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The quandary facing strategists through most of the war was how to reinstate mobility. The sheer size of the Eastern front made trench warfare unfeasible, creating a fluidity there that generals sought for the Western Front as well.

The quandary facing strategists through most of the war was how to reinstate mobility. The sheer size of the Eastern front made trench warfare unfeasible, creating a fluidity there that generals sought for the Western Front as well.

=== Gas ===

====Gas====

The Germans took the first step on January 3, 1915 when, in contravention of the [[Hague Convention]] of 1899, which outlawed the use of poisons in war, they employed gas warfare at Bolimov, on the Eastern Front. This attack was largely ineffective, however. The Germans had used xylyl bromide, a non-lethal, but lachrymatory (tear-producing) gas, but it froze in the sub-zero temperatures. But, by April of that year, the Germans had an abundance of lethal [[chlorine]] gas that overstimulates fluid production in the lungs, drowning the victim.   

The Germans took the first step on January 3, 1915 when, in contravention of the [[Hague Convention]] of 1899, which outlawed the use of poisons in war, they employed gas warfare at Bolimov, on the Eastern Front. This attack was largely ineffective, however. The Germans had used xylyl bromide, a non-lethal, but lachrymatory (tear-producing) gas, but it froze in the sub-zero temperatures. But, by April of that year, the Germans had an abundance of lethal [[chlorine]] gas that overstimulates fluid production in the lungs, drowning the victim.   

=== Overcoming the wire ===

====Overcoming the wire====

Gas had restored mobility to a certain extent, but there was still the problem of wire barriers. Cutting barbed wire was a serious tactical problem. In [[Gallipoli]], Allied forces had attempted to destroy wire with artillery bombardments, but shells only exploded upon hitting the ground, which usually only served to create further entanglements. The French produced a solution in 1915, with a new kind of fuse called the '''Fusée Instantée Allongée''' (elongated instantaneous fuse), containing a brass tape that unwound during flight. Once unwound, it freed the hammer, and when the shell hit the ground, this triggered the detonator, setting off the primer and exploding the shell. British inventors made some changes to improve its safety, reliability and suitability for mass production, resulting in the Type 106 percussion fuse. The final product was a shell that exploded on impact with all but the softest ground. The explosion produced no crater, dispersed high-velocity steel splinters over the ground, which were lethal at 800 metres. Hence the infantry called them "ground shrapnel" or "daisy cutters". This new fuse bode well for a solution to the wire problem.  

Gas had restored mobility to a certain extent, but there was still the problem of wire barriers. Cutting barbed wire was a serious tactical problem. In [[Gallipoli]], Allied forces had attempted to destroy wire with artillery bombardments, but shells only exploded upon hitting the ground, which usually only served to create further entanglements. The French produced a solution in 1915, with a new kind of fuse called the '''Fusée Instantée Allongée''' (elongated instantaneous fuse), containing a brass tape that unwound during flight. Once unwound, it freed the hammer, and when the shell hit the ground, this triggered the detonator, setting off the primer and exploding the shell. British inventors made some changes to improve its safety, reliability and suitability for mass production, resulting in the Type 106 percussion fuse. The final product was a shell that exploded on impact with all but the softest ground. The explosion produced no crater, dispersed high-velocity steel splinters over the ground, which were lethal at 800 metres. Hence the infantry called them "ground shrapnel" or "daisy cutters". This new fuse bode well for a solution to the wire problem.  

=== Tanks ===

====Tanks====

With wire resolved, there still remained the problem of what lay behind it: machine guns and rifles, manned by entrenched soldiers. It was necessary to get men past the wire to enemy trenches without costly frontal assaults. This would be possible by protecting the attacker with a mobile bulletproof shield, as such a shield would be too heavy to carry. To accomplish this, the Allies introduced the ‘tank,’ as it was code-named, in 1916. The intention was to restore power to the offensive by combining firepower, protection and movement. The first two were often stressed to the detriment of the third; the tank's average speed was five miles per hour.  They were used sparingly at the Somme and had little effect until used en masse the following year.

With wire resolved, there still remained the problem of what lay behind it: machine guns and rifles, manned by entrenched soldiers. It was necessary to get men past the wire to enemy trenches without costly frontal assaults. This would be possible by protecting the attacker with a mobile bulletproof shield, as such a shield would be too heavy to carry. To accomplish this, the Allies introduced the ‘tank,’ as it was code-named, in 1916. The intention was to restore power to the offensive by combining firepower, protection and movement. The first two were often stressed to the detriment of the third; the tank's average speed was five miles per hour.  They were used sparingly at the Somme and had little effect until used en masse the following year.

However, tanks did not immeditately revolutionize warfare. Historian Ernest Swinton described the role of the tank as “purely auxiliary to the infantry, and are intended to sweep away the obstructions that have hitherto stopped the advance of our infantry beyond the Germans’ first line and cannot with certainty be disposed of by shell fire.”  Tanks were certainly an effective weapon in breaking trench lines, but were not independently decisive. Swinton’s description was mostly accurate, except for the part about destruction by artillery. While the tanks were heavily armoured, they were exceedingly slow, and moving over rough terrain slowed them further, making them easy targets for artillery. Indeed, many tanks were destroyed before generals realized that they could only be truly effective if working in cooperation with infantry and artillery.  

However, tanks did not immeditately revolutionize warfare. Historian Ernest Swinton described the role of the tank as “purely auxiliary to the infantry, and are intended to sweep away the obstructions that have hitherto stopped the advance of our infantry beyond the Germans’ first line and cannot with certainty be disposed of by shell fire.”  Tanks were certainly an effective weapon in breaking trench lines, but were not independently decisive. Swinton’s description was mostly accurate, except for the part about destruction by artillery. While the tanks were heavily armoured, they were exceedingly slow, and moving over rough terrain slowed them further, making them easy targets for artillery. Indeed, many tanks were destroyed before generals realized that they could only be truly effective if working in cooperation with infantry and artillery.  

There was one area in which tanks could be said to be the most important, that being psychological warfare. German officers recorded that their troops “felt powerless to stop the tanks,” and while this is not entirely true, the tank was a formidable-looking machine. Military theorist and historian General J.F.C. Fuller notes that the tank was “a psychological, more so than a material weapon.” This concept, of the tank as a fast-moving weapon suited to destroying an enemy's will to fight by psychological shock, was to be developed between WWI and WWII by Fuller, Basil Liddell-Hart, Georgi Zhukov, Konstantin Rokossovskiy and Heinz Guderian, culminating in the manouevre warfare doctrine used by Germany in WWII and NATO up to the present day.

There was one area in which tanks could be said to be the most important, that being psychological warfare. German officers recorded that their troops “felt powerless to stop the tanks,” and while this is not entirely true, the tank was a formidable-looking machine. Military theorist and historian General J.F.C. Fuller notes that the tank was “a psychological, more so than a material weapon.” This concept, of the tank as a fast-moving weapon suited to destroying an enemy's will to fight by psychological shock, was to be developed between WWI and WWII by Fuller, [[Basil Liddell-Hart]], [[Georgi Zhukov]], [[Konstantin Rokossovskiy]] and [[Heinz Guderian]], culminating in the manouevre warfare doctrine used by Germany in WWII and [[NATO]] up to the present day.

===War in the East===

===War in the East===