Changes

According to information announced in April 2017 by the head of the [[Security Service of Ukraine]] (SBU), '''Vasyl Hrytsak''', the first stage of cooperation with the Ukraine-NATO Trust Fund in the field of cyber defense included a total of one million [[euro]]s, which was used to purchase equipment and software to equip computer incident response centers of key Ukrainian state institutions, in particular, the Situation Center of the [[SBU]] and the Cyber Incident Response Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.<ref>https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/433693.html</ref>

According to information announced in April 2017 by the head of the [[Security Service of Ukraine]] (SBU), '''Vasyl Hrytsak''', the first stage of cooperation with the Ukraine-NATO Trust Fund in the field of cyber defense included a total of one million [[euro]]s, which was used to purchase equipment and software to equip computer incident response centers of key Ukrainian state institutions, in particular, the Situation Center of the [[SBU]] and the Cyber Incident Response Center of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine.<ref>https://interfax.com.ua/news/general/433693.html</ref>

While building the SBU’s new directorate, the [[CIA]] embarked on a far more ambitious project with the [[Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine]]. From 2015 on, the CIA embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and [[active measures]] operations against Russia. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU.

While building the SBU’s new directorate, the [[CIA]] embarked on a far more ambitious project with the [[Main Intelligence Directorate of Ukraine]]. From 2015 on, the CIA embarked on an extensive transformation of the GUR. With fewer than 5,000 employees, the GUR was a fraction of the size of the SBU and had a narrower focus on [[espionage]] and active measures operations against Russia. It also had a younger workforce with fewer holdovers from [[Soviet]] times, while the SBU was still perceived as penetrated by Russian intelligence. Some of the GUR’s new recruits were transfers from the SBU.

The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art [[surveillance]] and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also [[software]] tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the [[American]]s.

The CIA helped the GUR acquire state-of-the-art [[surveillance]] and electronic eavesdropping systems, including mobile equipment that could be placed along Russian-controlled lines in eastern Ukraine, but also [[software]] tools used to exploit the [[cellphone]]s of [[Kremlin]] officials visiting outside of Moscow. Ukrainian officers operated the systems but everything gleaned was shared with the [[American]]s.