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Line 141: − [[File:Hugo Chávez on USS Yorktown 2002.jpg|thumb|left|Hugo Chávez on USS Yorktown, 2002.]]+ − + Line 158:
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→Relations with the United States
====Relations with the United States====
====Relations with the United States====
U.S.-Venezuelan relations have been tense in recent years. President Hugo Chávez continuously defined himself in opposition to the United States, using inflammatory rhetoric to insult [[President George W. Bush]] and senior administration officials. For example, in his September 2006 speech to the [[UN General Assembly]], President Chávez called President Bush "the Devil" and other offensive names. The [[United States]] continued to seek constructive engagement with the Venezuelan Government, focusing on areas of technical cooperation. Major U.S. interests in Venezuela include promotion of U.S. [[export]]s and protection of U.S. investment, preservation of Venezuela's government, closer counter-[[narcotic]]s cooperation, more vigorous efforts on counterterrorism, and continued access to [[petroleum]] imports from Venezuala.
U.S.-Venezuelan relations have been tense in recent years. President Hugo Chávez continuously defined himself in opposition to the United States, using inflammatory rhetoric to insult [[President George W. Bush]] and senior administration officials. For example, in his September 2006 speech to the [[UN General Assembly]], President Chávez called President Bush "the Devil" and other offensive names. The [[United States]] continued to seek constructive engagement with the Venezuelan Government, focusing on areas of technical cooperation. Major U.S. interests in Venezuela include promotion of U.S. [[export]]s and protection of U.S. investment, preservation of Venezuela's government, closer counter-[[narcotic]]s cooperation, more vigorous efforts on counterterrorism, and continued access to [[petroleum]] imports from Venezuala.
[[File:Hugo Chávez on USS Yorktown 2002.jpg|thumb|right|Hugo Chávez on USS Yorktown, 2002.]]
U.S.-Venezuelan commercial ties are deep. As of 2006 the United States was Venezuela's most important trading partner, representing about a third of imports and approximately 60 percent of Venezuelan exports. In turn, Venezuela is the United States' third-largest export market in Latin America, purchasing U.S. machinery, transportation equipment, agricultural commodities, and auto parts. Venezuela's opening of its petroleum sector to foreign investment in 1996 created extensive trade and investment opportunities for U.S. companies. As a result, Venezuela became one of the top four suppliers of foreign [[oil]] to the United States. The [[US Department of State]] is committed to promoting the interests of U.S. companies in overseas markets.
U.S.-Venezuelan commercial ties are deep. As of 2006 the United States was Venezuela's most important trading partner, representing about a third of imports and approximately 60 percent of Venezuelan exports. In turn, Venezuela is the United States' third-largest export market in Latin America, purchasing U.S. machinery, transportation equipment, agricultural commodities, and auto parts. Venezuela's opening of its petroleum sector to foreign investment in 1996 created extensive trade and investment opportunities for U.S. companies. As a result, Venezuela became one of the top four suppliers of foreign [[oil]] to the United States. The [[US Department of State]] is committed to promoting the interests of U.S. companies in overseas markets.
'''2025 tensions'''
'''2025 tensions'''
[[File:Photo 2025-09-01 12-51-22.jpg|right|300px|thumb|]]
[[File:Photo 2025-09-01 12-51-22.jpg|right|300px|thumb|]]
In August 2025 the [[United States]] assembled a strike package off the coast of Venezuela, capable of launching at least 268 [[Tomahawk cruise missile]]s, as well as amphibious assault ships capable of landing around 4,000 [[U.S. Marines]]. The warships represented ~12% of the entire [[U.S. Navy]] then at sea.
In August 2025 the [[United States]] assembled a strike package off the coast of Venezuela, capable of launching at least 268 [[Tomahawk cruise missile]]s, as well as amphibious assault ships capable of landing around 4,000 [[U.S. Marines]]. The warships represented ~12% of the entire [[U.S. Navy]] then at sea. The operational cost of the strike force standing idly by was $18 million per day or more than half of a Billion [[dollar]]s per month.