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→Kiel Institute
The [[Kiel Institute]], a German [[think tank]], was the only organization attempting to track the blank check Congress wrote to Ukraine in 2022. Their numbers include all aid from January 24, 2022 to October 3, 2022. According to Kiel, in that time period the U.S. transferred military and non-military aid worth $54.43 billion to the [[Zelensky regime]].<ref>https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/</ref>
The [[Kiel Institute]], a German [[think tank]], was the only organization attempting to track the blank check Congress wrote to Ukraine in 2022. Their numbers include all aid from January 24, 2022 to October 3, 2022. According to Kiel, in that time period the U.S. transferred military and non-military aid worth $54.43 billion to the [[Zelensky regime]].<ref>https://www.ifw-kiel.de/topics/war-against-ukraine/ukraine-support-tracker/</ref>
The September 2024 Kiel Report stated that suggests that the overall picture for [[Germany]], [[Europe]] and the [[United States]], is grim. The bottom line is that despite all the [[NATO]] [[war]] talk, NATO (including the United States) is not ready for any conflict with [[Russia]].<ref>https://weapons.substack.com/p/a-disturbing-study-makes-it-clear</ref> The [[Russian]] military industrial capacities rose strongly in 2022 and 2023, well beyond the levels of Russian material losses in [[Ukraine]]. Meanwhile, the build-up of [[German]] capacities progressed slowly. Germany not only has not expanded weapons procurement, but in fact on some key systems it is experiencing a net loss in materiel. Given Germany's disarmament in recent decades and the current procurement speed, the Kiel Institute found that for some key [[weapon]] systems, Germany will not attain 2004 levels of armament for about 100 years.<ref>https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/1f9c7f5f-15d2-45c4-8b85-9bb550cd449d-Kiel_Report_no1.pdf</ref>
The September 2024 Kiel Report stated that the overall picture for [[Germany]], [[Europe]] and the [[United States]], is grim. The bottom line is that despite all the [[NATO]] [[war]] talk, NATO (including the United States) is not ready for any conflict with [[Russia]].<ref>https://weapons.substack.com/p/a-disturbing-study-makes-it-clear</ref> The [[Russian]] military industrial capacities rose strongly in 2022 and 2023, well beyond the levels of Russian material losses in [[Ukraine]]. Meanwhile, the build-up of [[German]] capacities progressed slowly. Germany not only has not expanded weapons procurement, but in fact on some key systems it is experiencing a net loss in materiel. Given Germany's disarmament in recent decades and the current procurement speed, the Kiel Institute found that for some key [[weapon]] systems, Germany will not attain 2004 levels of armament for about 100 years.<ref>https://www.ifw-kiel.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/IfW-Publications/fis-import/1f9c7f5f-15d2-45c4-8b85-9bb550cd449d-Kiel_Report_no1.pdf</ref>
Russian production capacities are so large that they can produce the entire stock of the [[Bundeswehr]] in just over six months. Russia has significantly increased its production capacities for important weapons systems, for example doubling its production of long-range air defense systems and tripling its production of [[tank]]s.
Russian production capacities are so large that they can produce the entire stock of the [[Bundeswehr]] in just over six months. Russia has significantly increased its production capacities for important weapons systems, for example doubling its production of long-range air defense systems and tripling its production of [[tank]]s.