Changes

Major Carrizo-Salvadores would later be at special pains to explain that he did his best to arrange some measure of comfort for his men on Mount Longdon:{{cquote|We took good care of the personnel. We did what we could do to set an example. Captain Eduardo Lopez was there with the platoons, with news-updates and nougat bars. The soldiers had everything you can imagine in their kitbags, including thermos flasks and transistor radios. Some of the soldiers heard that the British had disembarked at San Carlos and captured Goose Green by tuning radios on to the BBC. In the mornings the soldiers had a mug of the green Guarani herb 'mate' which contains around the same amount of caffein as a cup of coffee; it is stimulating and helps register a feeling of fullness. Meals were served in the open and consumed in mugs.  I remember that mutton and pasta figured largely on the menu. There was a strict ration of one ratpack per man per week, eaten slowly to make it last.<ref>[http://britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/David/Longdon.htm]</ref>}}

Major Carrizo-Salvadores would later be at special pains to explain that he did his best to arrange some measure of comfort for his men on Mount Longdon:{{cquote|We took good care of the personnel. We did what we could do to set an example. Captain Eduardo Lopez was there with the platoons, with news-updates and nougat bars. The soldiers had everything you can imagine in their kitbags, including thermos flasks and transistor radios. Some of the soldiers heard that the British had disembarked at San Carlos and captured Goose Green by tuning radios on to the BBC. In the mornings the soldiers had a mug of the green Guarani herb 'mate' which contains around the same amount of caffein as a cup of coffee; it is stimulating and helps register a feeling of fullness. Meals were served in the open and consumed in mugs.  I remember that mutton and pasta figured largely on the menu. There was a strict ration of one ratpack per man per week, eaten slowly to make it last.<ref>[http://britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/David/Longdon.htm]</ref>}}

Sergeant Rolando Spizuocco also refutes the charge that he left the 1st Platoon conscript to fend for themselves: ''"I saw to it that they were not cheated of their ratpacks, that they had chocolate bars, balaclavas and the best possible warm-up tents."''<ref>[http://britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/David/Longdon.htm]</ref>}}

Sergeant Rolando Spizuocco also refutes the charge that he left the 1st Platoon conscript to fend for themselves: ''"I saw to it that they were not cheated of their ratpacks, that they had chocolate bars, balaclavas and the best possible warm-up tents."''<ref>[http://britains-smallwars.com/Falklands/David/Longdon.htm]</ref>

Brigadier Julian Thompson, who commanded 3 Commando Brigade and its supporting Parachute battalions, now had a firm footing on Mount Kent, an important position on the road to Stanley. For the 7th Regiment's 'B' Company, the initial contact came as a series of probing patrols. The Rasit ground surveillance radar operator, Sergeant Roque Nista, on the night of June 4-5, spotted a 3 PARA patrol northwest of Longdon.  The 3rd Artillery Group artillerymen on Stanley's outskirts took up position and with the forward artillery observation officer (Lieutenant Alberto Rolando Ramos) on Mount Longdon correcting the artillery fire, the Parachute patrol abandoned the beaten zone.   

Brigadier Julian Thompson, who commanded 3 Commando Brigade and its supporting Parachute battalions, now had a firm footing on Mount Kent, an important position on the road to Stanley. For the 7th Regiment's 'B' Company, the initial contact came as a series of probing patrols. The Rasit ground surveillance radar operator, Sergeant Roque Nista, on the night of June 4–5, spotted a 3 PARA patrol northwest of Longdon.  The 3rd Artillery Group artillerymen on Stanley's outskirts took up position and with the forward artillery observation officer (Lieutenant Alberto Rolando Ramos) on Mount Longdon correcting the artillery fire, the Parachute patrol abandoned the beaten zone.   

On the night of June 8-9, Sergeant Roque Antonio Nista operating the Rasit ground surveillance radar on the western end of Longdon detected the presence of 100 Paras and Royal Marine Commandos near Murrell River. Machinegun, mortar and artillery fire disperse the British force that had planned to surprise the defenders on Mount Longdon and Two Sisters Mountain.<ref>''El mayor Carlos Carrizo Salvadores en Longdon dice: «La noche del 8 al 9, nuevamente el Sargento Nista (operador del radar) me informó sobre la presencia del enemigo, quien estaba ubicado en el mismo lugar que la vez anterior, pero ahora, separados en grupos: a 1.500 m el primero, 2.000 m el segundo, 3.000 m el tercero y 4.000 m el cuarto, tomadas estas distancias desde la posición del radar''. Martín Antonio Balza, Malvinas: Relatos de Soldados, p. 80, Círculo Militar, 1986</ref><ref>''It was unfortunate that the previous night's patrol carried out by two troops, one each from Z and Y Companies, had been forced back by a heavy artillery barrage.'' The Falklands War: The Day by Day Record from Invasion to Victory, p. 314, Marshall Cavendish Limited, 1983</ref><ref>''On the evening of 8 June 3 PARA dispatched three large fighting patrols to Mount Longdon. Each comprised a half-platoon; one was accompanied by a guide from D (Patrols) Company and the other two by Falklands islanders Terry Peck and Vernon Steen. The patrols' mission was to locate suitable approaches to the objective and to test enemy reactions to probing. Unfortunately, however, the combination of a fine night and bright moonlight prevented them from penetrating enemy positions." Task Force: The Illustrated History of the Falklands War, David Reynolds, p. 179, Sutton, 2002</ref><ref>''But perhaps his greatest single asset was the RASIT radar set, with which he could scan the countryside at night to reveal any hostile troop movement within several thousand metres. It proved extremely effective in pinpointing Para patrols as they probed the defences during the nights prior to the attack." The Last Eleven: Winners of the Victoria Cross since the Second World War, Mark Adkin, p. 196, Pen & Sword, 1991</ref>

