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The unity within the Chinese Communist Party is shattering as all the three factions (Shanghai, Beijing, and Zhenjiang) in the party are embroiled in a feud.  The Shanghai faction is led by Jiang Zemin, the Beijing faction is led by Hu Jintao, and the Zhenjiang faction is led by President Xi Jinping.  Each one of the three is trying to nullify the influence of the other faction. Since 2012, when Xi Jinping took office political oppression has intensified and it has blanketed China. Press, social media, film, arts, literature and the Internet in China is heavily censored. Many intellectuals, Tibetans, Uighurs, lawyers, university students have been persecuted for voicing their opinions in favor of democracy.  Cracks appeared in Xi Jinping's hold on the Chinese Communist Party over the catastrophic handling of the [[CCP pandemic]].  This opened an opportunity for the Shanghai faction and the Beijing faction.
 
The unity within the Chinese Communist Party is shattering as all the three factions (Shanghai, Beijing, and Zhenjiang) in the party are embroiled in a feud.  The Shanghai faction is led by Jiang Zemin, the Beijing faction is led by Hu Jintao, and the Zhenjiang faction is led by President Xi Jinping.  Each one of the three is trying to nullify the influence of the other faction. Since 2012, when Xi Jinping took office political oppression has intensified and it has blanketed China. Press, social media, film, arts, literature and the Internet in China is heavily censored. Many intellectuals, Tibetans, Uighurs, lawyers, university students have been persecuted for voicing their opinions in favor of democracy.  Cracks appeared in Xi Jinping's hold on the Chinese Communist Party over the catastrophic handling of the [[CCP pandemic]].  This opened an opportunity for the Shanghai faction and the Beijing faction.
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==Ji Jinping Thought==
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==Xi Jinping Thought==
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In October 2017 an amendment including Xi's name was added to the CCP's party constitution, marking the first time a living leader's name was added since [[Mao Zedong]], reflecting Xi's standing within the Communist Party.  The amendment was approved by all 2,300 delegates attending the party congress, is called "Xi Jinping Thought for the New Era of Socialism With Chinese Special Characteristics."
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The move placed Xi on the same level as Mao and [[Deng Xiaoping]], whose names also appear in the party constitution in articles reflecting their principles. The political principles of [[Jiang Zemin]] and [[Hu Jintao]], Xi's predecessors, were added to the party constitution, but their names were not.
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''[[The New York Times]]'' Chris Buckley notes that Xi's authority "is not directly comparable to the almost godlike influence Mao commanded," but, at the same time, "the Chinese economy, state and military are much more powerful now than they were under Mao, or even under Deng, which gives Mr. Xi far more global influence than his predecessors."<ref>https://www.businessinsider.com/china-xi-jinping-and-chinese-economy-2017-10</ref>
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Xi Jinping Thought is an effort to avoid the demise of Communist party power such as happened in the [[Soviet Union]] as the result of ''[[Perestroika]]'' and ''[[Glasnost]]'' reform movements instituted by Soviet General Secretary [[Mikhail Gorbachev]].
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Jin Canrong, a professor and associate dean of the School of International Studies at Beijing’s Renmin University of China, laid out a multi-pronged strategy involving a range of malign actions to subvert the United States while strengthening the Chinese regime.<ref>https://www.theepochtimes.com/mkt_breakingnews/xi-jinpings-adviser-outlines-plan-for-ccp-to-defeat-us-including-manipulating-elections_3748196.html</ref>  Jin emphasized that Xi was unlike his predecessors in his ambitions. Previous CCP leaders, such as Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao worked hard to develop the regime’s power but didn’t dare to use it, he said.  “No matter how much power you have, it’s nothing if you don’t dare to use it,” Jin said. “Chairman Xi dares to use it. [Xi’s authorities] have the power, dare to use that power, and all of its attacks make the other party bleed.”
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Xi’s global strategy to bolster the regime’s global power has two pillars, according to Jin. One is the [[Belt and Road Initiative]] (BRI), the other is the Free Trade Area of the Asia-Pacific (FTAAP).
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Xi’s ambitions, however, cannot be revealed to the outside world, the professor said.  When Xi took power in 2012, he urged the country to realize the “Chinese dream.” This meant becoming a “moderately well-off” country by 2021, and then a “strong, democratic, civilized, harmonious, and modern socialist country” by 2049.  Jin explained that Xi’s target is actually to replace the United States as the world’s only superpower by 2049.  “[Chinese] Ministry of Foreign Affairs keeps on saying [at press briefings] that China loves peace. But no reporters at the press briefings believe this,” Jin said.
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===Xi Jinping and atheism===
 
