Changes

The document lists a number of threats that Russia might face and circumstances under which it might consider the use of nuclear weapons. It indicates that Russia could respond with nuclear weapons when it has received “reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies” and in response to the “use of [[nuclear weapon]]s or other types of [[weapons of mass destruction]] by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” Paragraph 19c of the Basic Principles states Russia could also respond with nuclear weapons following an “attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions. This effectively means any interference of any kind against civilian or military infrastructure, which would undermine nuclear retaliation capability.<ref>[https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sitrep-52424-situation-turns-critical SITREP 5/24/24: Situation Turns Critical as De-legitimized Zelensky Dangerously Escalates], SIMPLICIUS, MAY 25, 2024. simplicius76.substack.com</ref> And finally “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

The document lists a number of threats that Russia might face and circumstances under which it might consider the use of nuclear weapons. It indicates that Russia could respond with nuclear weapons when it has received “reliable data on a launch of ballistic missiles attacking the territory of the Russian Federation and/or its allies” and in response to the “use of [[nuclear weapon]]s or other types of [[weapons of mass destruction]] by an adversary against the Russian Federation and/or its allies.” Paragraph 19c of the Basic Principles states Russia could also respond with nuclear weapons following an “attack by adversary against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions. This effectively means any interference of any kind against civilian or military infrastructure, which would undermine nuclear retaliation capability.<ref>[https://simplicius76.substack.com/p/sitrep-52424-situation-turns-critical SITREP 5/24/24: Situation Turns Critical as De-legitimized Zelensky Dangerously Escalates], SIMPLICIUS, MAY 25, 2024. simplicius76.substack.com</ref> And finally “aggression against the Russian Federation with the use of conventional weapons when the very existence of the state is in jeopardy.”

As with previous official statements, this document does not call for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons during conventional conflicts. But it does not completely resolve the question of whether Russia would escalate to nuclear use if it were losing a conventional war. It notes that, “in the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an escalation of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”

As with previous official statements, this document does not call for the preemptive use of nuclear weapons during conventional conflicts. But it does not completely resolve the question of whether Russia would escalate to nuclear use if it were losing a conventional war. It notes that, “in the event of a military conflict, this Policy provides for the prevention of an [[escalation]] of military actions and their termination on conditions that are acceptable for the Russian Federation and/or its allies.”

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