On the night of June 8–9, Sergeant Roque Antonio Nista operating the Rasit ground surveillance radar on the western end of Longdon detected the presence of 100 Paras and Royal Marine Commandos near Murrell River. Machinegun, mortar and artillery fire disperse the British force that had planned to surprise the defenders on Mount Longdon and Two Sisters Mountain.<ref>''El mayor Carlos Carrizo Salvadores en Longdon dice: «La noche del 8 al 9, nuevamente el Sargento Nista (operador del radar) me informó sobre la presencia del enemigo, quien estaba ubicado en el mismo lugar que la vez anterior, pero ahora, separados en grupos: a 1.500 m el primero, 2.000 m el segundo, 3.000 m el tercero y 4.000 m el cuarto, tomadas estas distancias desde la posición del radar''. Martín Antonio Balza, Malvinas: Relatos de Soldados, p. 80, Círculo Militar, 1986</ref><ref>''It was unfortunate that the previous night's patrol carried out by two troops, one each from Z and Y Companies, had been forced back by a heavy artillery barrage.'' The Falklands War: The Day by Day Record from Invasion to Victory, p. 314, Marshall Cavendish Limited, 1983</ref><ref>''On the evening of 8 June 3 PARA dispatched three large fighting patrols to Mount Longdon. Each comprised a half-platoon; one was accompanied by a guide from D (Patrols) Company and the other two by Falklands islanders Terry Peck and Vernon Steen. The patrols' mission was to locate suitable approaches to the objective and to test enemy reactions to probing. Unfortunately, however, the combination of a fine night and bright moonlight prevented them from penetrating enemy positions." Task Force: The Illustrated History of the Falklands War, David Reynolds, p. 179, Sutton, 2002</ref><ref>''But perhaps his greatest single asset was the RASIT radar set, with which he could scan the countryside at night to reveal any hostile troop movement within several thousand metres. It proved extremely effective in pinpointing Para patrols as they probed the defences during the nights prior to the attack." The Last Eleven: Winners of the Victoria Cross since the Second World War, Mark Adkin, p. 196, Pen & Sword, 1991</ref>

The Mount Longdon defenders waited in a complex of bunkers. On the night of June 11, 3 PARA assaulted these bunkers and for the next 12 hours were involved in desperate close-quarter-combat and the Argentinians counterattacked them time and again.  Instead of the hasty field fortifications that the Royal Marine Commandos faced on the 'Monte Caseros' Line, they came against a strongly entrenched company.

The Mount Longdon defenders waited in a complex of bunkers. On the night of June 11, 3 PARA assaulted these bunkers and for the next 12 hours were involved in desperate close-quarter-combat and the Argentinians counterattacked them time and again.  Instead of the hasty field fortifications that the Royal Marine Commandos faced on the 'Monte Caseros' Line, they came against a strongly entrenched company.

On June 10, Lieutenant Colonel Hew Pike gave his orders in the Regimental Headquarters at Estancia House for the attack on Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge. They were told to expect around 300 Argentinian soldiers from Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Giménez's 7th 'La Plata' Mechanized Infantry Regiment defending the positions who were well dug in and provided with artillery cover from 18 Argentine 105mm Oto Melara howitzers from Lieutenant-Colonel Martín Antonio Balza's 3rd Artillery Group and a further 18 Oto Melaras near Government House from Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos Alberto Quevedo's 4th Airborne Artillery Group. In addition, the area had been heavily mined. British sappers later counted 1,500 frozen anti-personnel mines on the western lower slopes of Mount Longdon. Miraculously all but two mines failed to detonate.<ref>[https://www.sunderlandecho.com/news/feature-sunderland-falklands-veterans-remember-the-battle-of-mount-longdon-1-4623600 Sunderland Falklands veterans remember the Battle of Mount Longdon]</ref>  

On June 10, Lieutenant Colonel Hew Pike gave his orders in the Regimental Headquarters at Estancia House for the attack on Mount Longdon and Wireless Ridge. They were told to expect around 300 Argentinian soldiers from Lieutenant-Colonel Omar Giménez's 7th 'La Plata' Mechanized Infantry Regiment defending the positions who were well dug in and provided with artillery cover from 18 Argentine 105mm Oto Melara howitzers from Lieutenant-Colonel Martín Antonio Balza's 3rd Artillery Group and a further 18 Oto Melaras near Government House from Lieutenant-Colonel Carlos Alberto Quevedo's 4th Airborne Artillery Group. In addition, the area had been heavily mined. British sappers later counted 1,500 frozen anti-personnel mines on the western lower slopes of Mount Longdon. Miraculously all but two mines failed to detonate.<ref>[https://www.sunderlandecho.com/news/feature-sunderland-falklands-veterans-remember-the-battle-of-mount-longdon-1-4623600 Sunderland Falklands veterans remember the Battle of Mount Longdon]</ref>  

At 2015 local time on Friday June 11th 1982, the 3rd Battalion (3 PARA) from the British Parachute Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike began to advance to Mount Longdon. At the same time, 42 Commando Battalion was advancing towards Mount Harriet, whilst 45 Commando Battalion was heading for Two Sisters Mountain. The objective of the night attack of June 11 were three rocky peaks in the area west of Port Stanley: Mount Longdon, Two Sisters Mountain and Mount Harriet.

