| | Paper research (2017):<ref name=livingpropaganda-2017>Kehoe, T. J., & Greenhalgh, E. M. (2017). Living Propaganda and Self-Serving Recruitment: The Nazi Rationale for the German-Arab Training Unit, May 1941 to May 1943. War in History, 24(4), 520–543. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26393389</ref><blockquote>In 1941 Hitler set aside racial purity restrictions for the Wehrmacht to form the German-Arab Training Unit. New sources reveal Arab recruitment was self-serving, meant to bolster Nazi propaganda and foment anti-Allied Arab violence. Racism towards Arabs was pervasive throughout the Nazi regime and the Wehrmacht, stemming from Nazi ideology and older colonial attitudes. Consequently, the unit's two-year history from May 1941 to May 1943 was defined by tension between retaining racial segregation and feigning collaboration. The results were command indecision, neglect, reticence to deploy into combat, and reluctant expansion, which together created dysfunction and disorder in the unit.</blockquote> | | Paper research (2017):<ref name=livingpropaganda-2017>Kehoe, T. J., & Greenhalgh, E. M. (2017). Living Propaganda and Self-Serving Recruitment: The Nazi Rationale for the German-Arab Training Unit, May 1941 to May 1943. War in History, 24(4), 520–543. https://www.jstor.org/stable/26393389</ref><blockquote>In 1941 Hitler set aside racial purity restrictions for the Wehrmacht to form the German-Arab Training Unit. New sources reveal Arab recruitment was self-serving, meant to bolster Nazi propaganda and foment anti-Allied Arab violence. Racism towards Arabs was pervasive throughout the Nazi regime and the Wehrmacht, stemming from Nazi ideology and older colonial attitudes. Consequently, the unit's two-year history from May 1941 to May 1943 was defined by tension between retaining racial segregation and feigning collaboration. The results were command indecision, neglect, reticence to deploy into combat, and reluctant expansion, which together created dysfunction and disorder in the unit.</blockquote> |
| | + | Goebbels, Rosenberg, Himmler, all in their turn, discovered the im- passes created by the word antisemitism when confronted with alleged Semites, not only in the Middle East, but in the Soviet Union or in Germany... |
| | + | the Mufti of Jerusalem and Rosenberg in Mai 1943 Hans Hage- mayer, the director of the department 'Überstaatliche Mächte‹m' in Rosenberg's ministry recommended in a letter to Werner Koeppen, Rosenberg's man in Hitler's headquarters, that the German Press should avoid the use of the word antisemitism because the enemy abroad is made to believe that 'we make no distinction between Arabs and the Jews'. |
| | + | May 1943 meeting [[Alfred Rosenberg]] with the Palestinian Mufti and beyond:<ref>Jamison, Albert Leland. Tradition and Change in Jewish Experience. United States: Department of Religion, Syracuse University, 1978, [https://books.google.com/books?id=CpvXAAAAMAAJ&q=may+1943+mufti+rosenberg p. 243].</ref> |
| | + | <blockquote>A secret Nazi order, dated May 17, 1943, reads as follows: "When the Grand Mufti visited Reichsleiter Rosenberg, the Reichsleiter promised to instruct the press that the word antisemitism was henceforth to be abandoned."</blockquote> |
| | <font size=1>[Not that Hitler himself was "true" to or even "consistent" at his twisted "belief."<ref>[https://www.nli.org.il/he/newspapers/haretz/1941/11/07/01/article/21 Haaretz, Nov 07, 1941] | | <font size=1>[Not that Hitler himself was "true" to or even "consistent" at his twisted "belief."<ref>[https://www.nli.org.il/he/newspapers/haretz/1941/11/07/01/article/21 Haaretz, Nov 07, 1941] |