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| | By the 1920s, control of Manchuria was considered by Japanese leaders to be vital to Japan's economic development and security. | | By the 1920s, control of Manchuria was considered by Japanese leaders to be vital to Japan's economic development and security. |
| | ==1931-1941== | | ==1931-1941== |
| | + | [[Image:Nomonhan.JPG|thumb|300px|right|Japan and the Soviet Union clashes at Nomonhan and Changkufeng 1938–39.]] |
| | Threatened by the growth of Chinese nationalism there, the Japanese army staged an incident on Sept. 18, 1931, occupied all of Manchuria, and, on Feb. 18, 1932, created the puppet state of Manchukuo. Concerned less with who controlled Manchuria than with Japanese violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris (1927), the United States, independently and in concert with the League of Nations, exerted pressure on Japan. Foreign protests were ignored by the Japanese military, and the civilian government was unable to restrain the army. With none of the powers willing to impose sanctions, the U.S. Secretary of State [[Henry Stimson]] announced in January 1932 to "Stimson Doctrine"—a refusal to recognize conditions brought about by Japanese treaty violations. | | Threatened by the growth of Chinese nationalism there, the Japanese army staged an incident on Sept. 18, 1931, occupied all of Manchuria, and, on Feb. 18, 1932, created the puppet state of Manchukuo. Concerned less with who controlled Manchuria than with Japanese violations of the Nine-Power Treaty and the Pact of Paris (1927), the United States, independently and in concert with the League of Nations, exerted pressure on Japan. Foreign protests were ignored by the Japanese military, and the civilian government was unable to restrain the army. With none of the powers willing to impose sanctions, the U.S. Secretary of State [[Henry Stimson]] announced in January 1932 to "Stimson Doctrine"—a refusal to recognize conditions brought about by Japanese treaty violations. |
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| | Japan and the Soviet Union fought a large-scale border war in Manchukuo in 1939, resulting in a major Soviet victory at Nomonhan, and Japanese reluctance to engage the Soviets any more. Japan thereupon turned south.<ref>Alvin D. Coox, ''Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939'' (1985).</ref> | | Japan and the Soviet Union fought a large-scale border war in Manchukuo in 1939, resulting in a major Soviet victory at Nomonhan, and Japanese reluctance to engage the Soviets any more. Japan thereupon turned south.<ref>Alvin D. Coox, ''Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939'' (1985).</ref> |
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| − | The United States never recognized Manchukuo and refused to concede Japanese dominance over the region during the efforts of [[Cordell Hull]] and Nomura Kichisaburo to avoid war in 1941. | + | The United States never recognized Manchukuo and refused to concede Japanese dominance over the region during the efforts of [[Cordell Hull]] and Nomura Kichisaburo to avoid war in 1941. |
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| | ==1945 and after== | | ==1945 and after== |
| | At the [[Yalta Conference]] (in February 1945) President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] secretly agreed to give the Soviet Union Japan's sphere of interest in Manchuria in return for Soviet intervention in the war in Asia. The Red Army entered Manchuria in August 1945 and remained there until April 1946. After Soviet forces withdrew, [[Mao Zedong]] and his People's Liberation Army defeated Chiang Kai-shek's [[Kuomintang]] armies in Manchuria as in the rest of China. An agreement between Mao and [[Joseph Stalin]] in 1950 led to complete Chinese sovereignty in 1955. A separate American policy toward these northeastern provinces of China ceased to exist after 1947, when the administration of [[Harry S. Truman]] rejected Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer's proposal for a five-power or [[United Nations]] trusteeship for Manchuria. Communist strength in Manchuria proved the base, and "anvil of victory," for their forces against the Nationalists in 1948.<ref>Steven I. Levine, ''Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1947'' (1987).</ref> Manchuria was also the Chinese base for intervention in the [[Korean War]] in late 1950 to prevent a UN rollback of Communist North Korea. | | At the [[Yalta Conference]] (in February 1945) President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] secretly agreed to give the Soviet Union Japan's sphere of interest in Manchuria in return for Soviet intervention in the war in Asia. The Red Army entered Manchuria in August 1945 and remained there until April 1946. After Soviet forces withdrew, [[Mao Zedong]] and his People's Liberation Army defeated Chiang Kai-shek's [[Kuomintang]] armies in Manchuria as in the rest of China. An agreement between Mao and [[Joseph Stalin]] in 1950 led to complete Chinese sovereignty in 1955. A separate American policy toward these northeastern provinces of China ceased to exist after 1947, when the administration of [[Harry S. Truman]] rejected Gen. Albert C. Wedemeyer's proposal for a five-power or [[United Nations]] trusteeship for Manchuria. Communist strength in Manchuria proved the base, and "anvil of victory," for their forces against the Nationalists in 1948.<ref>Steven I. Levine, ''Anvil of Victory: The Communist Revolution in Manchuria, 1945–1947'' (1987).</ref> Manchuria was also the Chinese base for intervention in the [[Korean War]] in late 1950 to prevent a UN rollback of Communist North Korea. |