At 2015 local time on Friday June 11, 1982, the 3rd Battalion (3 PARA) from the British Parachute Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike began to advance to Mount Longdon. At the same time, 42 Commando Battalion was advancing towards Mount Harriet, whilst 45 Commando Battalion was heading for Two Sisters Mountain. The objective of the night attack of June 11 were three rocky peaks in the area west of Port Stanley: Mount Longdon, Two Sisters Mountain and Mount Harriet.

Pike's plan was for Major Mike Argue, commanding 'B' Company, 3 PARA to capture Mount Longdon ('Fly Half' and 'Full Back') while Major David Collett's 'A' Company seized the hill running north ('Wing Forward'). 'C' Company would attack the hill north of the Argentinian Command Post, nicknamed 'Rough Diamond'. The apparent ease with which the British Paratroopers got right up to Mount Longdon was lost when Corporal Brian Milne of 4 Platoon 'B' Company stepped on an anti-personnel mine and this alerted the Argentinian 1st Platoon. Corporal Gustavo Pedemonte deployed one of the 7.62mm belt-fed machineguns higher up 'Fly Half', and he engaged the Paras, holding up the British advance. Only after an hour or two, perhaps more, a couple of Paras blasted his machinegun out of the darkness.

Pike's plan was for Major Mike Argue, commanding 'B' Company, 3 PARA to capture Mount Longdon ('Fly Half' and 'Full Back') while Major David Collett's 'A' Company seized the hill running north ('Wing Forward'). 'C' Company would attack the hill north of the Argentinian Command Post, nicknamed 'Rough Diamond'. The apparent ease with which the British Paratroopers got right up to Mount Longdon was lost when Corporal Brian Milne of 4 Platoon 'B' Company stepped on an anti-personnel mine and this alerted the Argentinian 1st Platoon. Corporal Gustavo Pedemonte deployed one of the 7.62mm belt-fed machineguns higher up 'Fly Half', and he engaged the Paras, holding up the British advance. Only after an hour or two, perhaps more, a couple of Paras blasted his machinegun out of the darkness.

Despite moving in all-terrain lorries, Captain Zunino's company took about 5 hours to cover just four miles.  The 3rd Regiment had been conditioned to rely heavily on armoured personnel carriers to wage a war. Before long 2d Lieutenant Baldini and his platoon were surrounded by more than 100 Paras and he asked for assistance and Major Carrizo-Salvadores soon despatched the 1st Engineer Platoon under Lieutenant Hugo Quiroga.

Despite moving in all-terrain lorries, Captain Zunino's company took about 5 hours to cover just four miles.  The 3rd Regiment had been conditioned to rely heavily on armoured personnel carriers to wage a war. Before long 2d Lieutenant Baldini and his platoon were surrounded by more than 100 Paras and he asked for assistance and Major Carrizo-Salvadores soon despatched the 1st Engineer Platoon under Lieutenant Hugo Quiroga.

Uptill 2130 local time the night of June 11th had been like many other nights for the Argentinians on Mount Longdon. Major Carlos Eduardo Carrizo-Salvadores:{{cquote|I recall that, that evening, with a small reciever, we were listening to the Mass that his Holiness the Pope was saying from the Basilica of Lujan.  Just as he was giving the blessing  - night had already closed in - the Platoon Commanders telephoned me to let me know that, apart from the shelling, there was nothing to report.

Uptill 2130 local time the night of June 11 had been like many other nights for the Argentinians on Mount Longdon. Major Carlos Eduardo Carrizo-Salvadores:{{cquote|I recall that, that evening, with a small reciever, we were listening to the Mass that his Holiness the Pope was saying from the Basilica of Lujan.  Just as he was giving the blessing  - night had already closed in - the Platoon Commanders telephoned me to let me know that, apart from the shelling, there was nothing to report.

Through all the vivid events that week we knew that even with the efforts that had been made to achieve peace, the enemy attack was imminent and it would happen at any time.  I therefore ordered all personnel to get ready for action, foreseeing necessary rest periods by reason of our having had a week of permanent readiness because of the events already related, and of what happened during the 4th and 8th days respectively. At about 2030 hours I got in touch with the Commanding Officer to tell him the latest developments up to that time.  An hour later Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez called me, since a somewhat confused situation had arisen due to a message sent out by Lieutenant [Alberto Rolando] Ramos, who was my artillery forward observation officer - a message which never could be cleared up, because the officer was dying moments later occasioned by enemy fire [Lieutenant Alberto Ramos was the first to raise the alarm]. To obtain the greatest detail on what had happened I established telephone contact with Second Lieutenant Baldini, the 1st Platoon Commander and responsible for the western sector.  It was 2200 hours.  At that very moment an anti-personnel mine exploded to the northwest of the position and that in practice, marked the beginning of the action which would last until the following day.

