Changes

Because of his criticism of the [[Vietnam War]] (and perhaps the NSA), the NSA monitored him in "Project Minaret", along with [[Martin Luther King Jr.]] and [[Howard Baker]]. The NSA would later say that "Project Minaret" was "disreputable if not outright illegal."<ref>https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/25/secret-cold-war-documents-reveal-nsa-spied-on-senators/</ref>

Because of his criticism of the [[Vietnam War]] (and perhaps the NSA), the NSA monitored him in "Project Minaret", along with [[Martin Luther King Jr.]] and [[Howard Baker]]. The NSA would later say that "Project Minaret" was "disreputable if not outright illegal."<ref>https://foreignpolicy.com/2013/09/25/secret-cold-war-documents-reveal-nsa-spied-on-senators/</ref>

The Church Committee uncovered several foreign coups, assassinations, and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders, often by rogue elements within the CIA without presidential authorization, congressional oversight, or [[advise and consent]].<ref>[https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7324009.pdf - Report on CIA Assassination Plots (1)”], Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library</ref>  This marked the beginning of a permanent Senate Intelligence oversight committee.<ref><small>"The Senate acted first in May 1976, creating the Select Committee on Intelligence. The House followed suit a little over a year later, creating the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Both committees were made responsible for authorizing expenditures for intelligence activities (although the Senate was limited to "national" intelligence, whereas the House mandate included both "national" and "tactical" intelligence activities), and for conducting necessary oversight. The resolutions creating both committees recognized that they would be kept "fully and currently informed" of intelligence activities under their purview. Both committees were added to the list of those to receive notice of covert actions under the Hughes-Ryan amendment. The Senate committee also was given responsibility for handling the confirmation proceedings when the DCI and the Deputy DCI were nominated by the President.

The Church Committee uncovered several foreign coups, assassinations, and attempted assassinations of foreign leaders, often by rogue elements within the CIA without presidential authorization, congressional oversight, or [[advise and consent]] of the Congress.<ref>[https://www.fordlibrarymuseum.gov/library/document/0005/7324009.pdf - Report on CIA Assassination Plots (1)”], Richard B. Cheney Files at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library</ref>  This marked the beginning of a permanent Senate Intelligence oversight committee.<ref><small>"The Senate acted first in May 1976, creating the Select Committee on Intelligence. The House followed suit a little over a year later, creating the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Both committees were made responsible for authorizing expenditures for intelligence activities (although the Senate was limited to "national" intelligence, whereas the House mandate included both "national" and "tactical" intelligence activities), and for conducting necessary oversight. The resolutions creating both committees recognized that they would be kept "fully and currently informed" of intelligence activities under their purview. Both committees were added to the list of those to receive notice of covert actions under the Hughes-Ryan amendment. The Senate committee also was given responsibility for handling the confirmation proceedings when the DCI and the Deputy DCI were nominated by the President.

While efforts were made in succeeding months to let emotions over intelligence activities subside and to establish more "normal" relationships between the Legislative and Executive branches, the hiatus was relatively short-lived. In 1977, the Senate Committee reexamined the question whether the aggregate intelligence budget should be released publicly. This issue would continue to be debated for the next two decades. The statement of newly-appointed DCI Turner that he had no problem with the release of this figure aroused protests from those who believed disclosure could assist hostile intelligence services in deciphering U.S. intelligence activity.

While efforts were made in succeeding months to let emotions over intelligence activities subside and to establish more "normal" relationships between the Legislative and Executive branches, the hiatus was relatively short-lived. In 1977, the Senate Committee reexamined the question whether the aggregate intelligence budget should be released publicly. This issue would continue to be debated for the next two decades. The statement of newly-appointed DCI Turner that he had no problem with the release of this figure aroused protests from those who believed disclosure could assist hostile intelligence services in deciphering U.S. intelligence activity.