The September 2024 Kiel Report stated that [[Russian]] military industrial capacities rose strongly in 2022 and 2023, well beyond the levels of Russian material losses in [[Ukraine]]. Meanwhile, the build-up of [[German]] capacities progressed slowly. Germany not only has not expanded weapons procurement, but in fact on some key systems it is experiencing a net loss in materiel. Given Germany's disarmament in recent decades and the current procurement speed, the Kiel Institute found that for some key [[weapon]] systems, Germany will not attain 2004 levels of armament for about 100 years.<ref>https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/1f9c7f5f-15d2-45c4-8b85-9bb550cd449d-Kiel_Report_no1.pdf</ref> | The September 2024 Kiel Report stated that [[Russian]] military industrial capacities rose strongly in 2022 and 2023, well beyond the levels of Russian material losses in [[Ukraine]]. Meanwhile, the build-up of [[German]] capacities progressed slowly. Germany not only has not expanded weapons procurement, but in fact on some key systems it is experiencing a net loss in materiel. Given Germany's disarmament in recent decades and the current procurement speed, the Kiel Institute found that for some key [[weapon]] systems, Germany will not attain 2004 levels of armament for about 100 years.<ref>https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/1f9c7f5f-15d2-45c4-8b85-9bb550cd449d-Kiel_Report_no1.pdf</ref> |