Changes

However, tanks did not immeditately revolutionize warfare. Historian Ernest Swinton described the role of the tank as “purely auxiliary to the infantry, and are intended to sweep away the obstructions that have hitherto stopped the advance of our infantry beyond the Germans’ first line and cannot with certainty be disposed of by shell fire.”  Tanks were certainly an effective weapon in breaking trench lines, but were not independently decisive. Swinton’s description was mostly accurate, except for the part about destruction by artillery. While the tanks were heavily armoured, they were exceedingly slow, and moving over rough terrain slowed them further, making them easy targets for artillery. Indeed, many tanks were destroyed before generals realized that they could only be truly effective if working in cooperation with infantry and artillery.  

However, tanks did not immeditately revolutionize warfare. Historian Ernest Swinton described the role of the tank as “purely auxiliary to the infantry, and are intended to sweep away the obstructions that have hitherto stopped the advance of our infantry beyond the Germans’ first line and cannot with certainty be disposed of by shell fire.”  Tanks were certainly an effective weapon in breaking trench lines, but were not independently decisive. Swinton’s description was mostly accurate, except for the part about destruction by artillery. While the tanks were heavily armoured, they were exceedingly slow, and moving over rough terrain slowed them further, making them easy targets for artillery. Indeed, many tanks were destroyed before generals realized that they could only be truly effective if working in cooperation with infantry and artillery.  

There was one area in which tanks could be said to be the most important, that being psychological warfare. German officers recorded that their troops “felt powerless to stop the tanks,” and while this is not entirely true, the tank was a formidable-looking machine. Military theorist and historian General J.F.C. Fuller notes that the tank was “a psychological, more so than a material weapon.” This concept, of the tank as a fast-moving weapon suited to destroying an enemy's will to fight by psychological shock, was to be developed between WWI and WWII by Fuller, [[Basil Liddell-Hart]], [[Georgi Zhukov]], [[Konstantin Rokossovskiy]] and [[Heinz Guderian]], culminating in the manouevre warfare doctrine used by Germany in WWII and [[NATO]] up to the present day.

There was one area in which tanks could be said to be the most important, that being [[psychological warfare]]. German officers recorded that their troops “felt powerless to stop the tanks,” and while this is not entirely true, the tank was a formidable-looking machine. Military theorist and historian General J.F.C. Fuller notes that the tank was “a psychological, more so than a material weapon.” This concept, of the tank as a fast-moving weapon suited to destroying an enemy's will to fight by psychological shock, was to be developed between WWI and WWII by Fuller, [[Basil Liddell-Hart]], [[Georgi Zhukov]], [[Konstantin Rokossovskiy]] and [[Heinz Guderian]], culminating in the manouevre warfare doctrine used by Germany in WWII and [[NATO]] up to the present day.

===War in the East===

===War in the East===