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Having had a long personal friendship with Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the Kaiser of Imperial Germany, [[Wilhelm II]], was probably more deeply angered by the news from Sarajevo than any other European sovereign. Though mildly friendly to the Serbs beforehand, he now wrote, just two days after the assassination, that "matters must be cleared up with the Serbs {i.e., by military action}, and that right soon."<ref>McMeekin, ''July 1914'', p. 99.</ref> Thus, when visited on July 5 by Austro-Hungarian ambassador Count Ladislaus de Szögyény-Marich, Wilhelm was prepared to seriously discuss the possibility of punitive war in the Balkans. Although the kaiser warned that he could not give definitive support to such a policy without consulting his Chancellor, Count Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, he added that in his own opinion, Austria ought to undertake military action against Serbia right away, and that if this led to a war with Russia, the Austrians could count on German support. These statements were substantially endorsed by Chancellor Bethmann himself in conversations with Szögyény the following day.<ref>Ibid, 113, 117.</ref> These twin endorsements have since been described by historians as a "blank check" from Germany for Austrian war with Serbia (though it was assumed that the Austrians would launch such a war at once, and that it would be limited to, at the most, a German-Austrian-Russian-Serbian conflict).
Having had a long personal friendship with Franz Ferdinand and his wife, the Kaiser of Imperial Germany, [[Wilhelm II]], was probably more deeply angered by the news from Sarajevo than any other European sovereign. Though mildly friendly to the Serbs beforehand, he now wrote, just two days after the assassination, that "matters must be cleared up with the Serbs {i.e., by military action}, and that right soon."<ref>McMeekin, ''July 1914'', p. 99.</ref> Thus, when visited on July 5 by Austro-Hungarian ambassador Count Ladislaus de Szögyény-Marich, Wilhelm was prepared to seriously discuss the possibility of punitive war in the Balkans. Although the kaiser warned that he could not give definitive support to such a policy without consulting his Chancellor, Count Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, he added that in his own opinion, Austria ought to undertake military action against Serbia right away, and that if this led to a war with Russia, the Austrians could count on German support. These statements were substantially endorsed by Chancellor Bethmann himself in conversations with Szögyény the following day.<ref>Ibid, 113, 117.</ref> These twin endorsements have since been described by historians as a "blank check" from Germany for Austrian war with Serbia (though it was assumed that the Austrians would launch such a war at once, and that it would be limited to, at the most, a German-Austrian-Russian-Serbian conflict).
==Austrian Ultimatum==
Despite German insistence on the need for a speedy resolution of affairs, officials in Vienna dithered for the next week. Many of the Austrian army's soldiers from rural areas were home on leave to help in the summer harvest, and the Hungarian prime minister, István Tisza, was initially opposed to any kind of war against Serbia. Only on July 14 did Franz Josef's ministers finally agree to send an ultimatum to the Serbian government, stipulating a series of demands it must meet in response to the archduke's assassination. The main points of this ultimatum were that Serbia must suppress all propaganda and other written materials directed against Austria-Hungary; that all persons, in and out of the government and armed forces, who had been involved in the assassination must be arrested and stand trial; and that Austro-Hungarian officials be permitted to take part in both the investigation of the crime and the suppression of anti-Austrian propaganda.
Though it was possible Serbia would agree to some of these demands (in fact, it had already begun arresting some of the conspirators), the requirement for involvement of Austrian officials risked compromising the nation's sovereignty to such a degree that this part of the ultimatum would likely be refused. Berchtold and the other ministers, in fact, expected this; at which point, according to their plan, they would launch the war, occupying at least the capital city of [[Belgrade]] and possibly the entire country.
While the sending of this ultimatum was agreed to on the 14th, it was also decided not to actually do so until the 25th, not only to give soldiers on leave time to return to duty, but also because of a summit being held in [[St. Petersburg]], Russia, in the meantime, between Russian Tsar [[Nicholas II]] and French President Raymond Poincaré. By waiting until after the conclusion of this meeting, Berchtold hoped, Austria would deny Russia and France the chance to coordinate a response.
==References==
==References==