Through all the vivid events that week we knew that even with the efforts that had been made to achieve peace, the enemy attack was imminent and it would happen at any time.  I therefore ordered all personnel to get ready for action, foreseeing necessary rest periods by reason of our having had a week of permanent readiness because of the events already related, and of what happened during the 4th and 8th days respectively. At about 2030 hours I got in touch with the Commanding Officer to tell him the latest developments up to that time.  An hour later Lieutenant-Colonel Gimenez called me, since a somewhat confused situation had arisen due to a message sent out by Lieutenant [Alberto Rolando] Ramos, who was my artillery forward observation officer - a message which never could be cleared up, because the officer was dying moments later occasioned by enemy fire [Lieutenant Alberto Ramos was the first to raise the alarm]. To obtain the greatest detail on what had happened I established telephone contact with Second Lieutenant Baldini, the 1st Platoon Commander and responsible for the western sector.  It was 2200 hours.  At that very moment an anti-personnel mine exploded to the northwest of the position and that in practice, marked the beginning of the action which would last until the following day.

Major Carrizo-Salvadores could hear shots where 1st Platoon was fighting but around his command bunker it was quiet. But as dawn arrived his command platoon was firing like mad. The local Argentinian reserve in the form of a platoon of engineers under Lieutenant Hugo Quiroga had reinforced 3rd Platoon and were all the time shooting at any one that moved forward. Lance-Corporal James Murdoch was mortally wounded, and Private Stewart Laing went forward to drag him into safety, he in turn also being mortally wounded by the engineers using head-mounted nightsights.  Under increasing pressure from Quiroga, the British in the southern sector pulled back.

Major Carrizo-Salvadores could hear shots where 1st Platoon was fighting but around his command bunker it was quiet. But as dawn arrived his command platoon was firing like mad. The local Argentinian reserve in the form of a platoon of engineers under Lieutenant Hugo Quiroga had reinforced 3rd Platoon and were all the time shooting at any one that moved forward. Lance-Corporal James Murdoch was mortally wounded, and Private Stewart Laing went forward to drag him into safety, he in turn also being mortally wounded by the engineers using head-mounted nightsights.  Under increasing pressure from Quiroga, the British in the southern sector pulled back.

On the northern sector, a marine heavy machinegun position was causing considerable problems for Lieutenant Ian Bickerdicke's No. 4 Platoon who took the brunt of the enemy fire, with several killed and wounded, including the platoon commander and platoon sergeant Ian McKay. It was whilst attempting to destroy this position with a hand grenade that McKay was killed in action. Sergeant-Major Sammy ­Dougherty, was first to reach Ian. In 2012, he revealed: ''"Ian’s right hand had­ ­practically gone. He must have had a grenade in his hand and been shot and killed before releasing it."''<ref>[https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/the-falklands-untold-story-of-the-hero-para-795309 McKay VC: Untold story of the hero Para who sacrificed his life to help free the Falklands... and earned the last Victoria Cross of the 20th Century]</ref>For his act Sergeant McKay was awarded the [[Victoria Cross]]. Sergeant Des Fuller, therefore, took command of the remnants of 4 Platoon and moved forward to attack the Marine heavy machine gun position on the northern slopes. Unfortunately the enemy heavy machine-gun wasn't knocked out.  

On the northern sector, a marine heavy machinegun position was causing considerable problems for Lieutenant Ian Bickerdicke's No. 4 Platoon who took the brunt of the enemy fire, with several killed and wounded, including the platoon commander and platoon sergeant Ian McKay. It was whilst attempting to destroy this position with a hand grenade that McKay was killed in action. Sergeant-Major Sammy ­Dougherty, was first to reach Ian. In 2012, he revealed: ''"Ian’s right hand had­ ­practically gone. He must have had a grenade in his hand and been shot and killed before releasing it."''<ref>[https://www.mirror.co.uk/news/uk-news/the-falklands-untold-story-of-the-hero-para-795309 McKay VC: Untold story of the hero Para who sacrificed his life to help free the Falklands... and earned the last Victoria Cross of the 20th Century]</ref> For his act Sergeant McKay was awarded the [[Victoria Cross]]. Sergeant Des Fuller, therefore, took command of the remnants of 4 Platoon and moved forward to attack the Marine heavy machine gun position on the northern slopes. Unfortunately the enemy heavy machine-gun wasn't knocked out.  

A heavy bombardment now fell on 1st Platoon, and shortly before 0130 on June 12th, 4 and 5 Platoons had forced their way between 2d Lieutenant Baldini's men and the Marine Corps machine-gunners and riflemen present.

A heavy bombardment now fell on 1st Platoon, and shortly before 0130 on June 12, 4 and 5 Platoons had forced their way between 2d Lieutenant Baldini's men and the Marine Corps machine-gunners and riflemen present.