===Xi Jinping and atheism===
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:{{See also|National socialism}}
 
:{{See also|National socialism}}
 
Outside observers have seen certain changes as a movement toward [[National Socialism]] with Chinese [[racial]] characteristics.<ref>https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/15/national-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics/</ref><ref>https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/12/nazi-china-communists-carl-schmitt/617237/</ref><ref>https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/xi-jinpings-conception-of-socialism/</ref>
 
Outside observers have seen certain changes as a movement toward [[National Socialism]] with Chinese [[racial]] characteristics.<ref>https://foreignpolicy.com/2012/11/15/national-socialism-with-chinese-characteristics/</ref><ref>https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2020/12/nazi-china-communists-carl-schmitt/617237/</ref><ref>https://www.aspistrategist.org.au/xi-jinpings-conception-of-socialism/</ref>
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===Document 9===
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Document 9 was leaked by a Chinese dissident journalist who was in turn sentenced to a seven-year imprisonment for "leaking state secrets".<ref>{{cite web|title=Chinese journalist Gao Yu faces seven years in prison for 'leaking state secrets'|url=http://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-journalist-gao-yu-prison-sentence-leaking-state-secrets/|publisher=CBS News|accessdate=}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|first1=Chris|last1=Buckley|title=Chinese Journalist Sentenced to 7 Years on Charges of Leaking State Secrets|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/17/world/asia/china-journalist-gao-yu-gets-7-year-sentence.html|newspaper=The New York Times|date=16 April 2015|issn=0362-4331|accessdate=}}</ref>  The name of the document, '''Communiqué on the Current State of the Ideological Sphere''' (also translated as the '''Briefing on the Current Situation in the Ideological Realm'''<ref>{{cite news|title=Tilting backwards|url=https://www.economist.com/blogs/analects/2013/06/political-rebalancing|newspaper=The Economist|date=24 June 2013|issn=0013-0613|accessdate=}}</ref>) comes from it being the ninth such document issued that year in China.<ref>{{cite web|title=Document 9: A ChinaFile Translation|url=http://www.chinafile.com/document-9-chinafile-translation|website=ChinaFile|date=8 November 2013|accessdate=}}</ref>  It is thought that Document No. 9 was issued by the General Office of the Central Committee, and would have required the approval of Xi and other top leaders.  ''The New York Times'' reported that it "bears the unmistakable imprimatur of Xi Jinping".<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/20/world/asia/chinas-new-leadership-takes-hard-line-in-secret-memo.html?mcubz=1 | title=China Takes Aim at Western Ideas |work=The New York Times}}</ref>  The document specifically addresses the following issues which it regards as problems using these same terms in the document itself:
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# Promoting Western Constitutional Democracy: An attempt to undermine the current leadership and the "socialism with Chinese characteristics" system of governance.  (Including ''the [[separation of powers]], the multi-party system, general elections, and independent judiciaries''.)
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# Promoting “universal values” in an attempt to weaken the theoretical foundations of the Party’s leadership.  (That ''“the West’s values are the prevailing norm for all human civilization”'', that ''“only when China accepts Western values will it have a future”''.)
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# Promoting civil society in an attempt to dismantle the ruling party’s social foundation.  (i.e. that ''individual rights are paramount and ought to be immune to obstruction by the state''.)
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# Promoting Neoliberalism, attempting to change China’s Basic Economic System. (i.e. ''unrestrained economic liberalization, complete privatization, and total marketization''.)
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# Promoting the West’s idea of journalism, challenging China’s principle that the media and publishing system should be subject to Party discipline.
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# Promoting historical nihilism, trying to undermine the history of the CCP and of [[New China]].  (For example ''to deny the scientific and guiding value of [[Mao Zedong thought]]''.)
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# Questioning Reform and Opening and the socialist nature of socialism with Chinese characteristics.  (For example, saying ''“We have deviated from our Socialist orientation.”'')
    
==Globalism==
 
==Globalism==
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