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| | *private agreements | | *private agreements |
| | *civil liability | | *civil liability |
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| | + | == Ohio == |
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| | + | Prior to ''[[Dobbs]]''' overruling ''[[Roe v. Wade]]'', Ohio held that a unmarried father did not have a right in a decision about [[abortion]]: |
| | + | {{cquote|We will address first Hacker's argument that it is unconstitutional for the decision about abortion and adoption to belong only to the mother of the child. |
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| | + | We turn first to the issue of "choice". Hacker does not contest that, during the early stages of pregnancy, a woman has a right to decide whether to obtain an abortion. See, generally, Casey v. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania (1992), 505 U.S. 833, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (right to obtain abortion); Maher v. Roe (1977), 432 U.S. 464, 472, 97 S. Ct. 2376, 53 L. Ed. 2d 484 (right to carry fetus to term). He argues, however, that this "right to choose" should belong equally to the pregnant woman and to that woman's sexual partner. |
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| | + | The decision of whether to carry a fetus to term can never be an equal one when the parties disagree. It is a simple biological fact that, in this circumstance, the wishes of only one party must prevail. "Inasmuch as it is the woman who physically bears the child and who is the more directly and immediately affected by the pregnancy, as between the two [the woman and the man], the balance weighs in her favor." Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth (1976), 428 U.S. 52, 71, 96 S. Ct. 2831, 2842, 49 L. Ed. 2d 788. |
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| | + | In Danforth, supra, the Supreme Court addressed and disposed of Hacker's "equal choice" argument, holding that the spouse of a pregnant woman can not compel or forbid his wife to terminate her pregnancy. The Court reasoned that the state cannot delegate to a spouse a veto power which the state itself is prohibited from exercising. |
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| | + | Since the highest court of the land has refused to recognize that the husband of a pregnant woman has the right to compel or forbid abortion, we most assuredly do not find that a nonmarital partner has this right. See People ex rel. S.P.B. (Colo.1982), 651 P.2d 1213.}} |
| | + | ''Bryant v. Hacker'', 116 Ohio App. 3d 860, 863-64, 689 N.E.2d 609, 611 (1996) (footnotes omitted). |
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| | + | Many of the above decisions have been implicitly overruled by ''Dobbs''. |
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| | + | == Tennessee == |
| | + | {{cquote|Tennessee paternity actions do not abridge a putative father's right to procreational autonomy, because such actions do not interfere with the determination of whether to father a child. Any private wrong or other such unfair treatment that previously interfered with a man's procreational autonomy "does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." 449 N.E.2d at 716. Accordingly, we hold that Tennessee's paternity statutes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy.}} |
| | + | ''Sorrel v. Henson'', Appeal No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 852, at *11 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998). |
| | [[category:abortion]] | | [[category:abortion]] |