As Major Mike Argue's 4 and 5 Platoons moved over the top of 'Fly Half' on to more open ground sloping away to 'Full Back', however, they were counterattacked by Senior Lieutenant  Raúl Fernando Castañeda's 1st Platoon of 'C' Company 7th Regiment, which had just arrived to reinforce the positions there. Back in the main 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters, Brigadier Julian Thompson, could see it was going to be a very long night. Meanwhile, 'A' Company commanded by Major David Collett, was on 'Wing Forward', the subsidiary hill north of 'Fly Half', and came under accurate rifle and automatic fire as it advanced along a series of peat banks.  One member of the company, Private Timothy Jenkins was killed and Corporal Stephen Hope was seriously wounded, and would die many hours later. It later transpired that Castañeda's platoon had had head-mounted night sights issued when ordered to move up Mount Longdon. Castañeda―later promoted to colonel in the 1990s―found Private Leonardo Rondi a most inspiring soldier. Private Leonardo Rondi seeing the radio operator die in the course of his duties, jumped into the middle of the fray and began organizing the defences of the platoon, running to the rifle sections, dodging enemy groups, to report to the section commanders on the fighting. Rondi seemed to be everywhere, using his rifle and hand grenades at close quarters and caring for the wounded. For his bravery he was awarded a Gallantry in Combat Medal.

As Major Mike Argue's 4 and 5 Platoons moved over the top of 'Fly Half' on to more open ground sloping away to 'Full Back', however, they were counterattacked by Senior Lieutenant  Raúl Fernando Castañeda's 1st Platoon of 'C' Company 7th Regiment, which had just arrived to reinforce the positions there. Back in the main 3 Commando Brigade Headquarters, Brigadier Julian Thompson, could see it was going to be a very long night. Meanwhile, 'A' Company commanded by Major David Collett, was on 'Wing Forward', the subsidiary hill north of 'Fly Half', and came under accurate rifle and automatic fire as it advanced along a series of peat banks.  One member of the company, Private Timothy Jenkins was killed and Corporal Stephen Hope was seriously wounded, and would die many hours later. It later transpired that Castañeda's platoon had had head-mounted night sights issued when ordered to move up Mount Longdon. Castañeda―later promoted to colonel in the 1990s―found Private Leonardo Rondi a most inspiring soldier. Private Leonardo Rondi seeing the radio operator die in the course of his duties, jumped into the middle of the fray and began organizing the defences of the platoon, running to the rifle sections, dodging enemy groups, to report to the section commanders on the fighting. Rondi seemed to be everywhere, using his rifle and hand grenades at close quarters and caring for the wounded. For his bravery he was awarded a Gallantry in Combat Medal.

On the summit was Lance-Corporal Vincent Bramley, firing. The Paras' Milan teams on 'Fly Half' were bringing down fire on the Argentinian command post and Castañeda called up Corporal Manuel Adan Medina to deal with the Milan platoon.  Medina of Castañeda's platoon, who was later awarded the Gallantry in Combat Medal, personally hunted down an Argentinian Czekalski 105 millimetre anti-tank gun and he knocked out one Milan team with a direct hit at approximately 0600 local time.

On the summit was Lance-Corporal Vincent Bramley, firing. The Paras' Milan teams on 'Fly Half' were bringing down fire on the Argentinian command post and Castañeda called up Corporal Manuel Adan Medina to deal with the Milan platoon.  Medina of Castañeda's platoon, who was later awarded the Gallantry in Combat Medal, personally hunted down an Argentinian Czekalski 105 millimetre anti-tank gun and he knocked out one Milan team with a direct hit at approximately 0600 local time.

At the time another rifle platoon from the 7th Regiment's 'A' Company on 'Apple Pie' was on standby in reserve. There was no evidence of hesistancy or lack of aggression when they were called into the fight. But Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre, in a decision that has been argued ever since, cancelled the move. This fresh platoon could have made such a difference, and even turned the battle.

At the time another rifle platoon from the 7th Regiment's 'A' Company on 'Apple Pie' was on standby in reserve. There was no evidence of hesitancy or lack of aggression when they were called into the fight. But Brigadier-General Oscar Luis Jofre, in a decision that has been argued ever since, cancelled the move. This fresh platoon could have made such a difference, and even turned the battle.

In the first glimmer of dawn Major Collett's company resumed its advance.  The Paras got very close to the Argentine command post and the second in command of the 7th Regiment was  ordered to conduct a fighting withdrawal, but despite this Major Carrizo-Salvadores refused to give in, and it was not until 0632 that morning that he abandoned his command post and  the surviving defenders escaped under cover of mist.

In the first glimmer of dawn Major Collett's company resumed its advance.  The Paras got very close to the Argentine command post and the second in command of the 7th Regiment was  ordered to conduct a fighting withdrawal, but despite this Major Carrizo-Salvadores refused to give in, and it was not until 0632 that morning that he abandoned his command post and  the surviving defenders escaped under cover of mist.

On the night of June 13/14, 2 PARA deployed 3 PARA and, supported by British light tanks and [[Royal Navy warships]], attacked Wireless Ridge. During the attack British artillery fired 6,000 rounds with their 105 mm guns and as the British Paratroopers began their final push, they were further backed by naval fire and the 76mm and 30mm guns mounted on the light tanks.<ref>«During the course of the battle British field artillery pumped 6,000 105mm shells onto Wireless Ridge, while two frigates lobbed about 600 4.5in shells on to the eastern slopes.»  The Falklands War 1982, Duncan Anderson, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014</ref>After their heavy losses at Goose Green, the Paras were taking no chances.

