On January 12, 1950, President [[Harry Truman]]'s [[Deep State]] [[Secretary of State]] [[Dean Acheson]] gave his carefully written "defensive perimeter" speech at the National Press Club, which [[communist]]s interpreted as allowing communist [[North Korea]] to invade [[South Korea]]. Acheson's speech notably excluded South Korea (the Republic of Korea) and Taiwan (the Republic of China) from the defensive perimeter that extended from [[Japan]]’s Ryukyu Islands to the [[Philippines]]. As explained by the ''World Tribune'':
+
On January 12, 1950, President [[Harry Truman]]'s [[Deep State]] [[Secretary of State]] [[Dean Acheson]] gave his carefully written "defensive perimeter" speech at the National Press Club, which [[Communist]]s interpreted as allowing Communist [[North Korea]] to invade [[South Korea]]. Acheson's speech notably excluded South Korea (the Republic of Korea) and Taiwan (the Republic of China) from the defensive perimeter that extended from [[Japan]]’s Ryukyu Islands to the [[Philippines]]. As explained by the ''World Tribune'':
{{cquote|According to Soviet eyewitness accounts made available after the Soviet Union’s collapse in the early 1990s, Acheson’s speech was rushed to Stalin’s desk for a careful study. Stalin then immediately held secret deliberations with Mao, who had been in the USSR since late December 1949, about the seemingly changed military assessment concerning Korea. [North Korea dictator Kim Il-Sung] had been begging Stalin to approve his plan to attack South Korea, only to be repeatedly rejected by him on account of an assumed American military response. But only two weeks after Acheson’s speech, as the post-Soviet Union archival releases have indicated, on January 30, 1950, Stalin finally issued a general approval for Kim Il-Sung to launch the attack on the South.<ref>https://www.worldtribune.com/dean-achesons-fateful-speech-and-the-outbreak-of-the-korean-war-on-june-25-1950/</ref>}}
{{cquote|According to Soviet eyewitness accounts made available after the Soviet Union’s collapse in the early 1990s, Acheson’s speech was rushed to Stalin’s desk for a careful study. Stalin then immediately held secret deliberations with Mao, who had been in the USSR since late December 1949, about the seemingly changed military assessment concerning Korea. [North Korea dictator Kim Il-Sung] had been begging Stalin to approve his plan to attack South Korea, only to be repeatedly rejected by him on account of an assumed American military response. But only two weeks after Acheson’s speech, as the post-Soviet Union archival releases have indicated, on January 30, 1950, Stalin finally issued a general approval for Kim Il-Sung to launch the attack on the South.<ref>https://www.worldtribune.com/dean-achesons-fateful-speech-and-the-outbreak-of-the-korean-war-on-june-25-1950/</ref>}}