers misled the kaiser into believing that the British might support an Austro-Hungarian attack on Serbia. In December, Lichnowsky, the German ambassador to Britain, informed the kaiser that Britain would likely side with France in the event of such a war. The kaiser responded by ordering a "postponement of the great fight" until the summer of 1914 so that additional preparations could be made.<ref name=rohl18 /> Wilhelm was anxious that 1913, his jubilee, be a year of peace.<ref>Röhl, p. 954.</ref>

Fischer identifies a meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 as the moment when the imperial government resolved upon war.<ref name=rohl18 /> The meeting was attended by the kaiser and four advisors.<ref name=stemple /> In April 1913, Moltke discontinued work on a longstanding plan for an offensive against Russia. The move was intended to rule out "half measures" and left the [[Schlieffen Plan]] as Germany's only war plan.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref>  In June, the Reichstag passed a bill to expand the army from 544,000 soldiers to 870,000 soldiers. It was the largest expansion since 1871.<ref name="ArmyExpand" />

Fischer identifies a meeting of the German Imperial War Council on December 8, 1912 as the moment when the imperial government resolved upon war.<ref name=rohl18 /> The meeting was attended by the kaiser and four advisors.<ref name=stemple /> In April 1913, Moltke discontinued work on a longstanding plan for an offensive against Russia. The move was intended to rule out "half measures" and left the [[Schlieffen Plan]] as Germany's only war plan.<ref>''[https://books.google.co.uk/books?id=t4gDyLfeUEQC&dq= Helmuth Von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War]'', p. 103.</ref>  In June, the Reichstag passed a bill to expand the army from 544,000 soldiers to 870,000 soldiers. It was the largest expansion since 1871.<ref name="ArmyExpand" />