On the night of June 13/14, 2 PARA deployed 3 PARA and, supported by British light tanks and [[Royal Navy warships]], attacked Wireless Ridge. During the attack British artillery fired 6,000 rounds with their 105 mm guns and as the British Paratroopers began their final push, they were further backed by naval fire and the 76mm and 30mm guns mounted on the light tanks.<ref>«During the course of the battle British field artillery pumped 6,000 105mm shells onto Wireless Ridge, while two frigates lobbed about 600 4.5in shells on to the eastern slopes.»  The Falklands War 1982, Duncan Anderson, Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014</ref>After their heavy losses at Goose Green, the Paras were taking no chances.

By the time 2 PARA reached their first objective, ''Rough Diamond'', the Argentinian 7th Infantry Regiment's C Company survivors under Company Sergeant-Major Raúl Ibáñez<ref>[http://www.lavoz.com.ar/malvinas/intimidades-batalla-final Intimidades de la batalla final]</ref>had withdrawn. As a result, A and B Companies were convinced the Argentinian 7th Infantry Regiment's A Company on the 'Apple Pie' objective had been defeated, and began to advance confidently, but they encountered heavy fire when they left their trenches. It later emerged that Private Roberto Arturo Sañisky had been instrumental in rousing the exhausted conscripts sheltering from the British bombardment.<ref>Malvinas: La guerra íntima (2005 TV Documentary directed by Ricardo Kon)</ref>With the Argentinian conscripts manning the defences on 'Apple Pie', the British Paratroopers retreated back to their positions and ordered massive retaliation from the British machine-gunners and the guns of the 'Blues and Royals' light tanks. As a result, 'A' and 'B' Companies were able to advance again and this time take ''Apple Pie''.  

By the time 2 PARA reached their first objective, ''Rough Diamond'', the Argentinian 7th Infantry Regiment's C Company survivors under Company Sergeant-Major Raúl Ibáñez<ref>[http://www.lavoz.com.ar/malvinas/intimidades-batalla-final Intimidades de la batalla final]</ref> had withdrawn. As a result, A and B Companies were convinced the Argentinian 7th Infantry Regiment's A Company on the 'Apple Pie' objective had been defeated, and began to advance confidently, but they encountered heavy fire when they left their trenches. It later emerged that Private Roberto Arturo Sañisky had been instrumental in rousing the exhausted conscripts sheltering from the British bombardment.<ref>Malvinas: La guerra íntima (2005 TV Documentary directed by Ricardo Kon)</ref> With the Argentinian conscripts manning the defences on 'Apple Pie', the British Paratroopers retreated back to their positions and ordered massive retaliation from the British machine-gunners and the guns of the 'Blues and Royals' light tanks. As a result, 'A' and 'B' Companies were able to advance again and this time take ''Apple Pie''.  

Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company then began the final assault from the western end of Wireless Ridge, under the cover of heavy fire from the British warship HMS 'Ambuscade', the light tanks, twelve 105 mm artillery pieces, several mortars and anti-tank rockets.

Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company then began the final assault from the western end of Wireless Ridge, under the cover of heavy fire from the British warship HMS 'Ambuscade', the light tanks, twelve 105 mm artillery pieces, several mortars and anti-tank rockets.

'D' Company took the first half of the objective after a hard fight with Guidobono's signallers and 30 Argentinian paratroopers (armed with ten 7.62 mm belt-fed machine-guns) under 2d Lieutenant Gustavo Alberto Aimar (wounded in action) from the Córdoba-based 2nd 'General Balcarce' Airborne Infantry Regiment<ref>«...habian llegado la noche anterior. Una sección de ametralladoras no es un elemento que figure en las organizaciones comunes, fue constituido a propósito para esta oportunidad: eran 30 hombres con diez ametralladoras. La puse a disposición de Jofre para reforzar el 7.»  Malvinas: Testimonio de Su Gobernador,  Mario Benjamín Menéndez, Carlos M. Túrolo, p. 278, Editorial Sudamericana, 1983 </ref>that had arrived in a Hercules C-130 transport on the night of June 11-12th.<ref>«In believing that Menendez could hold out for at least ten days and since the Air Bridge was still open, the Joint Operations Group authorized the continued piecemeal reinforcement of Army Group Falklands with the despatch of 2nd Airborne Infantry Regiment. The weather and the speed of the British advance prevented its full deployment and only a platoon arrived in time to join 7th Infantry Regiment on Wireless Ridge.»  Nine Battles to Stanley,  Nick van der Bijl, p. 224, Leo Cooper, 1999</ref>Private  Guillermo Vélez recalls:{{cquote|They were guys from Córdoba, they had just arrived in the islands from Comodoro Rivadavia ... they had never heard a bomb, and they had been put there, in the middle of hell. We, theoretically, were going to receive, by radio, the orders. There were two signals, one to attack, and another to retreat, but in the middle of that mess we never received any order. We could not hear anything other than the bombs ... The A, B and C companies of the 7th had already retreated and we, as a result, ended up being the front line ... We were doing what we could; We could barely protect ourselves and occasionally answer the fire. We joined together in groups, and in front of us placed a defence line of MAG machine guns."<ref>Crónica Documental de las Malvinas: Testimonios y Documentos de la Guerra, Hugo Gambini, P. 885, Biblioteca de Redacción, 1982</ref>}}

