Changes

On November 18, 1941, Secretary Morgenthau sent to Hull a long memorandum drafted by White with reference to the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan.<ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>

On November 18, 1941, Secretary Morgenthau sent to Hull a long memorandum drafted by White with reference to the terms for peace that should be presented to Japan.<ref>Memorandum by Secretary Morgenthau, November 17, 1941, Foreign Relations, 1941, IV, pp. 606-613. Dr. Kubek in 1959 wrote "at this time is altogether improbable" that White would have acted in collaboration with Currie and one of the Hiss brothers whom he was known to have a relationship, or "at their instigation."  This is in keeping with the version of events told by Vitali Pavlov in 1995 that White received through him directions from Moscow. Kubek further adds White heard his draft was being tampered with in the State Department where the Hiss brothers worked and wished to have the tampering stopped. ''Communism at Pearl Harbor'', Kubek, 1959, pg. 19.</ref>

'''Institute of Pacific Relations'''

===Institute of Pacific Relations===

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative [[Owen Lattimore]], whom FDR appointed special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]] at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence  Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the intransigent ultimatum when Congress investigated the Pearl Harbor attack.<ref>Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>

Pressure exerted by the Institute of Pacific Relations must also be taken into account. On November 25, Soviet operative [[Owen Lattimore]], whom FDR appointed special advisor to [[Chiang Kai-shek]] at Currie's behest, dispatched an anxious cable to Currie arguing against any agreement between the United States and Japan.  Currie's assistant in the White House, [[Michael Greenberg]], was another Soviet operative and part of the Silvermaster spy organization.<ref>[[Elizabeth Bentley]]'s testimony in Institute of Pacific Relations, Hearings, Part 2, Exhibit No. 1ll, 112, pp. 433-434.</ref> Hull testified later he took a tough line with the Japanese because of the cable from Lattimore to Currie reporting on Chinese morale in the Kuomintang. The cable from Lattimore to Currie was the only documentary evidence  Hull presented which influenced his decision to reverse himself and send the intransigent ultimatum when Congress investigated the Pearl Harbor attack.<ref>Testimony of Cordell Hull, November 23, 1945. Pearl Harbor Attack, Part 2, 434-435 and Unnumbered Volume, pp. 36-37.</ref>