Changes

According to information announced in April 2017 by the head of the [[Security Service of Ukraine]] (SBU), '''Vasyl Hrytsak''', the first stage of cooperation with the Ukraine-NATO Trust Fund in the field of cyber defense included a total of one million [[euro]]s, which was used to purchase equipment and software to equip computer incident response centers of key Ukrainian state institutions, in particular, the Situation Center of the [[SBU]] and the Cyber Incident Response Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.<ref>https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/433693.html</ref>

According to information announced in April 2017 by the head of the [[Security Service of Ukraine]] (SBU), '''Vasyl Hrytsak''', the first stage of cooperation with the Ukraine-NATO Trust Fund in the field of cyber defense included a total of one million [[euro]]s, which was used to purchase equipment and software to equip computer incident response centers of key Ukrainian state institutions, in particular, the Situation Center of the [[SBU]] and the Cyber Incident Response Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.<ref>https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/433693.html</ref>

While building the SBU’s new directorate, the [[CIA]] embarked on a far more ambitious project with the '''Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine'''. From 2015 on, the CIA embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and [[active measures]] operations against Russia. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU.

While building the SBU’s new directorate, the [[CIA]] embarked on a far more ambitious project with the [[Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine]]. From 2015 on, the CIA embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and [[active measures]] operations against Russia. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU.

The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art [[surveillance]] and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also [[software]] tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the [[American]]s.

The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art [[surveillance]] and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also [[software]] tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the [[American]]s.