'D' Company took the first half of the objective after a hard fight with Guidobono's signallers and 30 Argentinian paratroopers (armed with ten 7.62 mm belt-fed machine-guns) under 2d Lieutenant Gustavo Alberto Aimar (wounded in action) from the Córdoba-based 2nd 'General Balcarce' Airborne Infantry Regiment<ref>«...habian llegado la noche anterior. Una sección de ametralladoras no es un elemento que figure en las organizaciones comunes, fue constituido a propósito para esta oportunidad: eran 30 hombres con diez ametralladoras. La puse a disposición de Jofre para reforzar el 7.»  Malvinas: Testimonio de Su Gobernador,  Mario Benjamín Menéndez, Carlos M. Túrolo, p. 278, Editorial Sudamericana, 1983 </ref>that had arrived in a Hercules C-130 transport on the night of June 11-12th.<ref>«In believing that Menendez could hold out for at least ten days and since the Air Bridge was still open, the Joint Operations Group authorized the continued piecemeal reinforcement of Army Group Falklands with the despatch of 2nd Airborne Infantry Regiment. The weather and the speed of the British advance prevented its full deployment and only a platoon arrived in time to join 7th Infantry Regiment on Wireless Ridge.»  Nine Battles to Stanley,  Nick van der Bijl, p. 224, Leo Cooper, 1999</ref>Private  Guillermo Vélez recalls:{{cquote|They were guys from Córdoba, they had just arrived in the islands from Comodoro Rivadavia ... they had never heard a bomb, and they had been put there, in the middle of hell. We, theoretically, were going to receive, by radio, the orders. There were two signals, one to attack, and another to retreat, but in the middle of that mess we never received any order. We could not hear anything other than the bombs ... The A, B and C companies of the 7th had already retreated and we, as a result, ended up being the front line ... We were doing what we could; We could barely protect ourselves and occasionally answer the fire. We joined together in groups, and in front of us placed a defence line of MAG machine guns."<ref>Crónica Documental de las Malvinas: Testimonios y Documentos de la Guerra, Hugo Gambini, P. 885, Biblioteca de Redacción, 1982</ref>}}

At about 06.00 local time on June 14th, Guidobono's signallers and Aimar's paratroopers were hit by a company-sized attack. The Argentinian paratroopers communicated to he signallers that the British were about to get up and charge. Then with a hallow roar of a football crowd they were on the Argentinian defenders. The rest was confusion. The British Paras were moving as close as possible to the Argentinians to avoid the Argentinian Artillery fire. Preceded by a field artillery and naval bombardment, Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company, after suffering its ninth and last dead (Private Francis Slough) in the Falklands War, broke the ring of steel around Lieutenant-Colonel Giménez's command bunker. The Argentinian platoon of paratroopers, although nearly having lost half its strength captured or wounded/injured, moved back grudgingly.  

At about 06.00 local time on June 14, Guidobono's signallers and Aimar's paratroopers were hit by a company-sized attack. The Argentinian paratroopers communicated to he signallers that the British were about to get up and charge. Then with a hallow roar of a football crowd they were on the Argentinian defenders. The rest was confusion. The British Paras were moving as close as possible to the Argentinians to avoid the Argentinian Artillery fire. Preceded by a field artillery and naval bombardment, Major Philip Neame's 'D' Company, after suffering its ninth and last dead (Private Francis Slough) in the Falklands War, broke the ring of steel around Lieutenant-Colonel Giménez's command bunker. The Argentinian platoon of paratroopers, although nearly having lost half its strength captured or wounded/injured, moved back grudgingly.  

Soon there was a lot of action going above and around Moody Brook. Major Oscar Ramón Jaimet's 'B' Company, from the 6th 'Mercedes' Mechanized Infantry Regiment, on the northern slopes of Tumbledown Mountain, were busy shooting at Major Philip Neame's men, and them too, shooting back at the Argentinians.

Soon there was a lot of action going above and around Moody Brook. Major Oscar Ramón Jaimet's 'B' Company, from the 6th 'Mercedes' Mechanized Infantry Regiment, on the northern slopes of Tumbledown Mountain, were busy shooting at Major Philip Neame's men, and them too, shooting back at the Argentinians.

According to Private Patricio Pérez:{{cquote| I was carrying two rifles and I noticed that there was a sniper who was pinning me down. I wanted to come out of the rock and kill him but I couldn't because the firing was so intense. At that moment I heard somebody shout that he had seen the sniper. I came out, saw that he was leaning over the rock and shot at him and his gun fell silent. I saw him fall but I don't know whether he was wounded or dead. That kind of combat among the rocks is like a Western, but it all happens so fast that you don't quite realise what is going on ... What I felt at that moment was mostly hatred. I wanted revenge. I had forgotten fear by then, what sort of risk I was taking; the only thing I wanted to do, my obsession, was to avenge my fallen comrades. Whenever I saw one of my friends hit it was worse, it just made me want to continue fighting, it didn't matter for how long or at what cost. I didn't care about death at that time, the main thing was revenge ... We sent the wounded down and returned to the battle and fought on for four hours. Luckily after the surrender I found out that Horacio had survived. People greeted the surrender with relief. They were all crying. That wasn't how I reacted. I had been fighting for many hours and I was not prepared to give up my rifle until forced to do so. It's different for those who had been in actual combat. I couldn't give my rifle back until they took it away from me, and when I did give it back I made sure it was completely unusable.<ref>Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, Michael Bilton, Peter Kosminsky, p. 192, Andre Deutsch, 1989</ref>}}

