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While the sending of this ultimatum was agreed to on the 14th, it was also decided not to actually do so until the 25th, not only to give soldiers on leave time to return to duty, but also because of a summit being held in [[St. Petersburg]], Russia, in the meantime, between Russian Tsar [[Nicholas II]] and French President Raymond Poincaré. By waiting until after the conclusion of this meeting, Berchtold hoped, Austria would deny Russia and France the chance to coordinate a response.
While the sending of this ultimatum was agreed to on the 14th, it was also decided not to actually do so until the 25th, not only to give soldiers on leave time to return to duty, but also because of a summit being held in [[St. Petersburg]], Russia, in the meantime, between Russian Tsar [[Nicholas II]] and French President Raymond Poincaré. By waiting until after the conclusion of this meeting, Berchtold hoped, Austria would deny Russia and France the chance to coordinate a response.
==Franco-Russian Reaction==
Despite the best intentions of Berchtold and his fellow ministers to keep France and Russia in the dark about Austria-Hungary's planned ultimatum, word of it leaked to the Russian embassy in Vienna, and by Saturday, July 18, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov had learned enough to deduce what the Austrians were up to regarding Serbia, and briefed Nicholas II on the unfolding situation the following day.
The day after that--Monday, July 20--French President Poincaré and Premier René Viviani arrived in St. Petersburg on board the battleship ''France''. During the next three days of official ceremonies to mark the alliance between the two nations, Nicholas II and Sazonov brought both men up to date on the possibility of war in the Balkans; tsar and foreign minister expressed confidence in the outcome of a war with Austria, should they intervene on Serbia's behalf, and Poincaré in turn gave assurances that if Germany mobilized its armed forces in support of Austria, France would do the same in support of Russia. Warnings to this effect were conveyed to their potential opponents: Poincaré himself told the Austrian ambassador to Russia that "Serbia has very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an Ally, France. There are plenty of complications to be feared!" Meanwhile, Sazonov informed the German ambassador that "Russia would not be able to endure it if Austria-Hungary issued threatening language to Serbia or undertook military measures....whatever happens there must be no talk of an ultimatum."<ref>Maurice Paléologue, ''An Ambassador's Memoirs'' trans. by F. A. Holt. London: Hutchinson, 1923, vol. 1, p. 18-19.</ref>
==References==
==References==