Changes

Jump to navigation Jump to search
→‎Tennessee: right of procreational autonomy
Line 24: Line 24:     
== Tennessee ==
 
== Tennessee ==
 +
Tennessee recognizes a right of procreational autonomy in a father, which may depend on an agreement with the mother concerning an embryo:
 +
{{cquote|In summary, we hold that disputes involving the disposition of preembryos produced by in vitro fertilization should be resolved, first, by looking to the preferences of the progenitors. If their wishes cannot be ascertained, or if there is dispute, then their prior agreement concerning disposition should be carried out. If no prior agreement exists, then the relative interests of the parties in using or not using the preembryos must be weighed. Ordinarily, the party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by means other than use of the preembryos in question. If no other reasonable alternatives exist, then the argument in favor of using the preembryos to achieve pregnancy should be considered. However, if the party seeking control of the preembryos intends merely to donate them to another couple, the objecting party obviously has the greater interest and should prevail.
 +
 +
But the rule does not contemplate the creation of an automatic veto, and in affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, we would not wish to be interpreted as so holding.}}
 +
''Davis v. Davis'', 842 S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992)
 
{{cquote|Tennessee paternity actions do not abridge a putative father's right to procreational autonomy, because such actions do not interfere with the determination of whether to father a child. Any private wrong or other such unfair treatment that previously interfered with a man's procreational autonomy "does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." 449 N.E.2d at 716. Accordingly, we hold that Tennessee's paternity statutes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy.}}
 
{{cquote|Tennessee paternity actions do not abridge a putative father's right to procreational autonomy, because such actions do not interfere with the determination of whether to father a child. Any private wrong or other such unfair treatment that previously interfered with a man's procreational autonomy "does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation." 449 N.E.2d at 716. Accordingly, we hold that Tennessee's paternity statutes do not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy.}}
 
''Sorrel v. Henson'', Appeal No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 852, at *11 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
 
''Sorrel v. Henson'', Appeal No. 02A01-9609-JV-00212, 1998 Tenn. App. LEXIS 852, at *11 (Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1998).
 
[[category:abortion]]
 
[[category:abortion]]
Anthony, Irenaeus, Siteadmin, apieditor, Bureaucrats, Check users, nsAm_Govt_101RO, nsAm_Govt_101RW, nsAm_Govt_101_ta, nsJudgesRO, nsJudgesRW, nsJudges_talkRO, nsJudges_talkRW, nsTeam2RO, nsTeam2RW, nsTeam2_talkRO, nsTeam2_talkRW, oversight, Administrators
126,538

edits

Navigation menu