According to Private Patricio Pérez:{{cquote| I was carrying two rifles and I noticed that there was a sniper who was pinning me down. I wanted to come out of the rock and kill him but I couldn't because the firing was so intense. At that moment I heard somebody shout that he had seen the sniper. I came out, saw that he was leaning over the rock and shot at him and his gun fell silent. I saw him fall but I don't know whether he was wounded or dead. That kind of combat among the rocks is like a Western, but it all happens so fast that you don't quite realise what is going on ... What I felt at that moment was mostly hatred. I wanted revenge. I had forgotten fear by then, what sort of risk I was taking; the only thing I wanted to do, my obsession, was to avenge my fallen comrades. Whenever I saw one of my friends hit it was worse, it just made me want to continue fighting, it didn't matter for how long or at what cost. I didn't care about death at that time, the main thing was revenge ... We sent the wounded down and returned to the battle and fought on for four hours. Luckily after the surrender I found out that Horacio had survived. People greeted the surrender with relief. They were all crying. That wasn't how I reacted. I had been fighting for many hours and I was not prepared to give up my rifle until forced to do so. It's different for those who had been in actual combat. I couldn't give my rifle back until they took it away from me, and when I did give it back I made sure it was completely unusable.<ref>Speaking Out: Untold Stories from the Falklands War, Michael Bilton, Peter Kosminsky, p. 192, Andre Deutsch, 1989</ref>}}

Private Graham Carter of 'D' Company, 2 PARA, came within a whisker of death in this close-quarter battle:{{cquote|I had a bullet bounce off my helmet, then when our artillery shells came in on us, one landed 15 feet away-but thankfully was a dud. It could have killed at least three of us. <ref>The scars of War, Hugh McManners, p. 325, HarperCollins, 1993</ref>}}

Private Graham Carter of 'D' Company, 2 PARA, came within a whisker of death in this close-quarter battle:{{cquote|I had a bullet bounce off my helmet, then when our artillery shells came in on us, one landed 15 feet away-but thankfully was a dud. It could have killed at least three of us.<ref>The scars of War, Hugh McManners, p. 325, HarperCollins, 1993</ref>}}

Major Neame's officers and NCOs rallied the exhausted Paras to capture the final part of their objective and in the face of heavy fire, the rifle platoons of 2d Lieutenant Carlos Javier Aristegui (wounded in action) and Lieutenant Víctor Hugo Rodriguez-Pérez (wounded in action) having run out of ammunition, broke and retreated, covered by supporting machine gun fire from the rifle platoon of Lieutenant Horacio Alejandro Mones-Ruiz.   

Major Neame's officers and NCOs rallied the exhausted Paras to capture the final part of their objective and in the face of heavy fire, the rifle platoons of 2d Lieutenant Carlos Javier Aristegui (wounded in action) and Lieutenant Víctor Hugo Rodriguez-Pérez (wounded in action) having run out of ammunition, broke and retreated, covered by supporting machine gun fire from the rifle platoon of Lieutenant Horacio Alejandro Mones-Ruiz.   

==Cortley Ridge==

==Cortley Ridge==

The Special Air Service, along with men from the Special Boat Squadron, attempted to carry out a diversionary amphibious raid on Cortley Ridge on the night of June 13th. The plan was, as 2 PARA attacked Wireless Ridge, 4 rigid raiders, piloted by Royal Marines and carrying SAS soldiers (15 men from D Squadron) and 6 SBS men (No. 3 Section) would speed across Stanley Harbour and attack the oil storage facilities. The assault force was illuminated by a spotlight on the Argentinian hospital ship 'Almirante Irizar' before it could reach its objective. A massive volley of fire from the 101st Anti Aircraft Artillery Regiment's B Company (under Major Jorge Alberto Monge) arced down onto the SAS/SBS force from positions along the shore, causing the raiding party to withdraw. The Rigid Raiders were badly shot up and abandoned, but miraculously none of the men involved had been killed.

The Special Air Service, along with men from the Special Boat Squadron, attempted to carry out a diversionary amphibious raid on Cortley Ridge on the night of June 13. The plan was, as 2 PARA attacked Wireless Ridge, 4 rigid raiders, piloted by Royal Marines and carrying SAS soldiers (15 men from D Squadron) and 6 SBS men (No. 3 Section) would speed across Stanley Harbour and attack the oil storage facilities. The assault force was illuminated by a spotlight on the Argentinian hospital ship 'Almirante Irizar' before it could reach its objective. A massive volley of fire from the 101st Anti Aircraft Artillery Regiment's B Company (under Major Jorge Alberto Monge) arced down onto the SAS/SBS force from positions along the shore, causing the raiding party to withdraw. The Rigid Raiders were badly shot up and abandoned, but miraculously none of the men involved had been killed.

The wisdom of this attack was later questioned as it was seen by some as a reckless operation with little strategic benefit.

The wisdom of this attack was later questioned as it was seen by some as a reckless operation with little strategic benefit.